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Expert Analysis: What Really Caused The Crimea Bridge to Come Down

The Only Physical Link Between Crimea and Russia

In 2014 Vladimir Putin’s government illegally annexed Crimea as part of Russia. By 2018 he had built the longest bridge in Europe to physically connect the two land masses. This was a solid symbol of Russian domination. A $3.7 billion USD symbol. To make matters even clearer, Putin personally drove one of the first trucks over the structure the day it was opened. It’s like a dog peeing on something to claim ownership.

The bridge, of course, is of enormous practical importance. It plays a critical role in getting supplies from Russia, through Crimea, to Russian troops fighting in the Kherson region of Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin prepares to buckle up to drive one of the first trucks across the Crimean Bridge in 2018. Screenshot from YouTube and Wall Street Journal

On October 8th, at about 0600 local time, an enormous explosion severely damaged the Crimea (or, as it is sometimes called, Kerch) Bridge. Because of its strategic importance, the bridge is one of the most secure structures in the world. Security cameras cover almost every inch.

Please watch the footage below made available through Twitter and Russian Media Monitor. Carefully watch the truck in the right-hand lane toward the center of your screen. Many believe it is the main cause of the damage. At the 0:17 mark, it seems to vaporize, causing a huge fireball severely damaging rail cars on the adjacent railway. Coincidentally, all seven of them were full of fuel.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reports that an initial bomb damage assessment shows one lane of the road bridge to be collapsed and damage to the nearby railway track. The Russian Investigative Committee quickly surveyed the damage, and they concluded that a truck had exploded on the bridge and ignited the fuel-laden railway cars. Almost immediately, though, Russia sent divers to examine the structural integrity of the bridge supports underwater.

For the record, I do not believe the truck was what brought the bridge down. No way, and I’ll explain why.

Here we see a satellite photo of the final damage. You’ll note that the roadway between two spans has been dropped into the sea. Screenshot from YouTube and CNN

However, if the truck was the primary explosive device, we would see a hole in the middle of the road. None was evident. The structure collapsed into pieces and fell.

The bridge has dropped in multiple pieces, indicating a probable blast from below. Screenshot from YouTube and WSJ

The detonation of high explosives above the surface of the bridge, as has been claimed by the Russians, would have sent the majority of the blast force up and away from the truck. However, as noted above, that would cause a massive hole in the roadway and extensive scorching of the highway’s surface. What little we see of damage to the road’s surface is likely from the fire from the railway cars that were full of fuel. In addition, modern bridges are made to withstand accidents in the unlikely event that a truck carrying explosive cargo may ignite.

No, ladies and gentlemen, this blast came from below.

A waterborne object is picked up on a security camera immediately before the explosion. Screenshot from YouTube and WSJ.

By All Indications, an SOF Operation

Obviously, the Russians did not take out their own multi-billion dollar bridge and main supply line to a war they are currently fighting. The Ukrainians did this. But, they do not have weapons with the range to even come close to hitting the Crimea bridge from Ukraine. The HIMARS weapons systems we have provided to them could only cover a fraction of the hundreds of miles from Ukraine to the damaged bridge.

Sky News explains how the Crimea, or Kerch Bridge is a pivotal link to getting people and supplies from Russia to Crimea and through Ukraine to the Kherson region. This image also gives us an excellent idea of how far the bridge is from Ukraine. Screenshot from YouTube and Sky News

In my opinion, and you’ve probably read it here first, this was the result of a highly successful special operations forces mission. Mark my words: one day, a movie will be made about this. This operation took place deep behind enemy lines in Russian territory. Operators infiltrated the area with the highest degree of secrecy, bringing hundreds of pounds of high explosives. Whoever did was was good, very good. To say that the Russians are watching this bridge carefully would be an understatement.

I believe the explosion(s) came from under the bridge, with shaped charges likely being placed on the supporting structures. Who would have placed those explosives? Again, I can only speculate, but my money is on Ukrainian troops from the 73rd Naval Special Purpose Center. These are special forces units of the Ukrainian Naval Infantry, their version of our US Navy SEALs or British SBS. The exact details of their equipment are classified, but it is known to be highly sophisticated and comparable to what we have in the west. And keep in mind that US Special Operations Command Europe kept training the Ukrainians until the beginning of the war.

The Ukrainian 73rd has swimmer delivery vehicles (SDVs) and DPDs (diver propulsion devices) to get their combat divers where they need to be. The SDV can best be described as a mini-sub, about 22 feet long, with an electric motor and single screw propeller. High-frequency sonar and a doppler inertial navigation system get the Team and their gear where they need to be silently. They are often deployed from and may be retrieved by submarines. That’s one potential scenario for successful infiltration and exfiltration.

Unit patch from the Ukrainian 73rd Naval Special Operations Center

 

Regardless of exactly how they did it, the SOF made logistical issues for Russia in their war with Ukraine (especially in the Kherson region) much more difficult. Refer to the map above from Sky News. It shows how supplies, equipment, and troops were getting from the motherland to the Kherson region of Ukraine through annexed Crimea utilizing the 12-mile-long Crimea (Kerch) bridge. Now that they can’t do that, materiel will have to be moved by sea to the Ukrainian port cities of Berdyansk and Mariupol and trucked hundreds of miles through enemy territory to its destination.

The Russians, of course, will move to repair the bridge as quickly as possible. Still, I wager that the damage will buy the Ukrainians at least two or three weeks of valuable time where the already undersupplied Russian forces will receive very little or no support.

This is an enormous blow to the Russians, on par with the Ukrainian sinking of the Moskva. A sound tactical victory and one hell of a morale booster. “Look at what we can do,” they are telling the Kremlin, giving the middle finger directly to Putin. To his credit, Mr. Putin isn’t stupid, never said he was. Shortly after the attacks, he gave a speech stating how he views this as a terrorist attack against his country and, “The authors, perpetrators and those who ordered it are the special services of Ukraine.” As a former KGB man, he knows this and is currently doing his best to take revenge against the citizens of Ukraine because he has been made to look so bad.

My hope is that the armed forces of Ukraine will take full advantage of this situation to push Russian forces from the Kherson region. The New York Times just yesterday reported on increasingly lowered enemy morale and a general retreat from the area.

Author’s Note: Many thanks to the Wall Street Journal and their chief correspondent on the ground in Ukraine, Yaroslav Trofimov, for making the insightful YouTube video presented above. They seem to be of the same mind that we are, that this was not solely the work of a truck bomb and definitely not caused by a missile strike.

Russia’s Trump Card: Is Wagner’s African Playbook Running in Ukraine?

As the war in Ukraine continues, there is increased scrutiny of the Russian government’s global activities. In Africa, the newest development uses Russian mercenaries, most prominently the Wagner group, to achieve Russian interests. Even if the mercenaries are not particularly effective at defeating rebel groups, their appeal to African leaders and ability to implant themselves into the host country’s political system makes them difficult for the international community to counter. 

Using mercenaries offers the Russian state several benefits. Firstly, it allows Moscow’s most controversial activity in Africa to remain deniable, even if Wagner’s connections to the Kremlin are common knowledge and Wagner’s deployments are preceded by a deal with the Russian government. It also allows Russia more access to gold, diamonds, and other precious resources, which are suitable for the economy and a small way to mitigate the impact of Ukraine-related sanctions. Furthermore, because Wagner’s ability to operate depends on its link to the Kremlin and the Russian state’s willingness to overlook the constitutional ban on mercenaries, there is almost no risk that Wagner will operate against Moscow’s interests. Lastly, When Wagner mercenaries die, which is not infrequent, Russia owes the public no explanation.

The largest Wagner Group telegram channel posted this image (left) of their contractors posing with a sledgehammer in Kherson Oblast [Source: Twitter/@GuinieZoo_Intel]
Wagner initially fought for Russian interests in Eastern Ukraine and Syria but quickly secured contracts in Africa supporting then-President Omar Al-Bashir in Sudan and Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar. However, in the Central African Republic and now Mali, they developed their playbook of opportunistically exploiting ill-will towards France and the E.U. to secure lasting contracts and political influence.

The Wagner Playbook in Africa: The Central African Republic and Beyond

Wagner’s appeal to some African leaders is simple. They offer to train the military, act like a praetorian guard, and conduct counterinsurgency operations at a relatively low cost. The deal is incredibly enticing if a state or its people are unsatisfied with its current security assistance. Former French colonies, particularly those with an ongoing conflict and French military presence, are especially susceptible. The Central African Republic, for instance, relied on French, EU, and U.N. missions as their primary security partners from 2014 until 2018. Then, as it became clear that peacekeepers and French forces were unable or unwilling to stem the violence or defeat CAR’s many rebel groups, President Touadera reached out to Russia. Alongside a shipment of weapons, some 170 mercenaries arrived under several names, including Sewa Security Services and COSI.  

https://twitter.com/banko416/status/1544638366049763328

Wagner’s presence jumped dramatically in response to a rebel offensive on the capital. Rebel coalitions overthrew the government multiple times in CAR, making the newest effort, led by a former President, an existential threat to President Touadera and Russian interests. Reinforcing over 2,000 personnel, Wagner halted the rebel advance and launched a counterattack that reconquered massive territory in a few months. 

Wagner also offers a few ways to pay for its services. The traditional way to pay mercenaries costs thousands of dollars per mercenary per month. Some countries, like the Central African Republic, offered Wagner access to resources such as gold and diamonds. 

Engagement with Wagner also comes with a constellation of other companies linked to the same group of Oligarchs, most notably Putin associate Yevgeny Prigozhin. The oligarch’s companies range from security, such as Wagner and Sewa Security Services, to mining and resource extraction, such as M-Invest. Wagner protects resource extraction sites, such as in Sudan, and secures mines to bring Russian mining interests or extort the miners and seize the resources. There are also media and disinformation efforts, such as Prigozhin’s infamous “troll farm.” Wagner produced a trilogy of films about itself, the first of which Touriste was shot in the Central African Republic and screened to the Central African audiences in the capital city, Bangui.  

Once Wagner is in the country, the results on the ground are more mixed than the sales pitch. They can be effective in a conventional fight against lightly amred rebel groups, as demonstrated by their counteroffensive in the Central African Republic, but they struggle to win counterinsurgencies. In Mozambique, Wagner took severe losses against Islamist militants in Cabo Delgado, and their relations with the Mozambican government deteriorated to the point of ending the mission. 

In terms of public relations and international image, employing Wagner undermines goodwill towards African leaders. Wagner is almost always too heavy-handed in its operations, leading to systematic abuses against civilians in pursuit of rebels. Worse still, they encourage the local security forces they accompany to do the same. U.N. reports from the Central African Republic found that Wagner and the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) were responsible for nearly half of all confirmed instances of abuse. 

Wagner and Russia use the international isolation of their host states to increase their influence. The President of the Central African Republic has a Russian national security advisor, mandated teaching Russian in schools, and now seeks to make Russian an official language, along with a raft of changes allowing him to run for a third term. More importantly, CAR appears no closer to peace as fighting continues, and Wagner-led FACA forces create more grievances for people in central and eastern CAR than they solve. Wagner’s ability to personally protect the President means that his fortunes can rise even if his country falls. Russia supported anti-French protests and fund some civil society figures, accompanied by legitimate anger at France for its decades of paternalistic policies in Africa, ensure that there will be some level of support in Capital cities independent of the performance of presidents and juntas as heads of state. 

Wagner in Mali, The Newest Mission

Mali, Wagner’s newest mission in Africa, follows the same playbook as the Central African Republic. Mali’s years-long conflict against rebels and Al-Qaeda and ISIS-affiliated extremist groups led to French intervention, an E.U. training mission and task force, and one of the U.N.’s largest current peacekeeping missions. After a series of coups in 2020 and 2021, the governing junta decided to close the airspace over Mali and expel the French mission. In September 2021, press reports revealed that the committee was negotiating with Russia to send Wagner forces to help fight extremists.

Wagner and Russia played on the Malian government’s dissatisfaction with France’s inability to restore order and the post-coup junta’s poor relationship with the international community to push anti-French propaganda and promise results in exchange for monthly payments and access to resources in the Southwest of the country. Like CAR, the mission has grown in scope, pushed the junta away from its traditional security partners, and now wields significant influence. 

Wagner has already engaged in severe human rights abuses in Mali. U.N. reports note a 300% increase in civilian deaths compared to prior years, a disproportionate number committed by security forces. The numbers are likely higher since Wagner, and the Malian government refuses to cooperate with U.N. investigations. The prime example is the town of Moura, where the Wagner and the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) likely killed 300-600 people while “liberating” it from extremists. According to eyewitness accounts, Wagner and FAMA detained, interrogated, and executed most men in the town, regardless of affiliation with extremists. Malian authorities refused to allow the U.N. to investigate with support from Russia in the U.N. Security Council. They even detained investigators when they approached the town.

The E.U.’s Plan to Counter Wagner

Several countries are looking for ways to contain and degrade Wagner’s operations in Africa. The U.S. Department of Treasury and its European counterparts have Prighozhin and other associates under sanctions. In addition, Wagner will likely feature prominently in the Countering Malign Russian Activities Act, which passed the House of Representatives and awaits approval. The U.K. Foreign Affairs Committee has also launched an investigation into Russian mercenaries. 

While most anti-Wagner efforts are nascent at the national level, a recently leaked E.U. report from the European External Action Service (EEAS) proposes taking ambitious steps to contain Russian mercenaries. According to the EEAS, Wagner’s activities in Mali forced the E.U. to suspend its training mission, leading to the erosion of democratic principles and worse humanitarian outcomes. The EEAS wants to launch three missions in West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea that go beyond the typical E.U. training mission. These missions would be trained, equipped, accompanied, and virtually guaranteed that E.U. soldiers would enter combat. 

Without overwhelming support from its member states, the E.U.’s plan is dead on arrival. Brussels is betting that improving its reliability as a security partner and making some efforts to counter Russian disinformation will prevent other West African nations, particularly Burkina Faso and Niger, who face the same security environment as Mali and are reportedly next on the Wagner hit list. However, the obstacles to implementing the plan are likely insurmountable for the E.U. in the near term. 

For all the talk of launching a broad effort across West Africa, doing so actually requires the countries in West Africa to be on board. Niger and Burkina Faso requested E.U. support, but only for logistical support. While they may be interested in an E.U. training, equipping, and accompanying the mission, overstepping their request dramatically might undermine public confidence in their governance and appear to have less sovereignty over their affairs. 

It is also unclear if there is sufficient appetite for the E.U. member states to contribute troops for three additional missions with a more aggressive mandate. In terms of deployments, smaller countries might be squeamish about large implementations. The E.U. might be worried that deploying former colonial powers like France would make the missions susceptible to the same kind of Russian propaganda they seek to counter. Most democracies are casualty-averse, meaning that any significant reversal could compromise participation. Lastly, with Europe’s newfound concern for Russia comes a desire to keep within their borders or contribute to NATO’s frontier with Russia. 

It’s always possible that the E.U. and other efforts contain the group, but generally, Wagner is defeated by its host government. For example, the Mozambican government ended Wagner’s mission following its poor performance, not an E.U. mission in a neighboring country. Moreover, detaching Wagner will be tough without sustained diplomatic and political pressure for those increasingly relying on Wagner to prop up the regime and personalize control over the state, such as CAR and Mali. 

This is a user-submitted piece by Marcel Plichta. Marcel Plichta is a Ph.D. Candidate in International Relations at the University of St Andrews and a former intelligence analyst for the U.S. Department of Defense. He has written on African security issues for Newsweek, Defense One, and World Politics Review. All views are his own.

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What Would ARSOF’s Role Be in Near-Peer Conflict With Russia?

The Army’s Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) are in transition. With the end of the 20-year war in Afghanistan and the slow winding down of combat operations in Iraq, ARSOF units are moving from an emphasis to a door-kicking counter-terrorism role to a more traditional role of countering near-peer adversaries such as Russia or China. 

ARSOF’s operators spent 40 years working against Russia during the Cold War. Many of the concepts remain the same, but warfare has changed since then, and there are more domains to be studied and targeted.

The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), funded the Rand Corporation to conduct research on how ARSOF and SOCOM would best be utilized in a near-peer conflict with Russia. The report, which was released earlier this week, took a detailed look at how ARSOF units should be used. It concluded that the units need better and more detailed direction. 

The Rand Corporation report recommends a return to ARSOF’s roots to combat neer-peer adversaries. Pictured above is the 7th SFG A-Team in El Salvador. (U.S. Army)

The report highlighted ARSOF’s history in countering Russia. “Long before ARSOF were used for counterterrorism missions, these forces were created for combat and competition with other great powers. Many of the U.S. antecedents of contemporary ARSOF arose in response to the exigencies of World War II, and they provided perhaps the preeminent military tools for competition with the Soviet Union in the Cold War.”

The RAND report calls for a return to ARSOF’s roots, which center around developing a physical presence in friendly countries and engaging in activities that the U.S. has frequently used to strengthen partnerships. These include subject-matter expert exchanges, intelligence gathering, and sharing operations. They also include the core SOF activities of Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Security Force Assistance (SFA), Military Information Support Operations (MISO), and Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). 

In studying how best to use ARSOF in a near-peer environment against Russia, it is also important to study the Russians’ doctrine in asymmetric warfare. A report by the Joint Special Operations University highlights the Eight Phases of New Russian Generation Warfare.

eight phases of Russian new generation warfare
The Eight Phases of Russian New Generation Warfare. (Joint Special Operations University)

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all NATO members, are the most vulnerable to Russian aggression. While ARSOF units won’t have any influence in countering a conventional military invasion, they can be used very effectively against the Russian “little green men,” or proxy forces. 

According to RAND,

“In conditions of more intensified competition, when the risk of armed conflict is high, ARSOF can help to defend against proxy forces used by U.S. adversaries.”

“ARSOF can also be used to disrupt adversary operations in denied environments or to impose costs on adversaries, although the most aggressive uses of ARSOF — unconventional warfare intended to overthrow adversary governments—have traditionally been high-risk activities with relatively low rates of success. It may be more successful when used for less ambitious goals, such as disrupting adversary lines of communication in denied environments where reasonably effective and politically acceptable local surrogates exist.”

In the report, RAND Corporation recommended the following:

  • The U.S. Army needs to revise its multi-domain operations (MDO) concepts and provide better and more specific guidance for the employment of ARSOF;
  • SOCOM, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and other key stakeholders need to periodically review allocations of ARSOF to ensure that they are optimally utilized in near-peer power competition;
  • Given the high levels of risk, ARSOF should only engage Russia in UW or information warfare in rare circumstances;
  • Because the benefits of ARSOF tend to be incremental and best measured by partner nation successes, Special Operations troops should be embedded with partner nations for long-term strategy. 

Despite the lip service given to the new near-peer competition, the U.S. is lacking direction for its ARSOF units according to the RAND report.  “Although U.S. strategic guidance proclaims that the United States has entered a new era of great-power competition, concepts for succeeding in that competition remain underdeveloped.”

Remembering Simo Häyhä, The Deadliest Sniper in History

Today marks the 17th anniversary of the passing of the deadliest sniper in history. During the Ruso-Finnish Winter War of 1939-40, Simo Häyhä, a Finnish sniper and competitive shooter, racked up 505 confirmed kills, some put the number as high as 542 in just 100 days of combat.

The Finnish soldiers called him “The Magical Shooter”, the Soviet soldiers had a more apt nickname for him. They called him the “White Death”.

After being seriously wounded in the war, Häyhä would live quietly as a farmer until he passed away in 2002 at the age of 96.

Early Life:

Häyhä was born on December 17, 1905, in Rautjärvi, Viipuri Province, Finland, in a Lutheran heritage family of farmers as the second youngest among eight children.

Prior to joining the military, he was an accomplished hunter, shooter, and skier although he made his living as a farmer. He first joined the Finnish military in 1925 at age 17 as a member of the Finnish voluntary militia White Guard (Suojeluskunta), similar to the U.S. National Guard.

After his service, he returned to farming but he purchased his issued rifle, as Finnish soldiers were given the option to, an early series SAKO M/28-30 (Sn.35281/Civil Guard district number S60974). The rifle was a Finnish variant of the Mosin–Nagant rifle, known as “Pystykorva”, the Spitz, chambered in the Finnish Mosin–Nagant cartridge 7.62×53R. The Finns nicknamed it “The Spitz” since the front sight resembled a Spitz dog breed.

Häyhä lived near the Finnish base and was a frequent competitor in the shooting sports that the Finns would conduct there. And reportedly, his house was full of competitive shooting trophies. He was able to shoot and hit 16 targets at about 150 meters in a minute using a bolt-action rifle.

War With the Soviet Union:

The Russians wanted a war with Finland and tried to provoke the Finns in late November 1939 with a massive artillery bombardment of the border. Josef Stalin tried to blame the Finns for some untold “aggression” which fooled no one in the rest of the world.

On November 30, the Soviets invaded Finland with over 160,000 troops. Although severely outnumbered, the Finns were well led and prepared. Stalin had purged his officer corps in 1937 and executed thousands of his officers. The result was he had politically loyal but tactically inept leaders. And they would pay the price in Finland.

Another factor was the Russians weren’t prepared for the winter war. Their troops wore the green greatcoat of the military. This made them stand out perfectly, silhouetted against the white snow. It made snipers like Häyhä pick them off with ridiculous ease.

With the cold, ranging from -20C to -40C, the Finns would allow the Soviets to attack on the roads and then envelop them and attack from the rear, causing huge casualties. Häyhä was called back into service, serving under the 6th Company of JR 34 on the Kollaa River.

At one point Häyhä and his fellow troops, just 32 in all were facing 4000 Soviet troops. And amazingly enough, they held their ground. In the early days of the fighting, a Soviet sniper had killed three junior platoon leaders and an NCO. Häyhä’s platoon leader told him to take out the sniper.

As the sun was setting, the Soviet sniper considered the day’s fighting done and carelessly abandoned his position. As he did so, the fading sunlight glinted off his sniper scope. Häyhä put a round right thru his face. Later another Soviet sniper kept his unit pinned down, once again, Häyhä was summoned for and began to search out his quarry. Using another Finnish lieutenant as a spotter, Häyhä took him out with a single shot from 400 meters.

Soviet commanders then sent a countersniper out to get him but he too was dispatched with a single shot. The Soviets answered with a mortar barrage down on Häyhä’s position. When he began to take out the Soviet artillery spotters with ease, they unleashed a massive artillery barrage on the Finnish positions.

Unlike most snipers, Häyhä didn’t fire from the prone position, he preferred sitting up. He was a diminutive 5’3, so still didn’t offer a big target. But he’d pile up the snow in front of him and then pack down or pour water on the snow in front of his muzzle. That way, the enemy couldn’t see the telltale disturbance and blasting of the snow.

He’d place his gloves on the snow and place his rifle on top of them to lessen the recoil. But perhaps the most amazing thing about his exploits is that Häyhä eschewed the use of telescopic sights, doing all of his shooting with just the iron sight of the rifle. He also would fill his mouth with snow, so enemy snipers couldn’t see his breath. In one day he once killed 25 Soviet soldiers.

Häyhä with his precision rifle given to him after his exploits.

A Finnish Army document detailed how deadly Häyhä’s sniping was on the Soviets during the Winter War. On December 22, 1939, he was given credit for 138 kills in 22 days; on January 26, 1940, it mentions the total count as 199 with another 61 kills in 35 days; on February 17, 1940, his total had risen to 219 with another 20 kills in 22 days; and finally on March 7, 1940, on the day after he was severely wounded, the Finns listed the total number of kills as 259 with another 40 kills in 18 days. He was credited with almost the same number of kills with a submachine gun.

Häyhä had developed his knack for competitive shooting with his days as an accomplished hunter to hone his craft in the most deadly fashion. And he had learned to be spot-on with his range estimation, something he’d practiced hard at. With his rifle zeroed at 150 meters, he could estimate and make the changes needed faster and more accurately than his enemy could.

He was a hero in the Finnish army and was presented a special rifle, a custom-built precision weapon gifted by a Swedish businessman and friend of Finland, Eugen Johannson.

The Russians finally got to Häyhä when a Soviet sniper sent an explosive bullet into the cheek of Häyhä on March 6, 1940. It tore off his jaw and most of his left cheek. Amazingly enough, he survived and regained consciousness on the day the war ended. He had to endure 26 surgeries on his face, which took several years. He never fully recovered his speech. Finnish Field Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim elevated Häyhä from the rank of alikersantti (Corporal) to vänrikki (Second lieutenant).

After the war, he returned to farming, becoming a very successful dog breeder and moose hunter, and lived to the ripe old age of 96, passing away on April 1, 2002. He was asked a few years before his death how he became such an expert sniper…he replied, “practice.”

Photos: Wikipedia, Video: Weird History/YouTube.com

Tunnel-mapping tech may be the most important special operations gear of the 21st century

Recently, NEWSREP Editor-in-chief Jack Murphy reported on the U.S. military’s standing plan to infiltrate Iranian underground bunkers housing integral elements of the nation’s nuclear apparatus. If war between the United States and Iran were ever to come to fruition, these facilities (commonly referred to as hardened and deeply buried targets, or HDBTs) would be among America’s top priorities. But taking them out of commission would require a more dramatic approach than America’s preferred method of warfare by ballistic missile.

Many of these HDBTs are constructed deep underground, often by tunneling into mountains. The natural barrier provided by 2,000 feet of rock would, in some cases, render even America’s bunker-busting munitions useless. Instead, infiltrating and destroying these facilities would fall to America’s elite counterterrorism unit, the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, or Delta Force.

Although Delta has been training for these potential underground combat operations in Iran for years, the risks associated with such an operation have grown in tandem with the increasing number of potential enemy states—including North Korea, China, and Russia—all of which maintain (or are rumored to maintain) sizable underground facilities meant to shield against weapons of mass destruction and potentially afford protection to command and control elements from surveillance or engagement.

Soldiers of 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, prepare to clear a corridor during subterranean operations training. (U.S. Army)

As Jack Murphy pointed out in his NITRO ZEUS piece, “Numerous countries have sought to conceal and protect vulnerable military resources underground inside facilities hardened with reinforced concrete, vault doors, internal environmental systems, and more, such as the United States has done at the Cheyenne Mountain Complex.”

Put simply, fighting in enclosed spaces deep underground, where communications are limited and the stakes are at their highest, isn’t just a tactical nightmare, it may also become a pervasive part of what nation-level warfare looks like in the 21st century.

It’s likely with this concern in mind that America’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA, has issued a request for information regarding advanced technologies and methodologies that can be employed for the “3D mapping and surveying of underground environments.”

“What makes subterranean areas challenging for precision mapping and surveying, such as lack of GPS, constrained passages, dark or dust-filled air, is similar to what inhibits safe and speedy underground operations for our warfighters,” said DARPA Tactical Technology Office (TTO) Program Manager Timothy Chung. “Building an accurate three-dimensional picture is a key enabler to rapidly and remotely exploring and searching subterranean spaces.”

If you’ve seen the film “Prometheus,” this effort may seem familiar. In the movie, crew members deploy floating drones that use lasers to quickly map out the subterranean cave complex they’re exploring.

It doesn’t seem likely that DARPA’s cave-mapping drones will defy gravity like those depicted in “Prometheus,” but with small drone technology rapidly advancing, a “floating” mapping device doesn’t seem entirely out of the question. Of course, propulsion is far from the only technical hurdle faced in this initiative. Maintaining connectivity to the operator, processing the data captured and rendering it in a usable manner, and even concerns about battery life versus added weight are among the litany of hurdles developers will need to either mitigate or eliminate in order to make such a device a reality.

A soldier assigned to 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, provides security during subterranean operations training. (U.S. Army)

In many ways, special operations war-fighters operating in these tunnels will be doing so without any access to external digital or communications infrastructure, meaning the mapping system will need to be entirely self-contained between the probe and the operator’s gear. Cloud computing or outsourcing any of the computational work via any sort of network simply won’t work beneath 2,000 feet of rock

The challenges DARPA faces in this endeavor are not insignificant by any stretch of the imagination, but a breakthrough in this sort of technology could provide American and allied forces with a much-needed advantage in what would be sure to be brutal fighting inside confined spaces. America’s special operations troops may be the best trained in the world, but training doesn’t stop bullets. In tunnel warfare, a defender’s familiarity with the space, the terrain, and any potential hazards can offset a significant training advantage had by the attackers.

Despite not quite garnering the same sort of attention as programs like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter or new hypersonic missiles, tunnel-mapping technology may prove to be the most valuable tech in America’s war-fighting arsenal. After all, fast-moving missiles may help win a conventional war, but the only way to win a nuclear one is to prevent it from starting in the first place.

 

 

Feature image courtesy of the U.S. Army

Dr. Strangelove? Russians Claim to Have “Doomsday” Submarine Weapon

Alex Hollings, on the main NEWSREP site, penned a very intriguing piece about the latest Russian weapon, which they’re calling a “doomsday” submarine. If you’re having flashbacks to Stanley Kubrick’s dark comedy masterpiece, “Dr. Strangelove”, then you’re not alone. Read on…


Russia’s struggling economy may not make for a particularly effective military, but the Kremlin’s ability to mold public perceptions remains among the nation’s most comprehensive and powerful skill sets. While some within the United States are still content to dispute the idea that Moscow uses a combination of state-run media outlets and social media outreach campaigns to shape the way the world perceives Russia (and ourselves), there are few better examples of this state-sanctioned chicanery than recent reactions to the “Poseidon” or Status 6 unmanned, submersible nuclear weapon.

Let there be no mistake, Russia’s Poseidon is both well within the nation’s technological capabilities to develop and promises to offer a never-before-seen level of destruction if ever detonated inside an American port. Yet, beyond the headline-grabbing 100-megaton yield and the promise of irradiated tsunamis laying waste to coastal communities for hundreds of miles, the Poseidon offers Russia truly little in terms of strategic value.

That may seem counter-intuitive. After all, with the largest nuclear warhead ever put into service secured inside a stealthy platform that, in all likelihood, could reach American shores undetected, one could be inclined to think the Poseidon poses perhaps the most pressing threat to American security since the Soviet Union first developed the atomic bomb. However, the truth is, the same nuclear deterrence strategies that defanged Russia’s previous “doomsday” weapons remain in effect whether the nuclear threat comes from the sky or beneath the waves.

Russia, in fact, already boasts nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles that are massively more powerful than the platforms housed in America’s ICBM arsenal. Russia also holds the title for most nuclear weapons on hand, making it the clear winner in both categories for most and biggest nukes.

Even with Aegis-equipped destroyers, THAAD missile defense systems, America’s Ground-based Midcourse Defense system and a constellation of early warning satellites, there is no debating it: if Russia decided to throw every nuke it had at the U.S. (or even just a large chunk of them), America would have absolutely no chance of stopping them all.

It’s that understanding that led to the development of the nuclear triad: a system based on the ability to offer prompt nuclear retaliation no matter how overwhelming a nuclear attack may be. America’s nuclear triad relies on air-launched platforms (often carried by the B-52), ground-launched ICBMs, and submarine-launched weapons, making it all but impossible to neuter America’s nuclear response and guaranteeing Russia’s destruction in any nuclear exchange. America knows it can’t stop Russia from raining nuclear hellfire down on its people, so it’s settled for the next best thing: guaranteeing the U.S. would respond in kind.

That staring contest has been dubbed “mutually assured destruction,” and the concept is really about as simple as geopolitics can get: American and Russian leaders both know that launching even one nuke in the other nation’s direction will lead to a large-scale exchange that would likely end the world. If everyone is dead, it’s tough to pick a winner.

And that brings us back to Russia’s latest headline-grabbing Bond-villain-esque Poseidon. At 100 megatons (sometimes reported in Russian media as 200 megatons), the Poseidon carries a warhead that’s twice as large as the largest nuclear detonation ever recorded, making it a formidable weapon. Still, in terms of mutually assured destruction, it truly offers nothing of particular note. While a single Poseidon detonation could indeed cause an unprecedented level of destruction, headlines the following day (if there were any) would likely be focused on the hundreds of nuclear strikes that followed and the collapse of the modern world. Nothing would be different than if Russia had opted to launch an ICBM strike, rather than a sneaky, submersible one.

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Photo; Russian Ministry of Defense

Mismanagement Plagues Air Force F-22 Raptor Program

Another excellent article from Alex Hollings over on our parent site NEWSREP was posted the other day on the trials and tribulations of the most lethal superiority fighter in the world, the F-22 Raptor. Hollings wrote that the biggest issues with the fighter have to do from within the U.S., not its enemies.

U.S. congressmen, not thinking forward, stopped funding the program, thinking that the U.S. didn’t need the fighter ten years ago. Now, with a renewed emphasis on a possible conflict with Russia or China on the horizon, those decisions could come back to haunt them. Read on…

America’s first fifth-generation fighter, the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor, is widely considered to be the best air superiority fighter on the planet. The combination of its low observability and high performance makes it America’s heavyweight contender in the battle for air supremacy, even in the era of the data-fusing F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. While the F-35 was intended to serve as a jack-of-most-trades, with a heavy emphasis on air-to-ground power, the F-22 was built with one primary purpose in mind: to hunt down, close with, and destroy enemy fighters.

However, the pricey F-22 program soon saw retreating support among lawmakers that sought to reduce the cost of America’s defense apparatus without reducing the nation’s ongoing obligations in combat. With just 186 F-22s delivered to the U.S. Air Force, the program was cut short in 2009, a decision that has since been criticized as short-sighted. While the United States had no pressing need for an advanced air superiority fighter at the time, the nation now knows it was less than ten years away from a resurgence of concerns about nation-level threats posed by diplomatic competitors like China and Russia.

The Air Force, which also relies heavily on the F-15 for air superiority missions, has since tried its best to make do with its limited quantity of F-22s, which, it’s important to note, are notoriously difficult to maintain. The high cost and level of labor required to keep America’s Raptors operating tends to result in reduced availability for the airframe, but those problems, according to a new report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), are seriously exacerbated by the branch’s poor management of F-22s and related assets.

According to the GAO report, it was the Air Force’s decision to organize its fleet of F-22s into smaller units than seen in traditional air wings. F-22s are flown out of 18-to-21-aircraft squadrons with only two squadrons per wing. Conversely, other fighters operate out of wings comprised of three squadrons with 24 aircraft in each. These units, the GAO contends, are able to field more fighters, more consistently, thanks to efficiencies created by sharing more equipment and resources in the larger wings.

Those issues are made worse by the Air Force’s habit of deploying F-22 Unit Type Codes (UTCs), or small contingents of jets, with only six or so of a squadron’s aircraft. These UTCs, however, deploy with around half of the squadron’s maintenance personnel and equipment, leaving the remaining jets understaffed and under-equipped when it comes time for maintenance operations. All of this results in drastically reduced aircraft availability rates, which are also worsened by the branch’s reliance on F-22s for domestic air defense missions, operations the GAO contends could easily be conducted using fourth-generation fighters like the F-15.

All of these issues combine for a perfect storm of reduced F-22 availability for combat operations, but potentially worse, reduced availability of these jets for essential training operations.

To read the entire article, click here:

Photo: US Air Force

ISIS In Syria Being Decimated, Russia, Assad Call For US to Withdraw

Opinion: The Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) have continued to hammer the forces of the Islamic State (ISIS) that lay in front of them. The Syrian government of President Assad, along with their Russian allies are calling for the United States now to withdraw from the country.

“We also call on the United States, whose military units are on Syrian territory illegally, to leave the country,” the joint statement said.

The ISIS fighters are being squeezed into a four-square-kilometer sliver of territory along the Euphrates River. The fighting is fierce where the ISIS troops are now left with the prospect of having nowhere to run. In the recent fighting for the villages of Susa and Marashida, the Daesh, the Arabic word for ISIS are taking reprisals against the civilians who try to flee from the fighting. SDF troops, like everywhere ISIS has been are finding piles of bodies at every turn.

In the fierce fighting in Susa, SDF troops took the town, only to have ISIS counterattack and force them back out. But SDF augmented by Kurdish Special Forces troops, massive amounts of artillery and air strikes, routed the ISIS elements in the town, which lay in ruin now.

Because of the reprisals, ISIS has taken against the civilian populace, they’ll follow on with their next tactic out of their playbook which is to use the civilians as human shields. And the international community will call for them to be given another free pass like the one they were given at Raqua. ISIS made a deal with the SDF to allow “a few hundred” fighters and their families leave Raqua.

The BBC reported that 250 fighters were permitted to leave Raqqa. They left with 3,500 family members to ISIS-controlled territory. According to the BBC, their convoy included nearly 50 rented trucks, 13 buses, and more than 100 ISIS vehicles. Ten trucks were loaded with weapons. What was told was that just a few dozen fighters and their families would be let go. With no foreigners and no weapons.

If there’s one thing we’ve learned about ISIS over the past several years, is that they deserve no quarter from anyone. Have they given any to any civilian anywhere? The U.S. and British would not attack the convoys as the vehicles were driven by civilians and the coalition said they wouldn’t bomb women and children.

That sordid affair was captured here in its entirety:

The Syrians and Russians are also calling for the U.S. to allow refugees in Rukban along the Syrian-Jordan border to be evacuated by Syrian and Russian troops. The regime is supplying buses to move the refugees in the camp where conditions are dire.

Rukban lies smack in the middle of the US-Russian demilitarized zone, created by the two superpowers so that no “mistaken” conflicts arise between the two countries. Neither the Americans nor Russians would take responsibility for the camp.

The nearby U.S. military base near al-Tanf also allows the US to be close to a supply route where Iranian weapons enter Syria from Iraq.

The Jordanians will no longer help the camp after ISIS attacked its troops near the border. The civilians in the camp (about 50,000) are stuck in the middle. They initially fled from the Assad regime and ISIS. Assad’s forces have not allowed aid to reach the camp.

The Russians claim that a recent poll conducted by the U.N. had 95 percent of its refugees wanted to leave Rukban and that 80 percent wanted to return to areas under Syrian regime control. Yet when the Russians opened a pair of “humanitarian corridors” to territory held by the Assad regime, not one refugee left.

The civilians (80% women and children) fear arrest, torture, and even death at the hands of Assad.

But yet, the Syrians and Russians try to lay the blame on the Americans. “The command of the US group in the al-Tanf zone interferes the exit, moreover, misleads the refugees about the inability to leave the camp, spreads rumors, that on the territory controlled by the Syrian government, they will be devastated, forced into conscription and arrested,” they said in their statement.

The Trump Administration had said that they were completely pulling out of Syria, which is exactly what the regime, the Russians and the Iranians have wanted. But after speaking with Turkish President Ergodan, Trump reversed his field and has decided to leave about 400 troops in the country at two different locations. That is about 20 percent of the currently 2000 troops in the country.

Erdogan has made it clear that his government will not tolerate armed Kurds on the border with Turkey as he considers the SDF the same as the YPG and the outlawed  Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which his government sees as terrorists.

Meanwhile, freezing temperatures, lack of food, medicines, and doctors have the refugees on the brink. Eight children have starved to death in Rukban since the beginning of the year.

Now is not the time for the United States to leave too soon or to allow ISIS to leave the country unmolested. European nations are refusing to allow nationals who left to fight for ISIS back in their countries. The United States should adopt the same policy.

Photo: Getty Images

US Aid to Venezuela Thru Colombia Now is the Crux of the Crisis

Opinion: The United States is pushing the envelope against the authoritarian regime of Nicholas Maduro in Venezuela. No one is arguing, except Maduro that the tons of medical supplies are urgently needed. The people of Venezuela are in dire need of food, medicine and an end to the hyper-inflation devastating the once prosperous nation’s economy. Over three million Venezuelans have fled the country and are moving across the border into Colombia.  

But there is another side to the U.S. aid being shipped into Colombia, which is why many of the international aid agencies are wanting nothing to do with this. By sending the aid to neighboring Colombia, the United States has upped the ante to encourage military members, especially the junior to mid-level officers to cease their allegiance to Maduro. The aim is to foment regime change by backing the claims of the “interim President” Juan Guaidó who has called for a “humanitarian avalanche” with “caravans” to go to the Colombian borders to get the aid next Saturday.

The hope is that once the supplies, which the U.S. is shipping to the city of Cúcuta, on the border with Venezuela, reaches the bridge between the two countries, military leaders will defy Maduro and allow the aid to cross.

However, the U.N. and other aid agencies are balking at getting involved. “Humanitarian action needs to be independent of political, military or any other objectives,” Stéphane Dujarric, the U.N. spokesman, said last week. “The needs of the people should lead in terms of when and how humanitarian assistance is used.”

Right now, the border bridge on the Venezuelan side is blocked by a tanker truck and shipping containers. And Maduro is painting himself into a corner. He claims that there is no humanitarian crisis, that the United States is manufacturing a false claim to incite a military invasion.

Calling this false flies in the face of the facts. When three million of your countrymen flee and food stores are empty, hospitals are in dire need of medicine and your only supporters to your claim as President are those known “freedom loving democracies” as Russia, China, Cuba et al, it rings increasingly hollow.

Maduro’s Vice President,  Delcy Rodriguez got some advice that rivals that of Baghdad Bob when he alleged that the US aid was contaminated with carcinogens “to poison our population” and described it as a “biological weapon”, as reported by the Spanish newspaper El Mundo.

The ante is further being raised by the presence of Senator Marco Rubio from Florida who was in Colombia on Sunday. “There comes a time in many people’s lives when they have to make a decision that will define them forever,” Rubio said. “That time has come for the Venezuelan soldiers.”  Rubio called Maduro’s rule “a criminal regime willing to starve and kill its own people.”

Also, Richard Branson, the British billionaire, and philanthropist is organizing a benefit concert in Cúcuta this coming Friday. Branson said he hopes to raise $100 million for humanitarian aid.

Guaidó is calling for thousands of supporters dressed in white to march on the border to confront the border guards and allow the aid to pass. Colombians in Cúcuta are uneasy about the entire scene being played out in their midst. It is a city of 750,000 that has been inundated by Venezuelan refugees.

Other humanitarian aid is slated to be coming from the Brazilian border and from the neighboring island of Curaçao.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is continuing to push the Venezuelan military to decide, Elliott Abrams, the U.S. special envoy for Venezuela, said earlier this month at a press brief, “Members of the army are Venezuelan citizens. … Our hope is that they will be able to persuade Maduro, or they will simply disobey orders to continue the starvation of the people of Venezuela.”

Kevin Whittaker, the US Ambassador to Colombia, said last week that Maduro “needs to leave so his people’s needs can be attended to, so the Venezuelan economy can be put back on its feet, and so that Venezuela can once again be a normal country.”

Maduro is digging in his heels and last week denied entry to five members of the European Parliament who flew to Caracs to meet with Guaidó at his invitation. They were barred from entry into Venezuela’s Simon Bolivar International Airport and subsequently deported.

This next week will be very interesting to watch. All eyes now are on the Venezuelan military. On one hand, they’ve been very loyal to the Maduro’s regime. But the rank and file members have family members who are starving. They know that someday there will be a reckoning.

Photo: Wikipedia

Navy SEALs Are Placing More Emphasis on Big Wars With China, Russia

“The Times they are a-changin” wrote Bob Dylan in 1964 but for the U.S. Navy SEAL teams, it may not mean that they are changing per se, but returning to their original roots. After two decades of war in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, the Navy’s Special Warfare specialists are preparing more for a conflict with bigger countries and militaries like Russia and China.

It doesn’t mean an end to counter-insurgency operations and the Direct Action missions that the SEAL teams have been known for but they’re refocusing on some of their more traditional missions.

In a new story on NEWSREP, Stavros Atlamazoglou wrote about the SEALs and their refocusing on the Big Navy:

In a recent interview, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Bill Moran acknowledged and welcomed this development. “It’s to the point now where we include them in all of our exercises, our war games, our tabletops [training exercises] — because as much as it is their chance to ‘re-blue,’ it’s our chance to reconnect from the blue side,” he said. “We’ve grown used to not having them in a lot of those situations. Now as we’ve done the tabletops, the exercises and the war games, we see: ‘Wow, there is some great capability here that can set the conditions for the kind of operations in every single one of those campaigns.’ And that will continue to grow, I think,” added the Navy’s second-in-command.

The best way to display a unit’s relevancy, and thus accrue more funds, is to define a possible threat and show how the unit could address it. In the case of China, the threat would be the numerous man-made islands that the Chinese have been building in the South China Sea. Although nothing more than a few hundred meters of sand, these islands can carry anti-ship missile batteries that would serve as an outer ring of defense against the Navy’s aircraft carriers.

The NSWC appears to understand the problem and the opportunity it offers. What are SEALs good at doing? Other than being authorities in Direct Action (DA) missions, SEALs are capable of hydrographic and special reconnaissance (SR) and stealthy waterborne insertion. Moreover, SEAL Team 6 is renowned for its High Altitude High Opening (HAHO) and High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) parachute capabilities. Thus, in a potential conflict with China, they could be the eyes and ears of commanders in those man-made islands and either direct strikes against them or unilaterally eliminate them. And evidence suggests that this is what they are being training to do.

The SEALs, for example, have requested an exponential increase in training activities in Hawaii’s islands. As of now, around 100 training exercises take place in Hawaii per year, the majority of which are scuba diving training. However, NSWC has requested 330 exercises for 2019. The majority of the exercises would be parachute insertions followed by over-the-beach operations.

The Navy has yet to approve the increase. But, judging by the words of Admiral Moran, it will.

Photo: US Navy

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