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Expert Analysis: What Really Caused The Crimea Bridge to Come Down

The Only Physical Link Between Crimea and Russia

In 2014 Vladimir Putin’s government illegally annexed Crimea as part of Russia. By 2018 he had built the longest bridge in Europe to physically connect the two land masses. This was a solid symbol of Russian domination. A $3.7 billion USD symbol. To make matters even clearer, Putin personally drove one of the first trucks over the structure the day it was opened. It’s like a dog peeing on something to claim ownership.

The bridge, of course, is of enormous practical importance. It plays a critical role in getting supplies from Russia, through Crimea, to Russian troops fighting in the Kherson region of Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin prepares to buckle up to drive one of the first trucks across the Crimean Bridge in 2018. Screenshot from YouTube and Wall Street Journal

On October 8th, at about 0600 local time, an enormous explosion severely damaged the Crimea (or, as it is sometimes called, Kerch) Bridge. Because of its strategic importance, the bridge is one of the most secure structures in the world. Security cameras cover almost every inch.

Please watch the footage below made available through Twitter and Russian Media Monitor. Carefully watch the truck in the right-hand lane toward the center of your screen. Many believe it is the main cause of the damage. At the 0:17 mark, it seems to vaporize, causing a huge fireball severely damaging rail cars on the adjacent railway. Coincidentally, all seven of them were full of fuel.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reports that an initial bomb damage assessment shows one lane of the road bridge to be collapsed and damage to the nearby railway track. The Russian Investigative Committee quickly surveyed the damage, and they concluded that a truck had exploded on the bridge and ignited the fuel-laden railway cars. Almost immediately, though, Russia sent divers to examine the structural integrity of the bridge supports underwater.

For the record, I do not believe the truck was what brought the bridge down. No way, and I’ll explain why.

Here we see a satellite photo of the final damage. You’ll note that the roadway between two spans has been dropped into the sea. Screenshot from YouTube and CNN

However, if the truck was the primary explosive device, we would see a hole in the middle of the road. None was evident. The structure collapsed into pieces and fell.

The bridge has dropped in multiple pieces, indicating a probable blast from below. Screenshot from YouTube and WSJ

The detonation of high explosives above the surface of the bridge, as has been claimed by the Russians, would have sent the majority of the blast force up and away from the truck. However, as noted above, that would cause a massive hole in the roadway and extensive scorching of the highway’s surface. What little we see of damage to the road’s surface is likely from the fire from the railway cars that were full of fuel. In addition, modern bridges are made to withstand accidents in the unlikely event that a truck carrying explosive cargo may ignite.

No, ladies and gentlemen, this blast came from below.

A waterborne object is picked up on a security camera immediately before the explosion. Screenshot from YouTube and WSJ.

By All Indications, an SOF Operation

Obviously, the Russians did not take out their own multi-billion dollar bridge and main supply line to a war they are currently fighting. The Ukrainians did this. But, they do not have weapons with the range to even come close to hitting the Crimea bridge from Ukraine. The HIMARS weapons systems we have provided to them could only cover a fraction of the hundreds of miles from Ukraine to the damaged bridge.

Sky News explains how the Crimea, or Kerch Bridge is a pivotal link to getting people and supplies from Russia to Crimea and through Ukraine to the Kherson region. This image also gives us an excellent idea of how far the bridge is from Ukraine. Screenshot from YouTube and Sky News

In my opinion, and you’ve probably read it here first, this was the result of a highly successful special operations forces mission. Mark my words: one day, a movie will be made about this. This operation took place deep behind enemy lines in Russian territory. Operators infiltrated the area with the highest degree of secrecy, bringing hundreds of pounds of high explosives. Whoever did was was good, very good. To say that the Russians are watching this bridge carefully would be an understatement.

I believe the explosion(s) came from under the bridge, with shaped charges likely being placed on the supporting structures. Who would have placed those explosives? Again, I can only speculate, but my money is on Ukrainian troops from the 73rd Naval Special Purpose Center. These are special forces units of the Ukrainian Naval Infantry, their version of our US Navy SEALs or British SBS. The exact details of their equipment are classified, but it is known to be highly sophisticated and comparable to what we have in the west. And keep in mind that US Special Operations Command Europe kept training the Ukrainians until the beginning of the war.

The Ukrainian 73rd has swimmer delivery vehicles (SDVs) and DPDs (diver propulsion devices) to get their combat divers where they need to be. The SDV can best be described as a mini-sub, about 22 feet long, with an electric motor and single screw propeller. High-frequency sonar and a doppler inertial navigation system get the Team and their gear where they need to be silently. They are often deployed from and may be retrieved by submarines. That’s one potential scenario for successful infiltration and exfiltration.

Unit patch from the Ukrainian 73rd Naval Special Operations Center

 

Regardless of exactly how they did it, the SOF made logistical issues for Russia in their war with Ukraine (especially in the Kherson region) much more difficult. Refer to the map above from Sky News. It shows how supplies, equipment, and troops were getting from the motherland to the Kherson region of Ukraine through annexed Crimea utilizing the 12-mile-long Crimea (Kerch) bridge. Now that they can’t do that, materiel will have to be moved by sea to the Ukrainian port cities of Berdyansk and Mariupol and trucked hundreds of miles through enemy territory to its destination.

The Russians, of course, will move to repair the bridge as quickly as possible. Still, I wager that the damage will buy the Ukrainians at least two or three weeks of valuable time where the already undersupplied Russian forces will receive very little or no support.

This is an enormous blow to the Russians, on par with the Ukrainian sinking of the Moskva. A sound tactical victory and one hell of a morale booster. “Look at what we can do,” they are telling the Kremlin, giving the middle finger directly to Putin. To his credit, Mr. Putin isn’t stupid, never said he was. Shortly after the attacks, he gave a speech stating how he views this as a terrorist attack against his country and, “The authors, perpetrators and those who ordered it are the special services of Ukraine.” As a former KGB man, he knows this and is currently doing his best to take revenge against the citizens of Ukraine because he has been made to look so bad.

My hope is that the armed forces of Ukraine will take full advantage of this situation to push Russian forces from the Kherson region. The New York Times just yesterday reported on increasingly lowered enemy morale and a general retreat from the area.

Author’s Note: Many thanks to the Wall Street Journal and their chief correspondent on the ground in Ukraine, Yaroslav Trofimov, for making the insightful YouTube video presented above. They seem to be of the same mind that we are, that this was not solely the work of a truck bomb and definitely not caused by a missile strike.

SOF Theory: Multi-Domain Operational Design and Approach is the Future

Members of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) are entrusted with various operations, including but not limited to frontline combat and terrorist operations, the liberation of hostages, provision of humanitarian assistance, and much more. But should traditional, straight-forward force be the core of SOF? 

The United States Special Operations Command (USSCOM), with its head office located at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Fla., is responsible for coordinating the operations of the incredibly competent and frequently undercover organization of military soldiers who are deployed all over the world.

With its history of triumph on the battlefield, SOF has been a subject of theories about whether the forces generate the so-called “fog of war” or it ultimately conducts “military statecraft.” This leads to the theory of SOF, which crafts a functional design that works to its advantage for succeeding operations and ensures the strengthening of its forces against potential risks. 

Special Forces Soldiers from four NATO countries observe targets on a firing range at the Grafenwoehr Training Area during a Judging Distance (JD) exercise on July 24. JD exercises, a common aspect of sniper training conducted by the International Special Training Centre (ISTC), are undertaken nearly daily and provide Soldiers a better understanding of determining distance to the target with the naked eye and rifle scope. The ISTC is sponsored by the 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC). (Source: Staff Sgt. Gina Vaile-Nelson, 133rd MPAD, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons)

These objectives suggest the primary components needed by SOF to radicalize their victory through a realistic design that enforces well-equipped troops, trained, and resolutely led armies to avoid the generation of “fog of war” from their side. In addition, SOF members receive training, education, and a skill set that is unparalleled in the military, allowing them to obscure the view of the opposing commander and influence their judgment to the point where it causes “operational paralysis.”

The 19th-century Military Theorists Carl von Clausewitz wrote in his famous piece, On War:

“The great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not infrequently — like the effect of a fog or moonshine — gives to things exaggerated dimensions and unnatural appearance.”

According to this concept, the fog of war is thought to be caused by special operations forces carrying out missions and operations outside the purview of the public eye. 

Multi-Domain Operational Design and Approach

Tech. Sgt. Brandon Tatum, Air Warfare Center chief of joint terminal attack control training, works with Pakistan commandos to locate and coordinate various targets of opportunity during a training scenario at a Pakistan military range, March 1, 2022. The partner nation training was part of Falcon Talon 2022, an Agile Combat Employment operation and the first bilateral training event between the U.S. and Pakistan since 2019. (Source: Capt. Monique Roux, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons)

Multi-Domain Operational Design and Approach

The Multi-Domain Operational Design and Approach focuses on three facets: Offensive Action, Support, and Financial Disruption. These are aimed at influencing the leadership and the forces accompanying it. The population from whom the enemy pulls its troops, whether by force or choice, is called the host population. They provide the financial and economic resources necessary to maintain the military.

Offensive action:

The enemy should be considered the centric Line of Operation or Effort in which human and technical assets, resources, and sources are employed to “exploit” the enemy’s location, organization, plans, and TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures). Offensive action uses available forces, not simply conventional military operations (Military, Governmental, and Commercial). So, theoretically, SOF planners and strategists should not limit Offensive Actions to military activities only. Ultimately, the purpose is to paralyze the enemy’s decision-making.

Support:

The active and passive supporters who give recruitment and resources are impacted by actions and efforts to erode the enemy’s faith and convert them towards neutrality.

This can be done by keeping the population, protecting civilians, creating economic opportunities, developing or repairing facilities, and assuring partner troops respect their populace.

This strategy contradicts the conventional understanding of the military’s role in society because it depends more on “soft power” than “hard power.” Statecraft is more applicable to special operations forces experts and operator dynamics than conventional warfare is, but modern warfare requires unconventional thinking and approach.

Lastly, financial disruption:

This concept elucidates the enemy’s survival ability through exodus, international donations, and state funding. Friendly nations and the Partner Nation must develop and implement this technique so the enemy cannot restore captured or damaged equipment and sustain military and propaganda activities.

Even while Special Operations Forces are working to improve partner capacity and train, advise, assist, and accompany operations, we must understand that these lines of operations need to be carried out as quickly and efficiently as possible. SOF’s effectiveness in its approach should be grounded on stable financial backing.

Getting Started with Multi-domain Ops

SOF Theory: Table created by Michael B. “Bulldog” Kelley and Greg E. Metzgar (Source: Smallwarsjournal)

The first thing that needs to be done to carry out Special Operations Forces Operational Design successfully is to concentrate on the intel and information that genuinely articulates the Operational Environment and the method of Joint Planning. 

The SOF planner is responsible for comprehending and accurately determining the “Centers of Gravity.” As argued in the report, deciding where the enemy’s center of gravity is critical.

The approach also notes that in today’s conflicts, special operations forces often find themselves pitted against an adversary whose tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are designed not to monopolize “key terrain” or to overpower and kill the enemy in large-scale conventional maneuvers,” but rather to decimate and bring down the “pillars of the state” to achieve a decisive win. 

Therefore, the terrain comprises the people, which includes both passive and active supporters, and the rural or urban ground over which it travels and operates. Ultimately, SOFs should be given access to information and intelligence as well as recruits and weapons, but most importantly, they need finance.

Gary Beikirch, Green Beret, Medal of Honor, Dies of Cancer at 74 

Green Beret and Medal of Honor recipient Gary Beikirch has died. He was 74 years old.

His daughter Stephanie announced Beikirch died shortly after 3 p.m. Sunday following a long battle with pancreatic cancer.

The Special Operations community has lost two of its heroes over the Christmas weekend. SEAL Team Six’s first commander Richard ‘Dick’ Marcinko, passed away on Christmas evening at 81.

The National Medal of Honor Museum released a statement on Beikirch’s passing.

“Gary was a true American hero. He displayed extraordinary courage on the battlefields of Vietnam and dedicated his life to encouraging and inspiring generations of Americans. As a counselor and man of deep faith, Gary touched and changed thousands of lives. The impact of his uplifting influence will be felt for years to come as his goodness lives on in those who know him. We offer our deepest sympathies to his family as they, together with America and the Medal of Honor community, grieve an amazing man.”

Beikirch with President Nixon and his mom at the MOH ceremony. US Army photo

On April 1, 1970, Beikirch showed incredible bravery during an attack on his Dak Seang A-Camp. He was exposing himself repeatedly to enemy fire to treat wounded comrades, despite his own serious wounds that President Nixon eventually awarded him the Medal of Honor. But his wartime service would haunt him upon returning home to the United States.

Beikirch was born on August 29, 1947, in Rochester, New York. After successfully completing two years of college, he withdrew from school to enlist in the Army to become a Special Forces trooper and go to Vietnam.

In August of 1967, he attended and successfully completed Basic and Advanced Infantry Training at Ft. Dix, NJ. That was followed by the Airborne Course at Ft. Benning, Ga. Beikirch then attended the Special Forces Qualification Course at Ft. Bragg, NC. After that, he completed the Special Forces Medical Sergeant Course and was shipped to Vietnam.

Beikirch deployed to Kontum Province, Vietnam, in July 1969. During his deployment, he was the medic for Detachment B-24 of the 5th Special Forces Group, assigned to the remote Montagnard village of Dak Seang in the central highlands of Vietnam. The camp was very remote, about 3 miles from the Laos border.

Beikirch, in an interview later, said that due to his affinity to the Montagnard people, he “went native,” living with the mountain people, and went days at a time without speaking any English. The SF A-Team with 12 men had about 500 Montagnard “strikers” who the Green Berets trained. The remainder of about 2300 personnel in the camp were civilians, mostly families of the men who were being trained and led by the Americans.

It was a strategy that worked well for the Americans Special Forces A-Teams. The Montagnard strikers fought much harder when their families were inside the isolated A-camps.

Beikirch in an official Army portrait. US Army photo

On April 1, 1970, three regiments of North Vietnamese troops numbering 10,000 began shelling Camp Dak Seang, intent on taking the camp. The North Vietnamese artillery pounded the camp, and Beikirch was wounded when shrapnel from a 122 mm rocket bruised his spinal column, he could not stand or walk.

The NVA artillery rounds hitting the camp had caused several casualties among the camp’s defenders. Unable to move on his own, Beikirch had his two Montagnard medical assistants carry him around the camp under heavy, intense fire to treat the wounded American and Vietnamese defenders.

Beikirch, with complete disregard for his own safety, moved out into the open while everyone else around him was ducking and hiding from the artillery. The “Bac-Si,” or doc as the tribesman called him, went down to the aid station where he assisted the other American medic until he collapsed.

Coming to, he urged the medic to help him up, where his Montagnard medics carried him from place to place in the compound. He then would help them get to the aid station. His love for and loyalty to his Montagnard partners was reciprocated. One of his tribesmen medics,  Dao, covered Beikirch with his own body at one point during the shelling getting killed in the process. He was just 15 years old.

Beikirch again refused treatment and continued searching for other casualties until he collapsed again. He said the last thing he remembered was the sight of a helicopter coming in. “And then I remember these hands, picking me up and throwing me into the chopper,” he said. The medics onboard the helicopter immediately stuck IVs in Beikirch, telling him he would be okay.

He was taken to Pleiku, then to Japan, and then finally to the Valley Forge Medical Center, where he remained for six months, recovering from his injuries. He exited the army and went back to college, majoring in pre-med after his experience, but the country wasn’t a great place for Vietnam veterans, especially the college campuses.

Spat on and called a baby killer, Beikirch had enough. He took off for the White Mountains in New Hampshire. His hair grew long, halfway down his back. He was living in a cave on Mount Washington as a hermit when he came down into town for supplies. He was told to wait for a call that evening.

“Is this Gary Beikirch who served with the 5th Special Forces in Vietnam?” the person asked. When Beikirch said that it was, he was told that he was being awarded the Medal of Honor. “It was things I was trying to forget,” he said. “It all came back.”

For his gallantry during the battle of Dak Seang, President Nixon awarded Sgt. Beikirch the Medal of Honor in 1973. He didn’t go out to celebrate that night. He stayed in his hotel room. The feelings of unworthiness and the horror of war flooded back to him. For many years, Beikirch didn’t participate in many of the other events that veterans and other Medal of Honor recipients participated in.

Beikirch in later years conducting an interview with the American Legion. YouTube photo

But as time passed, he became more at peace with it and frequently said that the Medal isn’t about him or anything that he did but represents men and women who value something so strongly that they are willing to die for it and be willing to defend our country for it. He became a counselor and helped thousands of others in his later life. 

It is, he said, a valuing of something greater than self.

Beikirch’s other awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star Medal; Bronze Star Medal; Purple Heart Medal with one oak leaf cluster; Good Conduct Medal; National Defense Service Medal; Vietnam Service Medal; Vietnam Campaign Medal; Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with silver star; Combat Medic Badge; Parachutist Badge; and Vietnamese jump wings.

Medal of Honor Citation:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty, Sgt. Beikirch, medical aidman, Detachment B-24, Company B, distinguished himself during the defense of Camp Dak Seang.

The allied defenders suffered a number of casualties as a result of an intense, devastating attack launched by the enemy from well-concealed positions surrounding the camp. Sgt. Beikirch, with complete disregard for his personal safety, moved unhesitatingly through the withering enemy fire to his fallen comrades, applied first aid to their wounds, and assisted them to the medical aid station.

When informed that a seriously injured American officer was lying in an exposed position, Sgt. Beikirch ran immediately through the hail of fire. Although he was wounded seriously by fragments from an exploding enemy mortar shell, Sgt. Beikirch carried the officer to a medical aid station. Ignoring his own serious injuries, Sgt. Beikirch left the relative safety of the medical bunker to search for and evacuate other men who had been injured. He was again wounded as he dragged a critically injured Vietnamese soldier to the medical bunker while simultaneously applying mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to sustain his life.

Sgt. Beikirch again refused treatment and continued his search for other casualties until he collapsed. Only then did he permit himself to be treated. Sgt. Beikirch’s complete devotion to the welfare of his comrades, at the risk of his life, is in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great credit on him, his unit, and the US Army.

Beikirch’s interview with the Medal of Honor Society can be seen here:

US Shoots Down Iranian Drone Flying Over Base In Southern Syria: Will The US Retaliate?

The U.S. military intercepted and shot down a small drone that was believed to be threatening a U.S. base in southern Syria Tuesday, just weeks after the same base was attacked by drones and rocket fire. It is believed to have been launched by Iranian proxy militias in the region. 

Capt. Bill Urban, the spokesman for U.S. Central Command, said that two drones or unmanned aerial systems (UAS) were tracked entering the airspace around Al-Tanf Garrison on Tuesday evening. “As one of the UAS continued its course deeper into the Al-Tanf Deconfliction Zone, it was assessed as demonstrating hostile intent and was shot down,” Urban said.

The drone was taken down by an air-to-air defense system. The second small drone turned and left the area. No casualties or damage to the facilities were reported. 

The al-Tanf base is in a strategic area near the Iraqi and Jordanian borders that includes the strategic M2 highway that enables Iranian-backed militias to travel all the way from Tehran to southern Lebanon. The U.S. troops at the base train Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to fight against ISIS fighters in the region.

Now the question remains, will the U.S. respond to this latest threat to U.S. troops and facilities in the region, or will there be more of the threats of retaliation with little action taken? 

Iranian drone during an army exercise dubbed ‘Zulfiqar 1400’, in the coastal area of the Gulf of Oman, Iran, in November. Iranian military photo-release

This is the second attack in weeks at al-Tanf. In an October 20 attack, five so-called “suicide drones” attacked the base, followed by rocket fire that damaged facilities at the base but resulted in no casualties among the U.S. troops. Thanks to a timely warning by Israeli intelligence, American troops were able to take cover, a big reason why there were no casualties. 

In that attack, the five drones crashed into the base. However, only two of the drones carrying a mixture of high explosives, shrapnel, and ball bearings exploded. The other three drones were examined and identified as being made in Iran. There was no doubt regardless of who was behind the attack when Iran proclaimed the attack as “a major success” and threatened more attacks would follow. 

The Iranian government denied any involvement, claiming that there was no proof of Iranian involvement. However, a site run by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) said the strike was a response to the U.S. allowing Israeli attacks on “resistance” forces in eastern Syria. Militia commanders, it said, concluded that they “must pull the teeth of the snake.”

American officials were reluctant to disclose further details of the attack. The Pentagon carefully worded the report as to not specifically accuse Iran, which may be due in part to politics. Direct accusations against Iran could derail talks to restart The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal with Iran, which the Biden administration has made a priority. 

After the October 20 attack, Captain Urban characterized it as “coordinated and deliberate” and threatened that the U.S. would respond “at a time and place of our choosing.” Now, nearly two months later, more threatening actions have occurred, and U.S. lives were at risk.

Damage to U.S. al-Tanf base in Syria after drone/rocket attack on October 20. Aurora Intel photo

American officials told the New York Times a month ago that Iran attacked al-Tanf as a result of Israeli missile attacks on weapons warehouses in Syria but was reluctant to attack Israel for fear of retaliation. So, they did the next best thing —  conduct a drone and rocket strike against the Americans. That is the part of the situation that Washington needs to examine much more closely.  

The Iranian proxy militias, now calling themselves the “Allies of Syria,” were reluctant to respond to Israel directly. They knew that the Israeli response would come quickly and be massive. That is what deterrence is all about. So they attacked an American base. Why? Because they didn’t fear any retaliation because the current administration is dead set on getting the JCPOA reinstated, even though Iran has long since exceeded the nuclear limits set by the agreement. 

That isn’t deterrence but shows what adversaries perceive as weakness. And that perceived weakness can result in more attacks on U.S. bases and personnel. Washington ignored the October 20 attack to entice Iran back to the negotiating table. This latest air incursion on al-Tanf will only embolden our adversaries further. 

After the chaotic and horribly conducted withdrawal from Afghanistan, the U.S. resolve has been called into question. And this is just another test of the American resolve or lack of it. 

“Operation Greif” German Special Operation During the Battle of the Bulge

The Battle of the Bulge began on December 16, 1944, when two Panzer armies, comprising most of the German armored reserve, crashed into a lightly defended sector of the American lines in the Ardennes Forest. 

The overly ambitious plan by Adolf Hitler was to split the American and British armies in two and race to the port of Antwerp. Hitler’s generals knew the plan had zero chance of ever succeeding. While the Germans made big gains in the opening days, punching a “bulge” deep into the American lines, tremendous resistance at the Elsenborn Ridge in the north and Bastogne in the south slowed the advance to a crawl. 

One of the other ambitious parts of the German plan was “Operation Greif.” It is a German special operation designed to seize bridges over the Meuse River, destroy American ammunition and fuel dumps, and reroute Allied units by having German soldiers posing as American troops while wearing American uniforms.

Operation Greif was commanded by SS Obersturmbannführer (Lieutenant Colonel) Otto Skorzeny, who was already known as “the most dangerous man in Europe.” The actual accomplishments of Operation Greif were few. However, the panic that Skorzeny caused among the Allies on the Western Front was vast and continued for several months afterward. 

Skorzeny – The Ultimate Nazi Special Operator: 

Otto Skorzeny was born in Vienna in 1908. He lived in a lower-middle-class family in Austria, although his forebears originally came from Poland. While pursuing an engineering degree, Skorzeny developed a fearsome reputation in the dueling societies that gave him the characteristic scar on his cheek. He fought in at least 15 duels. 

In 1938, during the German unification with Austria, Skorzeny came across Nazi roughnecks trying to kill Austrian President Miklas. He stopped them, and soon word spread in Germany about the 6’4 Austrian who possessed the makings of a fighter that they could rely on. 

When war broke out in 1939, Skorzeny joined the Waffen SS and fought with distinction on the Eastern Front after the invasion of the Soviet Union. He was wounded in the head by shrapnel and sent to Berlin to recuperate and became a staff officer. 

While there, he worked on concepts to create a German unconventional commando unit. He led the training and was named the commander of the unit. In 1943, he led the daring commando raid in Italy at the Campo Imperatore Hotel, a ski resort at Campo Imperatore in Italy’s Gran Sasso massif, high in the Apennine Mountains. His mission was to rescue Benito Mussolini, who had been deposed and held prisoner. 

Skorzeny’s men landed by glider in a dangerous move on top of the mountain and captured all 200 guards without firing a shot. In just 10 minutes, Mussolini was freed, and Skorzeny accompanied Mussolini to Germany for an audience with Hitler. 

Hitler personally selected Skorzeny to lead Operation Greif (which means Griffin in German). The word went out to all German units calling for volunteers that could speak English and knew American slang. At this point in the war the German Army may have been running short of English speaking troops or those that did speak English weren’t all that keen to “volunteer” for a risky operation, the result was that Skorzeny’s unit did not draw nearly enough English speaking troops as he had hoped. Skorzeny would end up with only ten men who spoke English like native speakers. In desperation, Skorzeny would send some of his men to POW camps holding American prisoners to brush up on the English.

This later proved to be a fatal flaw in Operation Greif, 

The Plan: 

Skorzeny’s men (the 150th Panzer-Brigade) were split into teams with a demolition group responsible for blowing bridges, ammo, and fuel dumps, a reconnaissance element reporting enemy troop movements, and a lead commando group who would be in charge of cutting telephone wires, disrupting enemy communications, and reversing road signs. The concept of the plan was for Skorzeny’s men to wear American Army uniforms employ captured U.S. jeeps to go behind U.S. lines and sow chaos and confusion.  Skorzeny’s men knew that under the rules of war if they were captured by the Americans in these uniforms they would be summarily executed.  There was also the very real risk that they would be shot at by their own side as well if they came back into contact with SS troops who mistook them for actual American soldiers in the fog of battle.

Getting the necessary uniforms, weapons, and equipment was a huge issue. So was the procurement of American tanks and other vehicles. The Germans disguised Panther tanks to resemble American M-10 tank destroyers since only one Sherman tank was available. 

His men were assigned to the 1st SS Panzer Corps under the command of Joachim Peiper. His men were to follow the Panzers into battle and then break off and surge ahead to their different targets. Peiper would later face war crimes charges for the massacre of eighty-four American prisoners at Malmedy.

German Panther tank camouflaged to appear to be an American M-10 tank destroyer. Photo; US Archives

The Operation: 

The Battle of the Bulge began in the early morning hours of December 16. Following a massive artillery bombardment, the heavy German units easily cut through the thinly defended American lines. Confusion on the American side lay supreme as they were caught completely unprepared. The road net soon became a tangle of combat units rushing to meet the Germans being met by rear-echelon support units caught in the offensive trying to get back to the rear of the fighting where they could support the counterattack. These units were generally artillery, quartermasters, field hospitals, and the like.  The narrow, two-lane roads were jammed.

Skorzeny’s men were easily able to infiltrate the American lines in the confusion of the early hours of the battle. One of his units was able to drive right into an American-held town and scout out all defenses. On the way out of town, he redirected an American convoy of armor and supplies to a different road. Two of his other units misdirected Allied convoys of supplies and reinforcements. They added to the general chaos among the Americans in the early hours of the battle. 

But the Allies soon learned that German soldiers were operating in American uniforms and sent out a warning to check out the identification and behavior of any suspicious troops. It was here that Skorzeny’s men accomplished far more than they did on the ground. Near panic ensued as GI checkpoints were posted everywhere. 

Troops initiated questions about American sports, celebrities, and slang as a means to ferret out Nazi infiltrators. General Bruce Clarke of the 7th Armored Division was held after telling MPs that the Chicago Cubs were in the American League. British Field Marshall Montgomery was briefly held when he said he “had no idea” who won the World Series. 

Rather than impede Skorzeny’s actions, this overreaction only caused to slow down the Allied response behind their lines and caused far more confusion than the threat itself. One of his men was captured by the Americans and under interrogation made up a story that Skorzeny was en route to Paris to kidnap General Eisenhower. Thus the Allied HQs became a fortress with tanks, machine guns, and troops posted everywhere. According to Eisenhower’s naval aide, Captain Harry Butcher, “He is a prisoner of our security police and is thoroughly but helplessly irritated by the restriction of his moves.”   Several actual U.S. soldiers were killed at check points by jittery guards who suspected they were Skorzeny’s men. One sharp-eyed sentry figured out that the forged identity cards the Germans were using had corrected the misspelled word “Indentification” used on the actual U.S.-issued ID cards. Anyone caught with an ID with the corrected spelling of “Identification” was arrested.

With the stiffening American resistance, soon the Germans knew that the offensive would fail in its ultimate goals, and the 150th Panzer-Brigade was withdrawn by the end of December. Out of the forty-four men Skorzeny sent behind U.S. lines in disguise, just eight were lost. As the initiative in the battle shifted back over to the Americans, the Germans still behind U.S. lines changed back into their German uniforms and slipped across American lines again. The Allies were particularly fierce in the treatment of German soldiers caught in American uniforms. Many were caught, imprisoned, and then executed. 

German troops caught wearing American uniforms during Operation Greif are executed by firing squad. Photo; US Archives

But the search for Skorzeny in Paris continued until February. 

As the war ended, Skorzeny was tried for war crimes but was exonerated on all charges. One charge that nearly stuck was one of improperly wearing US uniforms. But a witness for the defense, F. F. E. Yeo-Thomas, a former British Special Operations Executive (SOE) agent, testified that the Allies had done the exact same thing. He was acquitted. Although he was still held in a POW camp awaiting a de-Nazification hearing, Skorzeny escaped. He later worked as an adviser to Egyptian President Nasser and even the Mossad, helping track down German rocket scientists working for the Egyptians. Skorzeny died of cancer in 1975.

Although Operation Greif never accomplished its stated goals at the outset of the operation, the confusion and panic it caused among the Allies was a success. It ultimately proved to be a successful special operation by the Germans in their failed offensive.

Army-Navy Game 2021, Keys to the Game And Key Matchups

The college football season can’t begin the bowl season and playoff without first the traditional Army-Navy game. This year is set for December 11 and will be held at MetLife Stadium with a CBS broadcast starting at 3 p.m. eastern time. 

One of the oldest rivalries in college football, the two service academies will meet for the 122nd time, with the Naval Academy holding the edge 61-53-7. It is a streaky rivalry; the Navy won 14 in a row, many by a wide margin from 2002-2015. However, Army has won 4 of the last 5 contests, including a 15-0 shutout last year at West Point. 

Army (8-3) – has already clinched its second straight Commander-in-Chief’s Trophy, a three-way competition between Army, Navy, and Air Force. Navy lost to Air Force 23-3 in September. The Black Knights then beat Air Force in O.T. in November. 

This Black Knights team is one of the best that Jeff Monken has fielded at West Point. They are a Top 20 scoring team and a Top 20 defense. Army averages 301.2 yards per game and over 5 yards per rush with their ground game. 

Navy (3-8) – will miss a bowl game for the second year in a row under head coach Ken Niumatalolo and their third losing season in four years. The offense, specifically their scoring offense, has been an issue, especially earlier in the season. 

While the Midshipmen have a potent running offense of their own averaging 228.7 yards per game, their passing attack has been woeful, totaling only 599 yards on the season. The Navy QBs have attempted 91 passes and completed 44 but have been sacked 29 times. 

 

Every year, the two teams wear customized uniforms just for the game. This year, the Army is honoring Special Forces. They will be wearing the SF crossed arrows around their neck and have a patch of Task Force Dagger and where an Army name tape would go on a camouflage uniform. They’ll have the SF motto “De Oppresso Liber,” as well as the Special Forces crest on the crown of their helmets. 

Army’s Special Forces themed football uniforms. US Army Photo

The Navy’s uniform this year will be honoring the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter jet. The Navy’s website says about the uniforms, “Using one of the most famous naval career paths as an inspiration, the 2021 ‘Fly Navy’ uniform highlights classic American symbolism and the most utilized multirole fighter jet in aircraft carrier aviation, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet… the Super Hornet will remain the backbone of the carrier air wing well into the future.”

Navy’s F-18 themed uniforms. US Navy photo

So, let’s look at some of the key matchups:

 

When Army Has The Ball – Advantage Army:

The Black Knights running game is their bread and butter, and it all funnels through QB Christian Anderson, a dual-threat QB who is the team’s leading passer and the second leading rusher with 519 yards, an average of 5.9 yards per rush, and six touchdowns. Army’s leading rusher is running back Tyrell Robinson, who has carried the ball 89 times for 582 yards (9.9-yard average), with a long of 87 and three touchdowns. Army has four players with over 400 yards rushing. 

The Black Knights throw the ball even less than the Midshipmen do, having only passed 85 times but have nearly double the yardage (1030 yards) with 10 TDs and 3 INTs. Army QBs have only been sacked six times. Their biggest threat in the passing game is Isaiah Dalton, who has caught 18 passes for 384 yards (21.3-yard average) with 3 TDs. 

But it comes down to the running game. Neither of these teams is going to air it out; they live or die by the running game. Army’s rushing attack was superb in 2021, rushing for 3313 yards, a 4.9 yard average with 43 rushing touchdowns. If the Navy is going to keep this a game, they have to slow down the Army’s rushing attack. 

Army’s rushing attack was #2 in the FBS. US Army photo

That will require a total team effort, but their big guy at stuffing the run is #54, linebacker Diego Fagot. In the past three years, he has 11 tackles for a loss in 2021 and has 34 TFL. The Middies need a huge game from him on Saturday. However, their rush defense has been good, allowing just 131.6 yards per game. 

Army has averaged scoring 35.5 points per game, while Navy is allowing 29.6 points per game. If the Knights get anywhere close to that, it may be another long after for Navy. 

 

When Navy Has The Ball – Advantage Army:

The Midshipmen have a good running game of their own, pounding the rock for 229 yards per game. Navy has two good fullbacks who can carry the pile, the chew, and the clock. Isaac Ruoss has carried 157 times for 608 yards (3.9-yard average) with 5 TDs. Carlinos Acie has carried 57 times for 546 yards (9.6-yard average), with two TDs. 

Navy’s QB is Tai Lavatai, who has completed 54.5 percent of his passes with 5 TDs and 2 INTs. But he has a penchant for being sacked a lot, as have all of Navy’s QBs. Lavatai has also rushed for 309 yards on 150 rushes (just a 2.1-yard average), with 5 TDs. Navy’s most productive receiver is Chance Warren, with 10 receptions for 157 yards and 3 TDs. He has also been productive in the running game with 242 yards and a score.  

The Midshipmen need their big FBs to keep Army’s defense on the field. Army has allowed only 103.7 yards per game on the ground. And like Navy, they have a big run stuffer, junior linebacker Andre Carter II. Carter is a big, athletic 6’7, 250-pound outside linebacker who has played outstanding for the Knights. A year ago, he was playing around 260, but this year, he lost some weight to improve his speed and conditioning. This year, he doesn’t have to come out as much. Carter has logged 15 tackles for loss, 13.5 sacks, 4 forced fumbles, and an interception. 

This one, like every year, comes down to who can be more physical, control the tempo and the line of scrimmage, and most importantly, finish drives by running the football. The Army is favored by 7.5 points. The over/under for this one is just 33, and it tends to go with the under every year. 

The Navy will be looking to pull a big upset on Army this year. US Navy photo

But this one has a little different vibe to it. Although, as the old saying goes, “you can throw out their records” for this huge rivalry game, Army has a superior unit this year. Look for it to be close for a half and then the Black Knights ground game to eat the Navy up. Army 24-10

This rivalry is unique in that upon graduation, all of the players then join the same team. Some of the Army troops may find themselves in a tough spot somewhere in the world, and a Navy pilot will fly ground support missions for them. That’s where the rivalry may be bitter on the field but is full of respect off of it. 

Go Army, Beat Navy.

A Very Crazy Special Forces Thanksgiving in Bolivia

During Thanksgiving, we all give thanks for spending time with our families, friends, and loved ones. We enjoy food, football, and spend time reminiscing. Early this Thanksgiving morning, I spent some time reading some excellent posts on Thanksgiving experiences and what the holiday means.

We had a conversation at our home over morning coffee sitting outside enjoying a nice cool Florida morning about how many holidays were spent away from home… and there were many. Some were spent in schools (NCO Academy during my enlisted days) and others at SERE School which I wrote about a while back.   

 

That One Thanksgiving

One particular Thanksgiving stands out, thanks to what transpired in a typically bizarre set of circumstances that always seemed to make life interesting and funny in Special Forces. But first, a bit of background information.

Back in the day, the 7th Special Forces Group was supporting the U.S. Andean Ridge counter-narcotics policies by sending A-Teams throughout South America to work with and support DEA teams (Snowcap). The DEA teams were trying to eradicate cocaine labs and processing and stop the drug from making its way to the United States. One can argue whether those missions succeeded or failed, but for years we constantly had A-Teams in areas all over Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. 

One such area was the “lovely little village” of Chimore, Bolivia. Then-Captain Charlie Cleveland was the first A-Team commander who carved out a little base in Chimore. The base was in the strategic spot where the Chapare River intersected with the highway (Highway 4) that ran from the Chapare Valley where the majority of the coca-growing (and illicit drug labs) were being farmed. The drugs were transported to the capital of La Paz through Cochabamba to the west or Santa Cruz to the east. Cleveland later became a lieutenant general and headed Special Operations Command. 

The 7th SFG built up the camp at Chimore and expanded it where a battalion of UMOPAR (Unidad Móvil Policial para Áreas Rurales), counternarcotics paramilitary police was then stationed. Ostensibly, the UMOPAR fell under the Bolivian Special Anti-narcotics Force (Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico — FELCN) of the Bolivian National Police (Cuerpo de Policía Nacional). But the reality was much different. The UMOPAR really worked for the DEA and to a lesser extent the U.S. military. 

Successive A-Teams under Operation “Red Dragon” and “Stonebridge” continually built up the base. It ended up including an airstrip that would handle C-47/DC-3 aircraft that the U.S. sold to Bolivia as well as UH-1Hs as the U.S. provided the Bolivians with their own rotary-wing capability, called the “Red Devils.” Later, more A-Teams would do some great work just down the road in Villa Tunari as they’d be co-located with folks from the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS). There are some great stories from there…

As Chimore grew, it became the major DEA hub in the area. Eventually, the embassy and the MILGP wanted to cut the SF advising group from an A-Team to just two-three advisory teams. I had been there with an A-Team and then found myself back as part of the two-man team with my bud Dave O. 

 

Our Life Gets Better

Special Forces in Bolivia
The old SF living quarters (shacks) behind the haul of a night raid where about 80-90 pounds of uncut cocaine and precursor chemicals lay. (Courtesy of author)

The living conditions became much better. The A-Team lived in small plywood shacks that were hot as all hell during the day. When Dave and I got there, we moved into a small house on the Bolivian side of the base. It was run by NAS and our liaison (a great guy who wasn’t Bolivian but Paraguayan… go figure) did all the logistical work to keep the base running smoothly. He could and did get us anything we asked for… within reason.

Our house that we lived in with our NAS liaison was fairly austere by conventional standards but was the Taj Mahal by what we lived in with the A-Team. We even had a housekeeper/cook. Life was pretty darn good for being in the middle of nowhere in the jungle. During the days leading up to Thanksgiving, we asked (frequently) for us to get a turkey since we weren’t getting any football (the internet was science fiction for Bolivia at the time). We were told that the turkey was coming but it might be a bit late… fair enough. 

Thanksgiving came and went (we ate roasted chicken and fish caught in the river) and we were happy enough.

A couple of days later we were preparing to spend a long day at the demo range where Dave was going to teach the UMOPAR troops, cratering, and steel-cutting charges. 

I was getting dressed sleepily in my room dying for some coffee when I heard a commotion in the kitchen and our cook screaming in Quechua, the indigenous Indian language.

I walked out and saw that she had cornered a large armadillo in the kitchen and was beating it to death with a broomstick.

In between whacks, she asked me “Would you like some coffee and breakfast?” “Ah no thanks,” I replied, “we’ll just skip that this morning.” Such was life in the jungle camp. 

We stayed on the range all day and the troops had a ball. There is something about blowing sh*t up that brings out the little kid in all of us. Morale was high. We ate MRE’s for lunch and were still out there as the sun was beginning to set.

 

Be Thankful!

Around mid-morning, we got the great news from our NAS guy that the turkey was supposed to be arriving on a DEA plane ASAP. And sure enough soon after we saw it swoop in over at the airstrip…We must have mentioned turkey for dinner about 10 times during that day. We just hoped our cook would know enough to prepare it right. 

About 5-6 p.m. we cut the UMOPAR boys loose for their evening chow and headed for the little casa that was home. Upon opening the door, a delicious smell came upon us… that was a plus. Our cook told us that dinner was almost ready. Since we were waiting for our NAS guy (his name escapes me), I jumped in the shower to wash some Bolivian funk off me, and got ready to eat. 

We all sat down. Dinner was served and my first thought was…what the heck had she done to the bird… It was quartered but roasted with potatoes and veggies… ah well. As soon as I took a bite, I was taken back by some awfully nasty taste. She totally f**ked up our post-Thanksgiving turkey. 

A few more bites didn’t improve matters. It was then our NAS bud asked our cook about the “pavo,” the Spanish word for turkey in Quechua. “No, no, no,” she said and rambled on in her native tongue for a few moments. “What did she say,” Dave and I asked in unison? 

Our NAS started laughing. “She said no turkey came in on the plane, we are eating the armadillo,” he said.  

Is it an armadillo or a Bolivian turkey? (Wikimedia Commons)

I could feel the color drain from my face. I wanted to hurl. Knowing that armadillos carry leprosy, I immediately imagined that in a few months Dave and I would look like the guy in the village in Papillon who gave Steve McQueen the boat. 

So, the next time a family member complains about your turkey being dry and overdone, remind them that it is better than a freakin’ armadillo! 

The US Still Has a Lot of Tools to Use in Afghanistan According to the Top Special Operations Officer

Following the chaotic withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan in August, the Taliban took over, but the terrorists of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) remain. Although the Taliban steadfastly denied that al-Qaeda was in the country, that statement was not taken seriously. The Taliban and al-Qaeda always had a good relationship. 

ISIS is another matter. ISIS and the Taliban are enemies. ISIS believes the Taliban are too concerned with just Afghanistan and not enough with global jihad. And that global jihad is still a concern with the United States. But how will Washington target the terrorists in Afghanistan without any troops or intelligence assets on the ground?

Members of the Pentagon insist that they can continue to track and target terrorists using “over the horizon” capabilities. That method is not only much harder but uncertain as demonstrated when a humanitarian worker was confused with an ISIS planner and targeted. He and several of his family members, including children, were killed in the attack.

 

The US Still Has a Lot of Tools

ISIS-K fighters
ISIS-K fighters pose for a propaganda photo, that was taken by their media arm. (File photo)

SOCOM Commander Army General Richard Clarke speaking at Halifax International Security Forum, in Canada on Friday said that the job of finding and hunting terrorists in Afghanistan has gotten appreciably harder. However, there are still tools in the toolbox, Clarke said. 

“We built up amazing counterterrorism capabilities over the last 20 years,” he said. “Some of those capabilities can still be used in Afghanistan today,” General Clarke said.  

Clarke advocates working with partner Afghans who remained in the country as well as regional allies. However, Afghans who worked with the U.S. and remained are in grave danger with the Taliban regardless. If they were even suspected of still working with the Americans, their lives would be worth little. 

Asked specifically about over-the-horizon strikes, Clarke said, “It’s going to be harder. Anytime you have a physical presence on the ground, it stimulates the enemy forces — you see and sense, you’re with partner forces.” 

“It is going to be harder. However … the unique capabilities that we’ve built with airborne unmanned aerial vehicles, presence with Afghan partners, the ability to talk with them and continue to work with allies — it’s going to be what we’re going to continue to do. While hard, we’ve done hard, and we can do hard, and we’re going to continue to persist.”

General Clarke was also asked if a joint U.S.-Taliban partnership fighting ISIS is in the works.

“I don’t see them as a partner — I’ll just be frank,” Clarke replied. 

“I think we have an interest from the U.S. perspective that the ISIS threat that is in Afghanistan is disrupted, that it can’t roost [so that it could actually affect one of our nations. But I wouldn’t, as we look at the Taliban, I don’t think they’re an entity, today, that should be … a counterterrorism partner.”

“The most important thing for us in Afghanistan is to ensure we understand the intel picture of where [the] ISIS-K that exists there today actually is, and if it becomes such a threat that it could come back to the United States or could come to one of our allies and partners — we’ve built up capability,” he added. “We can go to where the enemy is. We’ve proven that time and time again with the counterterrorism forces that all of us have built up.”

Jawed Lundin, the former deputy foreign minister of Afghanistan, lambasted the over-the-horizon approach. 

“This whole idea of over-the-horizon, surgical strikes, military response to potential threats, we just saw that for 20 years — for God’s sake, it doesn’t work,” Lundin said.

The U.S. needs to be “more clever” and work with locals who can oppose and begin a resistance to the Taliban, as well as some of the other foreign embassies which remain and have the intelligence capability needed, Lundin added. 

 

Violent Extremist Is Still There

Afghan commando
A former Afghan commando in combat against the Taliban. SOCOM hopes to utilize them in counter-terrorism operations. (DVIDS)

“The violent extremism that attacked us on 9/11 is still there. We can never forget that,” Clarke said.

“While al-Qaeda was largely decimated in Afghanistan and the ISIS caliphate in Iraq and Syria was defeated, the threats still exist. In fact, in some ways, it has metastasized. It’s actually harder to track,” the general added.

“What we have to do is work with allies, and particularly indigenous partners from that region, to actually defeat that threat and try to contain it inside their borders, so that it doesn’t, in fact, grow,” he said. “So, we have gone to a more sustainable approach to the counter-VEO approach.”

Clarke added that the best way to defeat terrorism is to use all the available tools and not just the military. 

“It doesn’t always have to be the warhead on the forehead to defeat this, but really, it has to be an entire government approach, and it has to be… ensuring allies and those partner nations are capable to [meet] the threat.”

US Green Berets Raid Son Tay Prison and Make History

By mid-November 1970, there were 450 known American POWs in Vietnam, and more than double that amount reported as missing in action. Reports were surfacing of brutal conditions, torture, and starvation of American POWs. Operation Ivory Coast was a daring rescue mission conducted by U.S. Army Green Berets, flown in by Air Force Commandos, to rescue the POWs at a small prisoner of war camp at Son Tay, 23 miles west of Hanoi. The raid was commanded by Colonel Arthur “Bull” Simons and 56 specially selected Green Berets who had trained for the mission.

The mission was deemed a failure. Unknown to the raiders, rains had flooded the Son Tay prison just prior to the raid, forcing the Vietnamese guards to move the POWs to another location. The prisoners who had been moved just a few miles down the road, watched the raid unfold.

However, the raid was viewed as a success by many in the U.S. military, as the Special Forces troops killed over 50 guards and took the compound while suffering two very minor casualties. And the Air Force was able to fly them in and out through one of the most heavily defended air spaces on earth at that time.

 

The POW Camp Is Identified 

In May of 1970, the Pentagon learned of the camp when an SR-71 flying at 80,000 feet, streaked over it and took aerial photographs that showed at least 55 American POWs. However, 12,000 North Vietnamese troops were stationed just five miles away from the compound.

Planning began in earnest in early August. Simons, who was a legend and one of the most well-respected Special Forces officers, was named the commander of the raid force. Simons had taken part in the outstanding prisoner rescue during World War II with the 6th Ranger Bn. The Rangers rescued 500 POWs, who had survived the Bataan Death March, by raiding the Japanese POW camp at Cabanatuan in the Philippines. The Japanese were planning on killing every one of the POWs when the Americans arrived at the camp and foiled their plans.

He would have to select the raiders from among the 6th and 7th Special Forces Groups at Ft. Bragg, NC. Word spread through the Green Berets at Ft. Bragg that something big was brewing and it was to be commanded by Simons. Over 500 packed the post theater to hear Simons make a pitch for volunteers for a very dangerous mission. 

The training facility chosen for the raiders was Duke Field at Eglin AFB, Florida. USAF planners selected key Air Force commanders, who then picked personnel for their crews. Helicopter and A-1 Skyraider crews were put together from instructors at Eglin and personnel returned from combat tours in Southeast Asia. Two crews for C-130E(I) Combat Talons were assembled from squadrons in Germany and North Carolina.

The men were not briefed on their mission but were only told that it was hazardous.

A total of 219 men were selected: 103 Army and 116 Air Force personnel would serve as raiders, flight crew, support personnel, and planning. The Task Force was known as the “Joint Contingency Task Group” (JCTG).

The staff set up a plan to conduct a nighttime raid, the key point of which was clear weather and a quarter moon at 35 degrees above the horizon for optimum visibility during low-level flight. From these mission planning parameters, two mission “windows” were identified, 18–25 October and 18–25 November.

Son Tay Raiders
Special Forces Son Tay Raiders (U.S. Army)

Training under Simons proceeded on Range C-2 at Eglin. Simons’s Son Tay raiders used an exact but crudely made replica of the prison compound for rehearsals that could be quickly assembled and taken down before any Russian satellite would fly over. The raiders also had a superbly detailed five-by-five-foot scale table model — codenamed “Barbara” after a USAF secretary, Barbara L. Strosnider, who worked very long days supporting planning for the raid — which was built by the CIA for familiarization.

The Air Force pilots flew over 1,050 hours in C-130 Combat Talon and HH-3 aircraft to practice their formations while using the Forward-Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR), to fully acquaint themselves with the mission.

The Special Forces side of the training began on September 9, before moving into night training on September 17, and joint training with aircrews on September 28, which included six rehearsals a day, three of them under night conditions. By October 6, 170 practice sessions of all or some phases of the mission had been performed on the mockup by the Special Forces operators, using live fire.

Son Tay prison mockup
“Barbara,” the mockup of the Son Tay prison built by the CIA. (U.S. Army)

The Ground Force Commander would be LTC Bud Syndor. The assault element leader, which would purposely crashland a helicopter in the prison compound, would be led by another SF legend CPT Richard “Dick” Meadows.

Meadows, who would be integral for the raid, was one of the best Special Operators that this country has ever produced. He enlisted in the Army when he was just 15 and fought as a paratrooper in Korea. By the age of 20, he was the youngest Master Sergeant in the Army. He joined Special Forces in 1953 and for the remainder of his career until 1977 would serve in either Special Forces or Ranger units. 

During the Vietnam War, Meadows impressed General William Westmoreland so much during a briefing after an operation with MACSOGV that he was given a battlefield commission. He also helped Colonel Charles Beckwith form Delta Force. He was even recalled from retirement to assist in the Iran Hostage Rescue by posing as a European auto dealer on the ground in Tehran. 

On November 6, the first full-scale dress rehearsal, using a UH-1H as the assault helicopter, was conducted at night. It included a 5.5-hour, 687 miles (1,106 km) flight of all aircraft, replicating the timing, speeds, altitudes, and turns in the mission plan. The rehearsal indicated that the UH-1 helicopter was unsuitable for this mission. The smaller passenger compartment resulted in leg cramps to the SF raiders that completely disrupted the timing of their assault. Simons and his raiders opted for the HH-3E. Two further full-night rehearsals and a total of 31 practice landings by the HH-3E in the courtyard of the mockup followed.

The primary October window was chosen, but President Nixon was out of Washington and couldn’t be briefed properly in time, so Henry Kissinger moved back the raid to the November time window. Unbeknownst to anyone, this one-month’s delay would doom the mission to failure.

The Air Force moved all of the pieces for the raid force to Thailand, the jump-off location for the raid, between November 10 and 18. Piecemeal deployment was chosen to not attract attention. There the force was whittled down from the 100 men who trained for the mission to the 56 that would be going — a heartbreaking affair for the 44 men who had to stay behind in Thailand.

 

The Raiding Force 

The Special Forces were organized into three platoons: A 14-man assault group codenamed “Blueboy Element” led by Meadows, which would crashland within the prison compound. “Greenleaf” a 22-man support group, would provide immediate support for the assault team. And “Redwine” a 20-man security group to protect the prison area from any NVA reaction forces and provide backup support for either of the other two groups if needed. Simons (using the call sign “Axle”) accompanied the Greenleaf group, while the ground force commander, LTC Elliott P. “Bud” Sydnor, Jr. (“Wildroot”) was with the Redwine group.

The 56 raiders were heavily armed, carrying 48 CAR-15 carbines, two M16 rifles, four M79 grenade launchers, two shotguns, and four M60 machine guns. They carried 15 Claymore mines, 11 demolition charges, and 213 hand grenades. They also had a mix of wire and bolt cutters, axes, chainsaws, crowbars, ropes, bullhorns, lights, and other equipment. The ground force was also equipped for voice communications with 58 UHF-AM and 34 VHF-FM radios, including a survival radio for each individual soldier.

Five hours before takeoff, Simons finally addressed the men to what their actual mission was. “We are going to rescue 70 POWs from a camp called Son Tay. This is something American prisoners have a right to expect from their fellow soldiers. The camp is located 23 miles west of Hanoi.”

It was said that the troops stood and cheered. Simons put his own indelible mark on the operation with his final instructions.

“You are to let nothing, nothing interfere with the operation. We’re here to rescue prisoners not take prisoners. And if we walk into a trap, don’t dream about walking out of Vietnam unless you’ve got wings on your feet. It is 100 miles to Laos… I want to keep this force together. We will back up to the Song Con River and by Christ let them come across the goddamn open ground. We’ll make them pay for every foot across the sonuvabitch.”

 

Infiltration Into North Vietnam and Arrival at Son Tay

The raid force began taking off at 2200 hours from airfields in Thailand and South Vietnam. The formation flew across the Plain of Jars in Laos before turning northeast. The Air Force meticulously planned 12 separate legs of the flight plan in order to keep the vulnerable helicopters undetected by North Vietnamese radar. The force was aided by diversionary bombing missions going on in the area.

Son Tay prison
Banana 1, the helicopter purposely crashlanded at the Son Tay prison camp. (U.S. Army)

The assault force arrived at Son Tay at 0219 hours. The helicopter that was to crashland in the compound was to encounter trees thought to be 40-feet tall. In actuality, they were close to 150-feet. However, the pilot chopped through them like a huge lawnmower and the aircraft thudded into the ground. One man, an Air Force crew chief, suffered a broken ankle when a fire extinguisher broke free and smashed into his leg.

Meadows used a bullhorn and announced, “We’re American. Keep your heads down. We’re Americans. We’ll be in your cells in a minute.” Meadows’s group cut down many of the compound’s guards, including several trying to escape through the east wall. But as his men methodically advanced through the compound, they found no prisoners in the cells.

The Support Element landed in the wrong compound, which was known as the Secondary School. It found that it contained 100-200 Chinese soldiers who were there as advisors for some new missile defense weapons that were being emplaced. After a brief but intense firefight, the Special Forces troops using a mixture of automatic fire and grenades, the Chinese were eliminated.

The Security Element (“Redwine”) approached the south wall and Syndor, using the helicopter’s miniguns, wiped out the guard towers, while landing inside the compound. There they blew a utility pole and set up a roadblock, 100 meters from the LZ. They then encountered guards who were quickly trying to react to the raid. The raiders cut down several of them.

Simons leaped into a trench as the fighting raged on around him. A second later, an enemy soldier, roused from his sleep and wearing only his underwear, jumped in beside Simons not realizing what was happening. Simons emptied his .357 revolver into the soldier’s chest killing him.

Meadows radioed to Syndor, “Negative items.” No POWs were present. The assault force was preparing to leave when one of the members decided to leave the Vietnamese a message on who was responsible for the raid. MSG Joe Lupyak took a Green Beret with a 5th SFG flash and nailed it to the compound’s flagpole. The message was, “we can come within 20 miles of Hanoi and we’ll be back.” 

The extraction helicopters began arriving at 0239 hrs. The last aircraft departed at 0245. The entire raid had taken just 27 minutes. The formation had cleared North Vietnamese airspace by 0315 and had arrived back in Thailand by 0438 hrs.

 

Intelligence Failure/Mission Failure 

The lack of good intelligence hampered the operation from the start. It was later learned that due to the flooding of the river, the prisoners had been moved to a place they named “Camp Faith” that was about 15 miles closer to Hanoi. The area’s heavy rains had obscured the U.S. satellites from picking that up.

However, as the raiders flew back to Thailand crushed by the fact that they didn’t rescue any of the POWs, they didn’t realize that the impact of the raid would be a tremendous morale boost for the prisoners. The prisoners had watched the raid unfold from their new camp at Dong Hoi and knew right away that they had not been forgotten.

The North Vietnamese realized that had the operation been successful, the sight of the prisoners in their current emaciated state would have been disastrous. Resultantly, food and medical care improved for the prisoners and the Vietnamese consolidated the POWs and for the first time. Many of them were surprised to learn that instead of solitary confinement, they were housed together.

 

The Son Tay Raid Personnel

Support Element

COL Arthur D Simons, CPT Eric J Nelson, CPT Glenn R Rouse, CPT Udo H Walther, SFC Earl Bleacher, SFC Leroy N Carlson, SFC John Jakovenko, SFC Jack G Joplin, SFC Daniel Jurich, SFC David A Lawhon Jr, SFC Salvador M Suarez, SFC Donald Taapken, SFC Richard W Valentine, SSG Walter L Miller, SSG Robert L Nelson, SSG David S Nickerson, SSG Thomas E Powell, SSG John E Rodriquez, SGT Gary D Keel, SGT Keith R Medenski, SGT Franklin D Roe, SGT Marshall A Thomas.

 

Assault Element

CPT Richard J Meadows, CPT Thomas W Jaeger, CPT Dan H McKinney, 1LT George W Petrie, MSG Thomas J Kemmer, MSG Billy K Moore, MSG Galen C Kittleson, SFC Anthony Dodge, SFC Lorenzo O Robbins, SFC William L Tapley, SFC Donald R Wingrove, SSG Charles G Erickson, SSG Kenneth E McMullin, SGT Patrick St Clair.

 

Command Element – Security

LTC Elliot P Sydnor, LTC Joseph R Cataldo, CPT James W McClam, CPT Daniel D Turner, MSG Joseph J Lupyak, MSG Herman Spencer, SFC Tyrone J Adderly, SFC Donald D Blackard, SFC Freddie Doss, SFC Jerry W Hill, SFC Marion S Howell, SFC Billy R Martin, SFC Gregory T McGuire, SFC Charles A Masten Jr, SFC Joseph M Murray, SFC Noe Quezada, SFC Ronnie Strahan, SSG Paul S Poole, SSG Lawrence Young, SGT Terry L Buckler.

 

Support Personnel

LTC Bill L Robinson, LTC Gerald Kilburn, CPT Randel L Smith, SGM Minor B Pylant, MSG Jesse A Black, MSG Edgar C Britt, MSG Bernard L Rauscher, SFC Franklin Abramski, SFC James A Bass, SFC Archie Batrez Jr, SFC Robert L Dodd, SFC Charles M Erwin, SFC James A Green, SFC Bobby R Hansley, SFC Roswell D Henderson, SFC Frederick L Hubel, SFC Bruce M Hughes, SFC John R Jourdan, SFC Ernest R Pounder, SFC Aaron L Tolson Jr, SFC Burley W Turner, SFC Grady C Vines, SSG Elmer D Adams, SSG Rodger D Gross, SSG Larry G Stroklund, SSG David L Wilson, SGT Brian J Budy, SGT Michael G Green, SGT Robert R Hobdy, SGT John J Lippert, SGT Arlin L Olson, SP5 William F Dezurik, SP5 Lawrence C Elliot, SP5 Gary R Griffin, SP4 Christopher Casey, SP4 Frank J Closen.

 

UH-1 Crew Members

1LT George W Williams, CW2 Ronald J Exely, CW2 Jackie H Keely, CW2 John J Ward, SP6 Larry C Boots, SP4 Alan H Wood.

Never Be Light: Integrity and leadership lessons in Special Operations, the Hard Way

Well, there I was, attending the Special Operations Combat Medic Course (SOCM), the Army’s elite combat medic course in Fort Bragg, NC. I had recently graduated SWCC training and I thought I was hot shit thinking that all of the Special Forces students at SOCM had just begun their training pipeline.

The SOCM course was essentially owned by the Army Special Forces, the Navy was allotted just a few slots per class. As SEALs and SWCCs, we were guests in their home. The Navy cadre at the SOCM course had made it very clear that we were not permitted to fuck up, fuck off, or fuck around. Oh, and we had better not fail or they would make it a point to destroy our reputation before we ever even made it to the teams.

Like I said, this was an Army course, so you can be damn sure there was a lot of rucking going on… a lot. By the time I graduated, I couldn’t believe how fast I could move around with a big ass ruck on my back, but that’s a story for a different day.

We often did morning ruck runs as a part of the PT program. On one such morning, we had been instructed to fill our rucks with 45 pounds of weight, no big deal right? We had no scale or any actual measured weights. Our solution was to just load up a bunch of random items into our rucks: spare helmets, boots, canteens filled with water, some books, and whatever else we could find. We got to the schoolhouse the next morning and the Navy guys lifted each other’s rucks to make sure we all felt like we were at the 45-pound mark.

So, there we go, off on our hooah ruck run. Things were going well until I rounded a corner and saw a pickup truck with the cadre standing there, weighing each guy’s ruck. “Shit, hope I put enough bullshit in this bag.”

I took off my ruck and put it on the scale, it read 43.5 pounds. “Motherfucker!”

The instructor with the notepad wrote down my name and my weight deficit. “Alright, keep going,” he said.

Now I really knew I was fucked. From my experiences in the Navy, normally when you screw up you just get your ass-chewing/beating right then and there and then everyone moves on with their life.

After we returned to the schoolhouse, the lead instructor rounded up all the guys that had been underweight and told us that we would be doing an extra-long ruck run the next morning. “Be there at 0530.”

The catch was that we had to add the difference of the weight between 45 pounds and the weight the scale read, and then multiply it by 1.5. So here was the math for my ruck: (45+1.5) x 1.5 = 70 pounds, this would be the weight for my ruck. Some guys during the ruck had been straight cheating and had weighed in at 25 and 30 pounds, this was going to be a really hard learning lesson for them.

His ruck must also have been underweight.

There were nine of us who had the special privilege of taking part in this extra-curricular activity. When we showed up in the morning, there were two SF instructors waiting for us, with two 200-pound human training dummies, and no litters to carry them on. “You guys are going to carry these dummies as a team and you better make sure they don’t hit the ground.”

“Check.”

I looked at my one Navy buddy, who had fallen to the same fate, “Goddamnit, this is gonna suck dude.”

Off we went, ruck running on the trails around Fort Bragg. The two instructors also had rucks on, which I thought was pretty awesome.

Well, we kept rucking and rucking and then, yup, rucked some more. It was thoroughly sucking, and the guys that were carrying upwards of 100 pounds were starting to have a real tough time.

Throughout all of this, the instructors were relatively quiet. They weren’t yelling at us and telling us how worthless we were, which was a little bit different than some of my experiences in Coronado.

Finally, we made the final turn and I could tell we were headed back to the schoolhouse. “Thank God, I’m over this.”

We got back to the building. It was done. We put our rucks and those stupid dummies down. The main instructor circled us up and said: “This goes no further than what happened this morning. We’re not going to hold any grudges against you guys or attempt to sabotage your success while at this school. I hope everyone learned a valuable lesson here today. You all must recognize the importance of attention to detail and make it a point to follow instructions, your life may depend on it someday.”

Hell, I was motivated after that talk. The way that Special Forces instructor handled our situation was as professional as it gets. He was a confident leader. A silent professional through and through. That instructor will never know it, but I walked away from that event having learned an awesome lesson in leadership and humility.

To sum it up, that ruck run was an absolute gut punch, and you can be sure that I would never come in underweight on a ruck run ever again. But, on that day, I’m glad I was able to have that experience. It was an invaluable learning lesson for a young, naive operator.