Sections

SpecialOperations.com

The Definitive Spec Ops Resource

THE DEFINITIVE SPEC OPS RESOURCE FOR FITNESS AND SELECTION

Nicaragua

Death of David Baez, Green Beret, Sandinista Pt.3

The final installment of Greg Walker’s outstanding piece on the strange tale of David Baez is here today. Baez was born in Nicaragua and his father, a military officer was murdered by the Somoza regime. His hatred of everything that had to do with the Somoza’s stayed with Baez his entire life. He went to the United States, became a Green Beret with the 10th and 7th Special Forces Groups but then would leave the military to return to Nicaragua. He eventually became an officer of the Sandinista army.

On a mission to Honduras to spread the “cause” for their revolution, his choices would cause him to lose his life. Part III is here:

“Cry ‘Havoc,’ and let slip the dogs of war;

That this foul deed shall smell above the earth

With carrion men, groaning for burial.” – Julius Caesar, 1601

On July 27, 1983, Comandante Reyes Mata gave Lieutenant “Justo Martinez” a large sum of Honduran lempiras “to purchase mules, supplies, and, especially, food.” Lt. Martinez and several other guerrillas left the base camp at Congolon for the closest town, Nueva Palestina—a three- to four-day hike through the jungle on foot. It was a twofold mission. Martinez was to establish the FAP’s presence in the town, linking it with Congolon. A similar link would then be made with Tegucigalpa, the country’s capital city. Once accomplished, the FAP’s “internal front” would become a reality. “We have vested in it our hope for survival,” wrote Reyes Mata in his war diary.

Lieutenant Martinez was given three days to reach Nueva Palestina, two days to accomplish their tasks, and three days to return to base camp. On July 30th, Combatant “Marvin” deserted the base camp. Leaving his weapons and equipment the guerrilla took only his watch and blanket with him as he headed back toward the Patuca River. A three-man team sent to take him into custody could not catch the fleeing Honduran. “Marvin” was the first of what would become a relentless tide of desertions over the next six weeks.

On the morning of August 2nd, “Miguel,” “Mairena,” and “Renecito” had slipped away, taking their weapons and equipment to discourage any pursuit by the FAP. Unknown to Reyes Mata, two deserters had reached the town of Catacamas and turned themselves in to the FUSEP, or national police. They shared all they knew with the police, who in turn notified the Honduran Army. General Gustavo Alvarez, head of the armed forces, was furious and with good reason.

On July 19th, in Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega had proposed a six-point peace plan with Honduras tied to the Contra war. General Alvarez was learning that, on this very same date, with the support and blessings of the Cubans and Sandinistas, a heavily armed and well-trained Marxist column had crossed the Coco River. Further, it was led by Dr. Jose Reyes Mata, who had two Nicaraguan combat advisers with him. It was a betrayal the general would not abide by.

Guerrilla warfare 101

“The column was already screwing up if they made scheduled contact at the same time, and likely the same frequency, every day. That’s counter to best practices of guerrilla warfare comms [communications]. The FUSEP reported the column to the Estado Mayor in Tegu and [a] PSYOP/civic action effort was poured into the [Olancho] province. The Honduran SF was spun up, and with Contras tracking the column, updates were provided until the HSF arrived and was positioned to begin kicking ass. The Contras blocked any escape routes should the column [have] decided to evade back into NU [Nicaragua].” – Retired U.S. Special Forces Master Sergeant, Charlie Company, 3/7th Special Forces Group, Panama

On August 4th, the Honduran Army arrived in Nueva Palestina and established its forward operating base (FOB). Lieutenant Justo Martinez and his resupply team had just arrived as well. In his diary entry of August 6th, Reyes Mata offers, “We complete 10 days without food…we are all waiting anxiously for him….” Two days earlier Reyes Mata had personally executed Combatant “El Paisa,” whose true name was Juan Ortiz. Ortiz was accused of planning to assassinate Reyes Mata and inciting those who had deserted to have done so. A swift jungle trial was held, and Ortiz was killed in front of all those other guerrillas present. The execution did not stop the desertions. In fact, they would increase, with those surrendering providing even more information about the FAP.

By now the column had lost six of its original 96 members to desertion, capture, and execution. Still, Reyes Mena believed he had won a “great political victory.” He’d also lost four M16s, two grenades, and roughly 1,500 rounds of ammunition, and yet the FAP had not been in a single armed engagement.

The Honduran SF was spun up, and with Contras tracking the column, updates were provided until the HSF arrived and was positioned to begin kicking ass.

In an August 30th U.S. Department of Defense message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided by the Honduran G-2 and U.S. Defense Attaché, a nine-page report gave the names and position of each guerrilla in the column. In addition, the commanders, sub-commanders, and political officers for each of the four platoons were identified. The true names and aliases of the deserters to date and the members of the FAP support staff to include “Comandante Adolfo,” or David Arturo Baez Cruz, and “Gregorio,” were noted. Finally, the battle plan for the column was revealed as it sought to open separate fronts in Honduras.

The deserters had described radio communications capable of reaching Nicaragua and “other countries.” Deserter Enoc Benigno told his interrogators the radio had to be used with a dipole antenna put as high as possible in a tree “for better signal propagation.” One power source was a car battery and the other a portable generator operated by a mechanical pedal. Comandante “Fidel,” leader of the Third Platoon, held all the codes and frequencies. As he had forgotten to pack an extra battery, the generator had become the sole source of power for communications. Communication security was poor. Transmissions were made daily and always occurred at 0900 and 1600 hours, and were 30 minutes in duration each.

In short order the Honduran military, working in concert with the U.S. military and the CIA, began intercepting guerrilla radio traffic. Using the U.S.-operated clandestine radio communications intercept sites atop Tiger Island in the nearby Gulf of Fonseca, and another located inland between San Lorenzo and Tegucigalpa, General Alvarez’s Special Forces task force began placing blocking forces from Honduran infantry units at key trailheads, villages, towns, and roadways in Olancho Province. Major Leonel Luque was assigned by General Alvarez as the task force commander. Leonel Luque possessed a military police background and had attended the School of the Americas in Panama. He was also an important liaison with the Contra effort on the Honduran border and was known for his ruthlessness in dealing with subversives.

Reyes Mata allowed for just eight days for Justo Martinez to return to Congolon with supplies. The situation at the base camp was deteriorating swiftly. Listening to their own radio, the guerrillas discovered they’d been compromised by the deserters and the Army’s response. Reyes Mata ordered the camp struck and the column split in two. His group would remain in the Nueva Palestina area; the other group, now commanded by Comandante Serapio Romero (Frente Oriental), would begin its trek to the Catacamas Mountains. “Gregorio” would travel with this group. “Adolfo”/Baez would remain with Reyes Mata and combatant James “Lupe” Carney. Serapio’s unit departed 48 hours before Reyes Mata. Serapio would bivouac at a predetermined location and allow the slower-moving Reyes Mata to catch up before they parted for good. It was determined the FAP would not return to Nicaragua. It would remain in pursuit of its mission to wage war in Honduras.

As the starving band started down the trail, they were joined by combatant Raul Felipe Calix. “[He] appeared, completely beaten, but all right,” wrote Reyes Mata.

“They had left him alive.” Although his diary does not identify the other guerrillas that were with LT Martinez, it is reasonable to presume Felipe Calix was one of these and had managed to escape the army in Nueva Palestina to warn the FAP they were being hunted.

Rangers lead the way!

“…the U.S. Southern Command admits 150 American troops, most of them Army Rangers from Fort Lewis, Washington, were parachuted in Olancho on August 5th. They stayed until August 16, engaging in what the Pentagon called ‘a simulated counter-insurgency operation’ with Honduran forces. August 5th was the day after the Honduran Army’s Patuca Task Force arrived in Olancho on its real counter-insurgency mission.” – The Nation, “The Mysterious Death of Fr. Carney,” August 4-11, 1984

The Honduran Special Forces Squadron was originally trained in La Venta, Honduras, by a U.S. Special Forces operational detachment from the 3/7th SFG(A)—then stationed in Panama. La Venta, roughly 20 miles from Tegucigalpa, was the headquarters for both the “TIGERS” squadron as well as the COBRAS. The COBRAS were trained by a separate 40-man mobile training team recruited at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Both efforts took place in 1982. The Green Berets responsible for the COBRAS grew their hair out, wore civilian clothing, and arrived in Honduras completely “sterile,” meaning no dog tags or any other U.S. military identification (the same precautions David Baez had used before crossing the Coco River with the FAP).

Kidnapping, torture, assassination, and “disappearing” suspects by dropping their sometimes still-living but most often dead corpses from fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft were sanctioned.

Both the TIGERS and the COBRAS were trained in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and unconventional warfare strategies, tactics, and techniques. These included sniper deployment, special weapons, hand-to-hand combat, raids, ambushes, the clearing of airplanes and buildings, and intelligence collection/assessment. At times individual instructors with unique specialty skills such as photography and demolitions were brought in. Both MTTs delivered a well-trained 120-man Honduran Special Forces squadron owned by the army and a 40-man Urban Operations Command, or Hostage Rescue Force (HRF) that fell under FUSEP. Both these elite units were under the direct command of General Gustavo Alvarez, chief of the armed forces.

Working in conjunction with the TIGERS and COBRAS were the military intelligence teams of Battalion 316. B-316 was the direct result of General Alvarez’s long-time professional and personal relationships with the military in Argentina. That country’s armed forces had been conducting a “dirty war” against communist influence and objectives for more than five years. The larger operation began in 1976 and was a collaboration between Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay. CONDOR allowed for extraordinary cross-border cooperation between intelligence services and special units. Kidnapping, torture, assassination, and “disappearing” suspects by dropping their sometimes still-living but most often dead corpses from fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft was sanctioned.

The United States under both President Carter (1977-1981) and Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) was fully aware of CONDOR and both encouraged and resourced it. An August 1976 cable to the State Department from U.S. diplomats in Latin America raised early and grave concerns regarding CONDOR being far more than simply intelligence gathering and sharing (Figure 1). Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was at first cautious in his response, but within days sent the subtle message that no further oppositional action was to be taken regarding CONDOR and its goals/objectives by the U.S. (Figure 2).

Although CONDOR was officially shut down in Argentina and that country’s direct support of subject matter experts in interrogation, torture, and assassination withdrawn from supporting U.S. efforts in Central America, the overarching years of collaboration and financial support, as managed by the Central Intelligence Agency to its allies in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, had created units such as Battalion 316, a mirror image of its parent, Battalion 601, in Argentina.

Operation CONDOR, as it was formally known, was supported by U.S. assets and resources. The end game was the destruction of any and all suspected or proven communist movements in both the southern cone (South America) and Central American countries. CONDOR grew out of Cuba’s continued and blatant efforts to destabilize Latin America, with Che in Bolivia (and a concurrent Cuban-sponsored effort in Argentina at the same time) the basis for such a program. When Nicaragua fell to the internationalist Marxist revolutionaries under the Sandinista banner—and although by 1982/1983 Operation CONDOR was being shut down and war crimes trials for its creators and participants were on the horizon—El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala imported CONDOR veterans and their techniques to counter the myriad armed Marxist groups such as the FMLN, FSLN, and PRTC.

In all fairness, the Sandinistas, finding themselves facing the Contras with U.S. backing, likewise employed former CONDOR specialists for the same purposes.

Alvarez wanted his own counterpart unit to Argentina’s feared Battalion 601.And he got it.The 316 Military Intelligence Battalion’s commander reported directly to Alvarez and was on the same command wiring diagram as the Special Forces squadron and COBRAS. B-316 oversaw or ran counterintelligence operations, covert and clandestine operations, domestic and foreign operations, electronic and “other” surveillance efforts. It also had a hand in psychological operations, although those were run by a separate unit. The “iron fist” for B-316 were the TIGERS and the COBRAS. When the FAP crossed the Coco River and was discovered, as well as Daniel Ortega’s diplomatic treachery, the stage was set for all three units to be put to the test—with U.S. knowledge, support, assets, and resources.

“The Argentines came in first, and they taught how to disappear people. The United States made them more efficient. The Americans…brought the equipment. They gave the training in the United States, and they brought agents here to provide some training in Honduras. They taught us interrogation techniques.” – Lt. Oscar Alvarez, Honduran Special Forces, nephew of General Gustavo Alvarez

Death sentence

“In accordance with the International Rules of Land Warfare, had [the FAP] established a shadow government, held a piece of territory and governed it, wore uniforms and had an established legal system, they would have received protection under the Geneva Convention. Reyes Mata would have known this.” – MSG (ret) Leamon Ratterree, 3/7th Special Forces Group (A)

Reyes Mata and Serapio Romero went over their final plans. Reyes Mata and his group would continue toward Nueva Palestina and attempt to refit and resupply. Comandante Serapio would take his group, the fittest of the remaining FAP, and move along the Patuca River toward the Catacamas Mountains and, once there, strike inland toward the Capacan Mountain Range and the Tinto River. The guerrillas continued to forage in the jungle, and although their food was minimal, they were blessed in having an abundance of water available. A human being in the circumstances the FAP guerrillas were in would die within 48-72 hours without water. However, the sporadic rainfall and the Patuca River with its feeder streams ensured their survival.

What neither commander knew was just how enormous the manpower and resources of the Honduran and U.S armies were.

To read the entire article click here: 

Photo: Greg Walker/NEWSREP

David  Baez, Green Beret, Sandinista Officer -Part 2

We recently posted the first part in an outstanding three-part series written by former Special Forces NCO Greg Walker on the story of David Arturo Baez, a former Green Beret from the 3rd Bn, 7th SFG in Panama, who left the American military, ostensibly to help his family run a coffee farm. But he instead joined the Sandinista army.

Walker has done painstaking research and connected all of the dots on what was a story that was only whispered about in U.S. circles. Now, as the story unfolds, Baez takes an active role in not only joining the Sandinista army but training airborne and Special Operations units, using the training he received in the U.S.

We’ll run the final installment on the story tomorrow.

Prologue: How not to raise a revolutionary army

In August 1980, Green Beret David Arturo Baez was honorably discharged from the United States Army for compassionate hardship reasons. His carefully-constructed ruse of having to return to Nicaragua to help his aging grandparents on their small coffee Finca had fooled his command at the 3/7th Special Forces Group (A) in Panama, as well as the Army.

In fact, the government led by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) had nationalized Nicaragua’s coffee industry beginning in 1980. The FSLN purchased and sold all the country’s coffee, using the hard currency earned on the international market to finance its revolutionary war against the U.S.-backed Contra movement, supported by and from Honduras.

Part Two

In 1981, while conducting a clandestine intelligence-gathering mission in Managua, retired Lt. Col. Bill Chadwick, a Special Forces officer; and Lt. Col. John Lent, encountered now-Lt. David Baez in the uniform of a Sandinista officer. Recognizing each other from 3/7th, the trio had a brief conversation, then went their separate ways. Previously, Baez floated another story around the battalion that he was forced to return to Nicaragua by its new government, and in order to protect his family, would have to join the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS). So the chance encounter between the three men was friendly.

Chadwick recalled that the two American officers swiftly reported their encounter to the U.S. Southern Command J2 and its counterintelligence team. David Baez was now officially on the radar screen and a known enemy threat.

Assigned to the Combat Readiness Directorate, Baez’s first assignment was to train an EPS special unit of paratroopers. This he did with enthusiasm. The assignment was also seen as a means of monitoring the former American Special Forces soldier. “Trust but verify” was an important maxim for the Sandinistas. After training the paratrooper unit, Baez turned his expertise and the information he’d gathered as an AST in El Salvador toward the early formation and training of the EPS Irregular Warfare battalions (IWB). These battalions meant specifically to conduct counter-guerrilla warfare against the Contras. Strangely enough, the IWBs closely resembled the new Immediate Reaction battalions of the 3/7th mobile training teams in El Salvador in 1980–1981.

A born-again Sandinista

By 1982, Baez established himself as a born-again Sandinista. Promoted to the rank of captain, he volunteered for combat duty and was assigned to the “Pedro Altamirano” battalion of the EPS, then based at Montelimar. According to his brother, Eduardo Baez, Capt. Baez “would travel daily from El Crucero where we lived” to Montelimar to work. When his battalion deployed to the rugged Kilambéregion of northern Nicaragua, Baez was an invaluable asset on the ground.

After many months of combat duty, he was assigned to a special troop three-man mobile team that specialized in detecting and tracking Contra infiltrations along the no man’s land corridor between Honduras and Nicaragua.  The mobile team relied on jeeps to transport the team and its sophisticated Soviet-supplied radio intercept equipment to accomplish its missions.

Then, in April and May of 1983, Baez visited his brother and shared his next assignment. In his August 2001 interview with Roberto Fonseca of La Prensa, Eduardo recalled that sad moment. “He had volunteered to leave with a Honduran guerrilla column. He did not know if he would return or not. He asked me to take care of the children…you know, that kind of personal stuff.” Captain Baez, perhaps recalling the grief and pain that his family endured when his father disappeared in 1954, made a contingency plan should something similar happen to him.

He also recommended,” said Eduardo, “that if [we] heard any news about the capture or [death] of a guerrilla in Honduras, under the pseudonym Adolfo [their father’s first name], that I would know it would be him.” Baez told his brother he wrote a farewell letter to his youngest son, just three months old, “We had a few drinks, we cried, we said goodbye and he left,” recalled Eduardo in 2001.

The Honduran guerrillas would be wearing Contra-style uniforms for their infiltration, and carrying American-made weapons to include M16 rifles, M79 grenade launchers, M60 light machine guns, and 1911 .45 caliber pistols.  Each fighter had a nom de guerre, or “guerrilla name,” for security reasons. Baez, like the others, would go in sterile–without any incriminating forms of official identification. He was used to playing this role from his training and experiences at both 10th Special Forces Group (A) and later as an AST in Panama.

If Baez were captured or killed, and identified as a former Green Beret and now Sandinista officer, there would be diplomatic hell to pay with both the U.S. and Honduras.”

Dr. José Maria Reyes Mata, also known as “Comandante Pablo Mendoza,” possessed a long history of Marxist guerrilla actions: with Che Guevara in Bolivia; again in Nicaragua with the Sandinistas; and later with the PRTC in El Salvador. He was a convicted terrorist in Honduras, imprisoned for kidnapping, and released in 1982. (El Mundo)

His presence as both an assigned bodyguard for a high-ranking official [Dr. José Reyes Mata] and an EPS combat adviser to the column was a carefully-considered risk for the Sandinistas. If he were captured or killed in Honduras and identified as a Sandinista officer, especially as a former Green Beret and now Sandinista officer, there would be diplomatic hell to pay with both the U.S. and Honduras.

At the same time, the column began its infiltration, Daniel Ortega, coordinator of the Governing Board of Nicaragua, proposed a six-point peace plan to end the Contra war.

Dr. José Reyes Mata, whose nom de guerre for the Armed Forces of the People (FAP) campaign would be Comandante Pablo Mendoza, reminded himself of this situation when he wrote about it in his war diary after capture. “Our movement is extremely politically compromising. And we will not disappoint those who have placed their trust in us.”

“Those” included not only Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua but Fidel Castro in Cuba. Castro provided a year’s training for the new guerrilla army in 1982 at the Cuban Army’s Special Troops training base at Pinar del Rio, located just 90 minutes from Havana’s Jose Marti Airport.

By now, the 96-person column–brought back from Cuba in ones and twos–was assembled in a safe compound outside of Managua. Security conditions were strict. No leaving the compound, no female visitors, no contact with families, and no money. Individuals who deserted were captured and immediately put into a Sandinista prison. Reyes Mata didn’t see this red flag for what it was: the unhappiness and dissatisfaction of people who didn’t “volunteer” to be guerrillas in his revolution but rather press-ganged into the movement with promises of civilian occupation training in either Managua or Havana.

Reyes Mata’s recruiting efforts occurred in Honduras’ Olancho province by local Revolutionary Party of the Central American Workers (PRTC) Honduran agents, as well as “guerrilla priests,” many of these Jesuits. In a 1984 Miami Herald story (“Deserters Say Foreigners Fight for the Sandinistas”, Guy Gugliotta), Arnulfo Montoya Madariaga, then 35, described his recruitment in 1981. A campesino with a plot of land and seven children, he was recruited by “a French priest at his farm outside Danlíin southern Honduras.”

By September 21, 1983, 23 FAP combatants deserted, were captured, or turned themselves in to Honduran forces. The first desertion took place within two weeks of the FAP July crossing the Coco River in platoon-size elements. By the end of August, deserters provided the Hondurans and Americans with detailed descriptions regarding the platoons, personnel, leadership, weapons, communications, and the logistical support for the column.  “Disgruntled employees” and empty stomachs marked the beginning of the end.

Honduras is “peaceful and friendly”

The FAP was combat-ready. The column’s members were broken down into smaller groups of combatants and farmed out to the IWB of the EPS for another six months of fight training the Contras. On January 11, 1983, FAP commanders “LaPorta” and “Marcos” gave detailed reports about ambushing “an entire enemy company, which in its confused flight, left behind weapons, supplies, and a large quantity of rations.” The FAP continued working alongside the EPS until final preparations began for their infiltration into Honduras in mid-July.

Before leaving, I explained to everyone that our movement must not be noticed by the enemy, and that secrecy, precaution, silence, and initiative would be our principal weapons…based on the information obtained from the enemy which I checked, they were waiting for us, to liquidate us and the daring plan for a march, flanked by enemy [Contra] camps. Everything seemed uncertain.” – from the war diary of Dr. José Reyes Mata (Comandante Pablo Mendoza), July 15, 1983.

In Honduras, there was little concern about such an incursion. Although the September 1982 assault on the San Pedro Sula’s Chamber of Commerce building Cinchonero Popular Liberation Movement was dramatic–100 hostages taken, including three senior officials of the Honduran government–it ended after eight days, with no guerrilla demands granted.

The hostage-takers were flown to Cuba on a Panamanian air force cargo plane. Catholic clergy were involved in the negotiations. The UPI reported, “The official said San Pedro Sula Bishop Jaime Brufau and Papal Nuncio Andrea Cordero Lanza, the chief negotiators throughout the takeover, were to accompany the guerrillas on their flight to Cuba.”

The U.S. government and its Department of Defense (DOD) devoted their attention, efforts, and resources toward emerging wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador. The illegal Contra campaign required careful planning and sleight of hand by the Joint Chief of Staff and CIA. The unexpected success of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)–already operating in battalion size units that were destroying the Salvadoran Army’s unprepared army–had Washington concerned the country would fall to the Marxists by 1983.

Meanwhile, Honduras was painted by glowing U.S. embassy reports as “peaceful and friendly.”

For Reyes Mata, it was imperative for the Honduran PRTC/FAP units to have boots on the ground as soon as possible. The incursion was in the planning and training stages for nearly two years. A great deal of money was invested in it by Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union. In El Salvador, the FMLN, paired with its faction of the PRTC army, was close to victory. Nicaragua’s FSLN victory, with its PRTC division contributions, had only taken four years from start to finish.

In 1980, the PRTC in Guatemala struggled to establish itself against an exceptionally no-holds-barred counter-insurgency campaign spearheaded by the Guatemalan Army and its intelligence services. If the PRTC/FAP could establish itself in Honduras and begin a successful phase one insurgency against the government, it could count on cross-border logistical support from its sister organizations as well as the PRTC force in Costa Rica. This, in turn, would unite the diverse anti-government factions inside Honduras itself to support the PRTC/FAP.

All that remained necessary was to establish a liberated zone, beginning with the Olancho province, and a strong internal network elsewhere in the country.

I believe,” Reyes Mata wrote in his war diary while on the march, “…the entire Entre Rios mountain range should be considered in the future as a military stronghold for us, given the native and ‘nica’ enemy concentration, and the facility it offers for carrying out guerrilla tactical movements…the jungle is so dense it would be possible to conceal within it military forces consisting of over two thousand combatants.”

Plus, as a revolutionary, Reyes Mata was now a viejo, or “old one.” At 39, with many hard campaigns behind him and several recent years of sitting behind a desk in Cuba and Nicaragua, he needed to get back in the saddle for one last chance at success in his native Honduras. Suffering from ulcers and admitting in his diary he wasn’t in the best physical condition for the campaign, the addition of newly-promoted Comandante David Baez by the Sandinista leadership as “the old man’s bodyguard” wasn’t lost on him.

Padre Guadalupe, the chaplain-warfighter

“The march was programmed through topographical [illegible] or mountainous roadbeds, which would require quintupling the physical effort, and climbing up and down slopes that were very nearly vertical, on muddy terrain, and almost always under rainfall…Mario, an example of heroic campaigns, could not carry his rifle over his shoulder, and I was totally out of training.” – Dr. Reyes Mata, Guerrilla War Diary, Olancho Province

Padre James Francis “Guadalupe” “Mario” Carney, a World War II combat veteran, renounced his U.S. citizenship as a Jesuit priest in Honduras. He became a naturalized Honduran citizen, but had  citizenship stripped from him in 1979. After a brief stay in the U.S., he resided in Nicaragua where he became deeply involved with the PRTC-Honduras as well as the Sandinista FSLN. (Radio Progresso)

“Mario,” later identified as Padre Guadalupe, was James Francis Carney, an American. Carney served as an Army combat engineer and then military policeman in the European theatre during World War II. After the war he became an ordained priest and was a missionary to then British Honduras from 1955 to 1958.

In 1961, he joined the Jesuit Order, which sent him to Honduras. Carney, who adopted the first name Guadalupe, spent 18 years in Honduras and was beloved by the Hondurans he lived with and cared for. He renounced his American citizenship and became a naturalized Honduran during this time, but in 1979 the Honduran government stripped his citizenship and exiled him.

Carney embraced liberation theology, and his trajectory toward its roots in Marxism made him undesirable. He wrote his autobiography, To Be a Revolutionary, in Nicaragua, where he was welcomed by the new Sandinista government. In it, he offered “…being a Christian demands being a revolutionary and a socialist, and to be a revolutionary and socialist one has to use the Marxist-Leninist science of analysis and transformation of the world, then a Christian needs to understand Marxism.”

Prior to relocating in Nicaragua, Carney returned to the United States, specifically St. Louis, where he participated in an eight-day retreat at Jesuit Hall on the St. Louis University campus. There, he shared his dream of becoming a chaplain for Honduran revolutionaries. “I want to help a poor army,” he told his spiritual adviser.

He somehow obtained a valid U.S. passport again and returned to Nicaragua. He traveled to Cuba as well. It was during this time he encountered Mata and the PRTC of Honduras, agreeing to join the new FAP.

It still took me a couple of years to clarify my ideas about a Christian and his or her place in armed revolution.“

However, this time Carney embraced the role of chaplain-warfighter, as he would be armed. He wrote “After having sworn during World War II that I would never kill a person…it still took me a couple of years to clarify my ideas about a Christian and his or her place in armed revolution. During 1975, with its violent repression, my ideas on the Christian use of arms became clearer. I was gradually and finally [italics mine] acknowledging to myself the truth that love sometimes demands fighting back.”

However, when Carney picked up his FAP-issued M16 rifle and pistol, he gave up chaplain protections, as outlined by the Geneva Convention (GC) II of 1949 and the Additional Protocol 1 in 1977, which address what chaplains are to be afforded on the field of battle or in captivity (as opposed to “ministers of religion,” a different category altogether). Honduras became a signatory to the GC 1-IV in 1965. It affirmed its commitment to Protocols I and II in 1995, and to Protocol III in 2006.

Prior to joining the FAP, Carney shared with his Jesuit order what his intentions were. He was asked to resign, but allowed to keep the title of Father. Once with the FAP, he carried his weapons, a bible, his liturgical vestment, and his chalice.

Carney was assigned to the FAP’s 3rd Platoon, responsible to establish the Central Front which would conduct combat operations in the vicinity of Tegucigalpa, Choluteca, and Danlí. Sub-Comandante“Fidel” commanded the platoon. He was also a medical doctor and the FAP’s radio operator. The platoon’s political officer was Capt. Vela, also known as Juan Ramon. Carney was a combatant in the platoon’s 3rd Squad under 1st Lt. Jackson Morales. Carney would be initially identified by both his taken name–Padre Guadalupe–and his war name–“Mario”–in an August 30, 1983 U.S. DOD report sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Message Center in Washington, DC.

In that report, obtained by the U.S. Defense attaché in Honduras from the Honduran military, the FAP’s Table of Organization and Equipment was revealed by name and in detail. The information was gathered over the course of the month from 17 FAP deserters/prisoners, willingly provided to Honduran G-2 Intelligence and verified by their U.S. counterparts in-country. “Mario” is described as “Possible [emphasis mine] priest. Name is either Fausto Milla or Guadalupe and is thought to be 60-65 years old.”

Apparently, none of the 17 guerrillas in custody at that time were truly sure if “Mario” was a priest…or a combatant.

[Note: Father Milla, a Honduran, was also a liberation theology priest. He witnessed the U.S.-backed 1954 coup in Guatemala as well as some of the early massacres by the Salvadoran Army in 1980. Accused in Honduras of hiding weapons for guerrilla factions, and of being a guerrilla himself, the padre was taken into custody by Battalion 316, which interrogated him using torture for a week. He was unceremoniously dumped in the street by his captors upon release. Fausto Milla is an icon to revolutionary and resistance movements in Central America–so much so that in 2011, he and his assistant were again forced to flee Honduras in lieu of yet another coup d’état that resulted in renewed death threats against him.]

Platoons Across the Coco River

“This report provides an update on the HO [Honduras] infiltration…As of 26 August 83, a total of 17 guerrilla deserters from the 96-man guerrilla company called The Armed Forces of the People or F.A.P.–Fuerzas Armadas Del Pueblo–have been taken into custody…Efforts continue to locate the remaining guerrilla force which infiltrated from NU [Nicaragua] into the HO Olancho Department on 19 July 83 to “Make War on the Country.” Further details on the organization and Order of Battle for the guerrilla unit is provided along with an updated list of guerrilla deserters…” – DOD Joint Chiefs of Staff Message Center, August  30, 1983 / DECLASS 1/90, DOD Telegram #09347

On July 15th, Reyes Mata and his platoons moved to their jump-off point on the Nicaraguan side of the border. The weather was miserable. Never-ending rain turned the trails to slick, sticky mud. The men, carrying their weapons and 60-70-pound rucksacks, slipped, fell, and cursed as they struggled up the steep mountainside to make camp.  Still, morale was good. “I wanted to inspect the camp’s defense system. This required a great physical effort on my part, because the prolonged sedentary existence had left me out of shape,” Reyes Mata wrote in his diary that evening.

The goal was to have the platoons across by July 19th. Ten days earlier 2nd Lt. “Justo Martinez” led a reconnaissance patrol into Honduras well ahead of the main body. A single boat ferried the men and their equipment across the Coco River. Before the first crossing, Padre Guadalupe Carney formally christened it the Granma in honor of the 60-foot motor launch Fidel Castro used to transport his 82 guerrillas from Mexico to Cuba in 1956.

Reyes Mata planned for measured rations, with a belief the men could purchase food from local farmers or gather sustenance from the jungle.”

The heavy rains filled the Coco higher than expected, and nighttime infiltration turned into a harrowing process that wasn’t completed until broad daylight of the first day. However, by the 19ththree of the four platoons were across without the loss of material or men. The last platoon, responsible for additional rations and equipment, couldn’t cross safely until July 21st. Lieutenant Martinez’s recon team was 80 kilometers inside Honduras and in radio contact with the main body. Eight days were planned for the platoons to traverse the steep mountains and triple canopy jungle to their first base camp. Reyes Mata planned for just enough rations, with the belief men could purchase food from local farmers along the way or gather extra sustenance from the jungle.

Meanwhile, the FAP had to thread the deadly needle’s eye between Honduran Army and Contra patrols. The Contras had a significant presence in the towns of Yamala and Chilamata, well within patrolling distance of the FAP’s route. As the FAP consolidated itself in preparation to begin its journey inland, a second Nicaraguan officer from the Intelligence Directorate arrived. Known only as “Gregorio,” he was welcomed to the camp, along with another EPS officer, “Adolfo”–or ComandanteDavid Baez. Reyes Mata wasn’t privy to “Gregorio’s” reason for joining them, but it can be presumed it was to monitor the progress of the FAP and then return to Managua to make a report.

On July 23rd, a Contra who’d stumbled upon the tracks of the column and followed the guerrillas for three hours, was captured and summarily executed.

The eight days of stealthy movement turned into 12. The weather remained miserable and the guerrillas, used to eating every day, soon ran low on food as the misery of the terrain sapped their strength, slowed their pace, and consumed vital energy they couldn’t replace. The trail soon became littered with equipment tossed to the side as guerrillas tried to lighten their rucksacks. Reyes Matawas feeling the strain as well as “Mario,” or Padre Guadalupe. At one point, when the march had sped up after being seen by a local, he wrote “…we gave the order to hasten the march toward Point A…Mario gave evidence of his great capacity for sacrifice, and I was able to move better with only my equipment and rifle.”

After arriving at Point A, the main body continued on until arriving at Point B, the pre-determined site of its first base camp. However, upon arriving, Reyes Mata was informed a campesino was captured by a stay-behind team charged with watching their back trail. The man was interrogated and then executed.

It had to be done with a knife,” wrote Reyes Mata, “there was no other [option], given the place where we were [being] surrounded by enemies.”

By now, Comandante Pablo Mendoza revealed himself to be as being as cold and remorseless as his mentor, Che Guevara. Anyone who attempted to desert was shot. Anyone deemed a threat or determined to be a traitor received the death penalty. For Reyes Mata, there were no other options. Victory was the only reward.

To read the entire article, click here:

Photo: NEWSREP/YouTube

The Strange Story of David Baez, Green Beret, and Sandinista Officer

One of the most bizarre stories to come out about Central America was the strange saga of David Baez. Baez was born in Nicaragua but became a U.S. citizen and later a Green Beret. Baez’s father was a military officer in Nicaraguan National Guard before being executed by the military’s leader Anastasio Somoza.

Baez grew up an intense hatred of the Somoza’s and their regime and later while serving as a Green Beret in Panama with the 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, he’d leave the military to return to Nicaragua to join the Communist Sandinista regime to fight the troops of Somoza.

Greg Walker is an author and former Green Beret from 3/7 SFG who was one of the 55 advisors in El Salvador back in the same time frame. He has written an outstanding two-part story that gets to the truth of a very outstanding NCO in Special Forces that ended up fighting against the U.S.-backed Contras and for our enemy, the Sandinistas in the early 1980s.  

Prologue: Operation Patuca River, Honduras, 1983

On July 19, 1983, a group of 96 Marxist guerrillas with extensive training in Cuba and six months of combat conditioning in Nicaragua fighting U.S.-backed Contras, successfully infiltrated Honduras on foot after crossing the Coco River by boat.

The mission was planned and led by Dr. Jose Reyes Mata (“Commander Pablo Mendoza”), a well-known and highly-respected Honduran icon in the Latin American Marxist-Leninist community. The newly-formed Armed Forces of the People, or FAP, was a multi-national revolutionary army made up of Hondurans, Nicaraguans, Cubans, and two North Americans. Reyes Mata, an original founder of the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers, Honduras (PRTC-H) under whose umbrella the FAP fell, had fought in Bolivia during the second attempt by the survivors of Commander Che Guevara’s disastrous 1967 effort to overthrow that South American country’s government. Captured, Reyes Mata was sent to prison until escaping to nearby and revolutionary-friendly Chile.

In Chile, he continued to promote and refine for export Che’s “foco theory” of revolution, a theory he hoped to personally plant the seed of in Honduras. Making his way to Nicaragua, he participated in the 1979 victory of the Sandinista FSLN guerrilla war against President Anastacio Somoza Debayle, thereby earning great favor with the new Marxist government in Managua as well as in Cuba where he was a welcome visitor and, at times, a resident.

Christened “the March of Liberty toward Victory,” the column, organized into four platoons, was to establish a series of logistical FAP base camps in Honduras from which to begin additional local recruiting, training, and finally to conduct guerrilla operations against the government and armed forces of Honduras. The FAP was to be the regional vanguard movement with expected support from the external PRTC forces in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica.

Instead, in just two months, the column would be brutally annihilated by the elite Honduran Special Forces Squadron in close cooperation with its military intelligence sister unit, Battalion 316.

This NEWSREP three-part series relies upon current declassified documents, the extensive investigative efforts of both Honduran and U.S. media outlets, the declassified war diary of Dr. Reyes Mata, and personal recollections of those with first-hand knowledge of what took place in the rugged Olancho province of Honduras, as well as at the joint U.S./Honduran air base at El Aguacate.

Much has been speculated about–and written about–Operation Patuca River. To paraphrase SAS veteran Mike Coburn, author of the book “Soldier Five–The Real Truth About the Bravo Two Zero Mission,” retired Special Forces soldier Greg Walker offers: “It’s important to portray events as they really happened. Not only because the success of Operation Patuca River crushed a nascent civil war in Honduras, but because so many related to several of the FAP column have since searched for answers regarding their loved ones, regardless of their ideology, and to date found no resolution as to what happened to them.”

It begins with the family and friends of David Arturo Baez Cruz, the only known Green Beret to have willingly left his family and military career in 1980 to join the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) in its fight against the Contras, and in 1983 against the Honduran Army as an FSLN combat adviser to the FAP.

Part One

Arturo was obsessive. He wanted to contribute something to the overthrow of the Somozas. For him it was like a sense of mission, especially after the death of [our] dad at the hands of the Somozas. He did not know him, but he grew up with ‘So, you’re Baez Bone, you must have ‘guevon’ [“big balls”] like your dad.” – Eduardo Baez, brother and former Sandinista officer

David Arturo Baez Cruz was born on December 19, 1950, in Jenotepe, Nicaragua. His father, Adolfo Baez Bone, was a young lieutenant in Nicaraguan president Anastasio Somoza Garcia’s National Guard. His grandmother, whose surname was Bone, was Guatemalan. In 1947, Adolfo was expelled from the National Guard along with other officers who had supported President Leonardo Arguello over Somoza Garcia.

On April 4, 1954, Adolfo and his brother, Luis Felipe Baez Bone, along with 23 others, sought to overthrow President Somoza Garcia by assassination. Also to be killed were the president’s two adult sons, Luis and Anastasio, the latter better known as “Tachito.” On the eve of the attack, to be led by Adolfo, an informer betrayed the conspirators, and all were arrested and imprisoned. Adolfo was personally beaten and tortured by Tachito for four agonizing days before he was fatally shot. Luis was also killed as were the others. Their bodies were burned and then secretly buried in a mass unmarked grave. In an eerie forecast of things to come, Adolfo was reported to have spat in Tachito’s face and warned him, “My blood with chase you!” before his execution.

Growing up Nicaraguan

“He [Arturo] grew up sleeping in the room where the closet held his father’s remains in a wooden trunk. The bones were eventually buried, but not Baez’s hatred for the Somozas. He always had something in his head about avenging his father.” – Eduardo Baez, brother and former Sandinista officer

Friends of the families of those murdered eventually located the mass grave. Adolfo’s remains were identified–despite having been burned–and his bones were brought to the family. They were hidden away until it was deemed safe to bury them properly. Today, in Managua, there is a monument to the “Heroes of April 4, 1954” with all 25 names of those considered martyrs inscribed on it.

To read the complete article, click here:

Photo of ODA-5 Panama and Baez: Robert K. Brown

On This Day, President Reagan Gives CIA Authority To Create the Contras

Anti-Sandinista Nicaraguan Rebels Would Become a Thorny Issue

President Ronald Reagan did little to hide his disdain for the Marxist Nicaraguan leaders who seized power after the dictator Somoza was ousted. The Somoza family ruled the country with an iron hand for 46 years. Then the Sandinista National Liberation Front, Spanish Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN), overthrew Somoza and ruled the country between 1979-1990.

Reagan was convinced that the USSR (the former Soviet Union) and Cuba were helping in the arming of Communist guerrillas in neighboring El Salvador thru the Sandinista regime of Daniel Ortega. And he was going to turn up the heat on them. Reagan during his administration never shied away from calling out Ortega and the regime for being little Soviet stooges.

At various times Reagan called Ortega a “dictator in designer glasses,” after he learned that he had gone on a shopping spree while visiting the United Nations in New York City.

“Nicaragua today is an imprisoned nation; it is a nation condemned to unrelenting cruelty by a clique of very cruel men; by a dictator in designer glasses and his comrades, drunk with power and all its brutal implications,” Reagan said. He also dismissed the Marxist leader Ortega as “the little dictator who went to Moscow in his green fatigues.”

So, it was no surprise that his administration put a priority on creating an anti-Sandinista force to oust the Marxists from power. On November 23, 1981, the President signed National Security Decision Directive 17 (NSDD-17), a top secret document that gave CIA the authority to identify, recruit, train and support a 500-man Nicaraguan rebel force that would rise against and ultimately oust the leftist, Marxist Sandinista regime.

The Reagan administration was heavily involved with the civil war in El Salvador, however, Congress had strict limitations on the U.S. involvement and to aid to the country. Therefore, the administration was hoping to cut the flow of arms to the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador, most of which they opined flowed thru Ortega’s borders.

Who Were the Contras?

The forces that CIA would array against Ortega were divided into three main groups.

  • Right Wing Followers of Somoza- These men traditionally tended to be either from the National Guard forces of the former dictator or his close allies.
  • Disgruntled Sandinistas- Many of the early Contras were men who fought against Somoza and banded together with Ortega. But after they saw the direction the government was taking after seizing power, they left and joined the resistance. One of these was Edgar Chamorro who would become a key Contra leader.
  • Ordinary citizens- Many of these didn’t like Somoza and took no direct involvement with the overthrow, but disliked the Sandinistas and joined the forces trying to oust them.

CIA and the Argentine intelligence services worked together on this venture and they first went to Honduras to secure bases for the Contras to train, equip and refit and then the Argentines went about trying to recruit another 1000 rebels in addition to the original 500.

Officially the Contras were not allowed to be in Honduras as an armed force, but the government, worried about their own latent and incipient insurgency, turned a blind eye to the goings on and housed a tent city in at least one location that would easily hold a battalion of troops.

The Contras manning the base had a large base station radio that could communicate with deployed elements inside the country. And twice a day, runners would bring fresh intel reports to the Honduran 6th Infantry Battalion, located in Ojo de Agua.

CIA also covertly brought several hundred fighters to the U.S. and trained them with Special Forces troops of the 7th SFG at Eglin Air Force Base.

The Contras militarily were broken up into three main groups:

  • The FDN, Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense, FDN) which was composed of mostly National Guard Somoza men. However, the political directorate was comprised of businessmen and anti-Somoza activists. Led by former National Guard Colonel Enrique Bermúdez, the FDN was the most active of the Contra groups and was stationed in Honduras. They received the bulk of American support.
  • Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), commanded by former Sandinista Edén Pastora (Comandante Cero), who fought for the Ortega regime but grew disgruntled over the course of the revolution. His group operated in the southern part of the country until a bomb plot against him forced him to withdraw.
  • The third group, Misurasata, was comprised of  Miskito, Sumo and Rama native peoples of Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast. In December 1981 the Sandinistas, following the Communist playbook, decided to nationalize Indian land. This drove over 10,000 native Indians to relocation centers and several into armed conflict.

Money Cut, Iran-Contra Begins:

Congress never fully embraced the Contras, their aid began at a paltry $19 million dollars. CIA Deputy Director Admiral Bobby R. Inman argued that the $19 million allocations provided little buying power for arms and other materials, saying that “Nineteen million or $29 million isn’t going to buy you much of any kind these days, and certainly not against that kind of military force.” That amount would grow only to about $24 million.

Congress cut aid to the Contras with Boland Amendment, the lifeline for Contra activity was cut, but the Reagan Administration quickly worked around that. Using funding and support from third countries and private individuals, Reagan’s National Security Council raised $36.7 million dollars between 1984-1986. This effort was headed up by Marine LTC Oliver North.

North created an organization called The Enterprise, which was the NSC’s covert operation for the Contras. Enterprise had its own airplanes, pilots, airfield, ship, operatives, and secret Swiss bank accounts. It received extensive support from CIA personnel in Latin America. This operation would have its cover blown and culminated in the Iran–Contra Affair, where the funding of the Contras was done through the proceeds of arms sales to Iran.

The Contras were never a large military force and charges of corruption were rampant inside the organization. They, for years, produced little militarily and were reduced to isolated acts of terrorism. But in late 1987, they clashed with Sandinista forces in large battles in La Bonanza, La Siuna, and La Rosita in Zelaya province that resulted in heavy casualties on both sides.

International pressure to end the conflict resulted in the meeting of five Central American presidents (including Ortega) in 1989. They voted to disband the Contras in return for free elections in February 1990.

During that election, Ortega was roundly defeated by UDN candidate Violetta Chamorro and the Sandinistas were removed from power. The Nicaraguan people were fed up with years of war and were ready for a change. And it began with the directive from President Reagan.

Photos: Wikipedia

Protests Turn Ugly as Ortega Kills 25 or More in Nicaragua

Ever since the Sandinistas first came to power, they’ve been trying to assert total control over their population. And now as President Daniel Ortega’s newest Social Security policies are blowing up in his face, the government is violently cracking down on any dissent, real or perceived.

The riots that have taken place across Nicaragua have claimed at least 25 lives and the protests against the government show no signs of slowing down. Ortega’s Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) government tried to hammer home a reform to the national Social Security system, due to financial issues that continue to plague the system.

The reforms, which took effect on Wednesday, added a 5 percent tax on old age and disability payouts and also include higher employer and employee contributions set off a wave of protests across the country. Many Nicaraguans feel that their Social Security system would be fine if the Sandinista government would stop taking money out of it. That sounds a lot like many Americans feel about their own system, but we digress.

Of course, Ortega’s leftist government was defending the reforms with his spokeswoman, and Vice President Rosario Murillo, who also happens to be his wife saying the reforms were needed and added that the retirement age had not been raised from 60, the number of weekly contributions required for a state pension would remain the same and retirees would still receive their one-month Christmas bonus.

But that didn’t dissuade citizens to protest immediately in Managua, and in Leon. Ortega played the typical leftist playbook when he had his own supporters stage pro-government rallies at several key intersections in Managua. Members of the Sandinista Youth organization, physically attacked peaceful protesters in Managua while the Police watched on and did nothing.

Both Ortega and Murillo put the blame of the violence on the protesters rather than on themselves where it belongs. Murillo, on the state-owned radio station, called the protesters “vampires, needing blood to feed their political agendas.” Ortega blamed the United States, which has been a familiar foe since the Reagan administration.

Ortega was forced out of office in 1989 after the Sandinistas took on the U.S. backed Contras in a civil war until he was forced to hold free elections. Ortega learned his lesson with free elections and now leaves nothing to chance. After getting back in power, he’s been steadily eliminating opposition groups and re-writing the constitution.

When Ortega was running for “re-election” in 2016, he used his power over the Supreme Electoral Council and had it oust the head of the main opposition party, the Independent Liberation party (PLI), Eduardo Montealegre and then suspending nearly all of its members. Other parties that were in allegiance with the PLI were stripped of their legal status by judges and electoral officials controlled by Ortega’s government.

With many of the head government officials and courts headed by close friends or family members, Ortega rewrote the Constitution and abolished term limits. He then put together a sham of an election where government sources state that the turnout was nearly 66 percent of registered voters. But opposition leaders stated that nearly 70 percent of the registered voters abstained from voting in the election because they felt that the entire process was rigged.

Election monitors were few and selectively chosen and in the end, Ortega “won” with 72 percent of the vote. The Obama administration was not thrilled with this type of farce and worded their statement very politically correct while still making their point.

“The United States is deeply concerned by the flawed presidential and legislative electoral process in Nicaragua, which precluded the possibility of a free and fair election,” spokesman Mark Toner said in a statement.

Ortega cemented his power of all branches of the government including the armed forces and national police so they’ll follow along with whatever he says, they’ll not oppose him, his cronies pull the strings.

But these protests this week are sticky situations for the leftist President who President Reagan called a “dictator in designer glasses,” back in the 1980s. On one hand, the government, which brutally put down protests in 2013, has been firing bullets, some live and some rubber on protesters rallying at government locations while standing by and allowing several protests to burn and loot businesses in downtown Managua. Why?

It is an effort to put pressure on the same business sector personnel. Ortega has agreed to sit down and discuss the issues that have now become open rioting. But only with business leaders. This move is designed to soften them up when they sit down for talks that the outcome is already predestined.

One journalist was killed over the weekend. Angel Gahona was reporting live video via Facebook Live on protests in the city of Bluefields along the coast when he was killed by a gunshot to the head, that some protesters were calling an assassination. At least 25 other people have been killed since the latest protest began on Wednesday according to the independent Nicaraguan Human Rights Center. The Ortega government has acknowledged only nine dead, but both of those totals will no doubt rise.

Ortega is backed up to the wall and just on Monday said that he’d scrap the planned changes for Social Security. And he renewed his call to the business leaders of the country to sit and negotiate. But also on Monday, the business leaders pushed back and refused to sit down until the government stops the repression against the protests.

Ortega is concerned because the protests swelled from just Managua and Leon to dozens of other cities. Younger people, many of them college students, who flocked to the Sandinista cause in the ‘80s are the ones leading the charge against them now.

Now the Social Security issue is just a sideshow to the unrest as many of the young people want complete freedom of speech restored. That is a dangerous slope that Ortega will try to avoid at all costs. The scrapping of term limits and having Ortega, and his wife virtually in office for life is a threat to democracy and Nicaraguans are fed up.

Photo: AP

February 2, 1988, Networks Refuse to Air President Reagan’s Speech

The year 1988 was an interesting one in the realm of international politics and conflict and unlike the events of today, these were much closer to home. And when the President of the United States was going to make a speech to the American people, lobbying for aid against a Communist regime that threatened peace in the region, no one heard it. The three major networks refused to air the President’s speech. Not in 2018, this was in 1988. Why? They were worried that “the Great Communicator” would convince the American people to go along with his plan.

Central and South America was a hot spot for insurgencies and civil war during the 1970s and 1980s and many in the government were worried that the revolutions would find their way to Mexico, on the doorstep to the United States.

A communist insurgency in El Salvador had resulted in open warfare there for over a decade. The fighting had been going back and forth but the U.S. backed government. But after the early 1980s, the government made significant strides in both the military and political fields. Human rights abuses were down, the military had turned the tide of the war and both sides were finally sitting down for serious dialogue.

Guatemala had a brutal civil war that lasted from 1962 until 1996, the different military strongmen who overthrew one another grew more oppressive than the previous one. The insurgency of the Maya people was initially supported by Castro and the Cuban regime. Both sides resorted to terror and human rights abuses to achieve their aims. But war’s end over 200,000 people were dead.

But it was in Nicaragua where President Reagan was looking to oust the Sandinista junta led by Daniel Ortega. The Sandinistas were leftists promoted by the Soviets and Cubans and they overthrew the dictator, Somoza.

But as soon as they were in power, they cracked down on freedom of the press and began to conduct the same human rights abuses that they claimed they were trying to stop. Initially, in 1979 and 1980, President Carter sought to normalize relations with them and sent them humanitarian aid.

Immediately upon taking office, Reagan ceased aid to the Sandinistas. He sought aid for the Contras a group of former Somoza officers and Miskito Indians who were looking to oust the leftist government. By mid-November 1981, the President had signed National Directive 17 which authorized covert aid and support for anti-Sandinista forces.

Armed conflict between the Ortega regime and the Contras added to the destabilization of the region along with the civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala. The Contras, heavily backed by the CIA, secretly opened a “second front” on Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast and Costa Rican border. CIA Director William Casey was an old hand at setting up covert aid for foreign forces having been a World War II operative of the OSS.

By early 1983, the Contras had launched major offensives against the Sandinistas and with CIA (which was illegal) help, had mined the harbor of Managua. CIA operatives were also helping to stop arms flows coming into Nicaragua.

In late 1987, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias presented a peace plan that was signed by the five Central American presidents. His plan tried to promote national reconciliation, an end to hostilities, democratization, free elections, the termination of all assistance to irregular forces, negotiations on arms controls, and assistance to refugees. It also laid the ground for international verification procedures and provided a timetable for implementation.

Immediately after the Arias plan was signed, Ortega made a beeline for Cuba. But Fidel Castro wasn’t going to offer much as he himself was being squeezed by Mikhail Gorbachev as the death throes of the Soviet Union was already beginning.

While giving lip service to the Arias plan, the Sandinistas were not going to share power with anyone. During a November party conference, the Sandinistas publicly stated that there would never be talks either directly or indirectly with leaders of the counter-revolutionary forces.

Ortega was beginning to lose the war to the Contras and it seemed for the first time, that they may actually defeat the Sandinista Army on the field of battle. But that wasn’t good news to all Americans. Many of the Democrats in Congress actually favored the Sandinistas remaining in power. They hoped that the Soviets would eventually cut off their aid and the US could make them behave as dependents on US aid.

Their argument was that a no vote on contra aid was “a vote for the peace process.”

With debates raging in Congress, Reagan made a vastly reduced aid proposal just before his State of the Union Address. Democrats saw this as an opportunity to defeat it altogether. The Sandinistas, monitoring the events in Managua, sensed a victory in Congress as well and took the opportunity to crack down on opposition parties, having paid stooges pelt offices with rocks and bottles while police stood by and did nothing.

This didn’t sway Democrats however, they were convinced that they had the votes to defeat a contra aid bill. Their final worry…. The President’s appeal to the people which could sway public opinion on the matter.

The three major networks came to the Democrats rescue. The three all decided not to air the President’s address to the people. Only CNN carried it. In 1988, CNN was far from the giant it is today. Most people in the US didn’t have cable, including Washington D.C. so the vast majority of Americans never saw his speech including the entire population of D.C.

The lame excuse at the time was that there had already been enough debate on the topic and yet, all three networks dedicated shows the morning after Reagan’s speech to debate its merits or faults.

Reagan had always been the Republican Party’s best and most persuasive speaker. His inability to reach out to Americans was what he characterized later as “censorship” and “ an unprecedented affront which reveals right where their sympathies lie….with the Communist government of Nicaragua.”

The final vote was 219-211, on February 3, 1988, Contra aid was voted down.

“My fellow Americans, there can be no mistake about this vote. It is up or down for Central America. It is a win or lose for peace and freedom. It is a yes or no to America’s national security.” Reagan’s speech which was not carried by the three networks.

The aid package to the Contra’s debate continued to drag along, but in the end, the Communist junta was ousted by a legal vote in 1990. But for a moment in 1988, the major television networks took a stand together with one party against another. So much of the talk we hear today about a lack of an unbiased press isn’t new. It is history.

This is the speech in its entirety that the majority of the country never saw.

Photo: Wikipedia

“Those Green Berets Sure Taught You How to Shoot Straight”

“No, sir. This is the West, sir. When the legend becomes fact, print the legend.”
The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance

Sometimes having a reputation can work against you and then there are others when you just do your job and move on. And then there are those times you get treated like a rock star, say nothing and smile at karma .  How so? Read on.

Back in the day, I was on a Mountain Team in the 1st Bn. 7th Special Forces Group. Our company was going on a deployment to Honduras. And our team’s mission was to train the Anti-Tank troops of the Sexto (6th) Infantry Battalion that was deployed near the border of Nicaragua. The Hondurans had requested our support specifically for this unit.

These troops had a real-world mission as the threat of Nicaraguan invasion was very real in those days. In fact, they had a few border skirmishes with their neighbors as the borders were slightly ill-defined. The Nicaraguans had crossed the border inadvertently on several occasions while hammering it out with the Contras. (Remember them? See Ollie North, Iran/Contra) And yes it was inadvertent. We were there for the “invasion” during Operation Golden Pheasant.

Since the Nicaraguans had armor, the Anti-Tank troops were the first line of defense. They were constantly being tested had recently put on a firepower demonstration for the Estado Mayor (General Staff) of the military with their Vietnam-era M-40 106mm Recoilless Rifles that were combined jeep mounted and fixed on the ground and fired 50 rounds down range and hit nothing…not one single target.

Our guys who visited the base for a site survey didn’t get to meet or talk with any of the Anti-Tank unit. They’d been alerted en masse and were sent to the border. They only spoke with the Battalion’s commander and training officer. That was a big detriment to mission planning.

We were told to expect a nightmare. The anti-armor unit that can’t hit water out of a boat with a 106mm. For those unfamiliar with the M-40 106mm RR, it was a great short-range weapon that was actually a 105mm but the designation changed during the Korean War because the ammunition was not compatible with the failed M-27 design.

The M-40 had an M-8C .50 caliber spotting rifle attached to the top. The spotting rifle fires a round whose trajectory is nearly that of the 106mm round and gives off a puff of smoke on impact with the target. The system used a spotting rifle because the back blast of the main gun left such a signature, that a first-round hit was essential.

On the left (gunner’s) side, there is an elevating wheel, in the center of which is the trigger wheel used to fine adjust the elevation and at the same time firing the spotting rifle when pulled, and the main gun when pushed.

The weapon is mounted on a tripod, but the front leg has a wheel. On top of the mount is a traverse wheel. On the center of the traverse wheel is a locking wheel, when the wheel is down, the rifle is locked in traverse, and can only be moved right and left with the traverse wheel. When the wheel is raised, the rifle can be traversed by hand.

The 106mm RR fired HE (High Explosive), HEAT (High Explosive Anti-Tank), and an APERS (High Explosive Anti-personnel) that fired flechette rounds. There were other types of ammunition but no other type was available for the Honduran troops at that time. The rear end of the cartridge case is perforated, to allow the propellant gas to escape through the vented breech, thus neutralizing recoil. The 106mm RR could penetrate 12 inches of cold rolled steel at 300 meters. The .50 caliber ammo was not the standard issue for the M2 machine gun. But was shorter and specially designed to mimic the flight path of the main gun ammunition.

The weapon was bore sighted by using a cut-down 106mm round with a subcaliber .30 caliber round inserted. This would come into play much later.

The team prepared by making some coordination with JFKSWC (Special Warfare Center) Weapons Committee. They gave an excellent block of instruction on the 106 and got every member of the team up to standard on the operation, maintenance, and crew drills. We could each perform all the functions of a crew member, boresight the weapon and were then each comfortable enough to teach it to the Honduran troops.

We got to spend a couple of days on the range and put some steel on targets. Range control got really pissed when they specifically told us that an old school bus was danger close and off limits to us shooting at. And of course, one of our guys (I’ll never tell), put a flechette round into it. When the range control guys returned, the bus was still smoking and looked like Swiss cheese. Range Control was hot enough to spit flames at our team leader, but sometimes it is better to beg forgiveness than to ask permission.

We were ready. Our team nearly filled a C-141 with 106mm ammo with a slew of .50 caliber spotting rounds and we flew down to Honduras to get the mission underway. After a day or so to get settled in and get trucks to pack all the ammo and gear up into the mountains, we were underway.

Our initial training schedule had a couple of days for crew drills since we expected them to be pretty sloppy. We began by doing a quick inspection of the guns and they were all in very good to excellent condition. The troops obviously took very good care of them. Which was an encouraging sign.

Next, we broke down the unit into their mounted (Jeep) and fixed gun crews and had them walk thru their crew drills. They then went thru their crew drill at normal (combat) speed. I was on the gun crew next to the one our team leader was with and we made eye contact with one another. His eyebrows went up and without saying anything, I could tell he wasn’t expecting this. These guys looked incredibly smooth, much better than any regular Honduran line unit we had worked with, especially on Day 1.

After running them thru the crew drills a few more times, we had the crews bore sight their weapons and once again they did it without the slightest hitch. We broke for an early lunch at the range and would commence live fire after their break. Our weapons guys were surprised at how smooth they looked and at they seemed to have their act together, which for the Honduran army back then was no easy feat. And we wondered aloud why these troops couldn’t hit the side of a barn. Our questions would soon be answered.

After lunch, the crews broke down with their respective guns and we readied to see how well they could hit their targets. The targets were dugout areas on the side of a ridgeline 400-500 meters away and had logs laid into the 4’ x 6’ area and were painted white for easy identification.

The first gun crew was readying to fire when our senior weapons leader stopped them. “What the fuck are you doing,” he asked?  The crew wasn’t loading spotting rounds for the .50 caliber but the .30 caliber device for bore sighting. “We don’t have .50 caliber spotting rounds,” they said. Apparently, according to their Lieutenant, they hadn’t had any in years.

Some visiting straight-leg officer from the US MILGP (Military Group) in the US Embassy who had zero knowledge of the M-40 had told them in lieu of spotting rounds, the sub-caliber device for bore sighting could be used as a spotting round. Mystery solved. For any target farther than 100 meters, you wouldn’t hit jack shit.

We went into the back of our truck and broke out the spotting rounds and they loaded them up (for the first time) into their spotting rifles. The first gun crew fired the spotting round dead center of a target on the ridge in the distance and then fired their main gun. The target exploded with a direct hit. The unit cheered like they just scored a touchdown at the Super Bowl.

After ensuring that each crew had spotting rounds we spent the rest of the afternoon live firing the 106s and there were very very few misses. These guys were just lacking the proper ammunition for their spotting rifles and taking what an American officer had told them at face value. They did what they were told and had failed miserably. After the first day, their morale was sky high. For most of them, this was the first time, they hit a target with their assigned weapon.

Our training outline would have to be changed…obviously. And we got into more advanced training than we ever envisioned we would be able to accomplish. The support guys who set out the targets were told to start making them smaller. The lesser profiles were much harder to hit.

The mounted jeep sections were quickly getting adept at hitting their targets while racing between firing positions. And the others were getting their guns into action much faster getting them off-loaded from trucks.

Two months later, the Estado Mayor were once again called out to the range. They were briefed on the upcoming scenario, on the ridge line in the distance of 400 meters away was an enemy attacking force of armor. But the targets weren’t sized 4’ x 6’ but just 55-gallon drums painted white and much harder to hit.

The jeeps drove up quickly from the dirt road and took up firing positions. They engaged the first line of “tanks” and quickly destroyed every one of them. While they were moving to their secondary firing position, the fixed guns, which had been camouflaged using the brush and unseen from the VIPs opened fire quickly, covering their movement and destroying many more targets on the opposite hill.

The vehicle mounted sections again hit their targets decimating the remaining 55-gallon drums on the far side. As a final scenario, the Honduran LT called out an infantry attack coming up the draw, 150 meters to their left front. That was simulated by having about 50 rifle silhouette targets on a skid. The first gun sections depressed the barrels and gave them a salvo of flechette rounds. The silhouettes disappeared in a flash of dust and debris. Not a single target was left. What a difference from their earlier disaster just a few months earlier.

Was it great training on the SF part or just getting them the correct equipment? We knew the answer. But the LT begged our commander not to say the real reason why as it would make them look bad he said.

The Estado Mayor approached our Team Leader and asked to address our team. They were very pleased they said with the training. They could see the difference in the soldiers’ confidence and attitude. “A few months ago, they couldn’t hit a thing. Now, they can handle anything that comes at them and we thank you for that. Our border area is now safer thanks to you.” He then told our Captain not to let the Anti-Tank unit fire any more flechette rounds. “Save them for the “perro cacerros” when they cross the border.

They then addressed the Lieutenant. “You and your men did a fantastic job today. We can see how hard you’ve worked.” And then with a smile, he added, “Those Green Berets sure taught you how to shoot straight.”

______________

A sad footnote was that less than a week later, while responding to another alert on the border, one of the jeeps carrying a 106, took a corner too fast and rolled. The gun crushed one of the crew killing him and seriously injured two others.

Photos courtesy Author, US Army