Heroes of U.S. Special Operations

OSS Dons Chutes and Skis for a Dangerous Norway Mission

The CIA and the US Army Special Forces’ heritage is linked directly from the World War II OSS (Office of Strategic Services). Many of the operators who pulled classified missions for the OSS later became intelligence professionals or the original Special Forces troops. One such operator was William Colby who commanded Jedburgh teams in France and later would join the CIA, rising through the ranks to become the DCI (Director of Central Intelligence).

Colby later during World War II would be tasked to head an Operational Team to go into Norway to blow a key bridge, the Grana, on the Nordland railway during “Operation Rype.” The Norwegian Special Operations Group which was part of the OSS was tasked with the mission with Colby as the commander. In Colby’s narrative released after the war, he said it was the only mission that the US Army ran in WWII that the men used both parachutes and skis.

Near the end of 1944, the Soviets had overrun Finland and the German survivors from that campaign, some 150,000 ski and mountain troops were streaming into Norway. Colby and the Norwegian SOG’s mission was to blow the bridge between Narvik and Trondheim carrying thousands of troops back into Germany each day. The roads were frozen and impassable and Royal Navy was blocking the sea routes. Stopping the Germans from getting down from Finland was left to the OSS.

Colby’s men were bundled into eight B-24 Liberator bombers, specially configured to drop parachutists behind enemy lines. The team numbered 35 men. They were an eclectic lot, their expertise each ranged into different life paths that all led them this mission.

Things began to go wrong immediately. Of the eight aircraft taking off from Scotland, only four made their air drops. One group of a SSG and four CPLs was dropped in Sweden and were picked up by Swedish authorities and interned.

The transports that succeeded in dropping material at the frozen Jaevsjo Lake also succeeded in spreading the party and material over a 36-square-mile area, with some of the bundles landing kilometers into the surrounding woods. Colby reported that “many packages had no static cords attached and plummeted to Earth without chutes, burying themselves in the snow.”

Colby needed at least 35 men to do take out the bridge at Grana, but he only had 20 OSS men plus four more from the Norwegian underground who met them on the drop zones. They gathered the equipment that was dropped and waited for more men to be dropped.

Six days later, three planes appeared. The lake was shrouded in mist and the planes were unable to drop. Two of the aircraft got back and a third, with six more OSS commandos crashed in the Orkney Islands killing all 13 on board.

Another six days passed and the Air Corps tried again with four more planes, again in heavy bad weather. A plane with a Lt. and three noncoms crashed and exploded, again killing all onboard.

Colby had lost valuable time as more and more Germans were streaming down the railway each day. He decided to scrap the original plan and improvise. His plan from his notebook was the stuff of legend.

“Our plan was lifted bodily from the history of the West. We would seize a train, board it, throw her into reverse and blow up every tunnel and bridge we could until ammunition had run out; then drive the train into a ditch. We hoped to succeed by sheer bravado. Farnsworth, the demolition expert, was in seventh heaven. The others smiled again–this was the kind of direct American action they’d heard about, read about, knew went on all the time.”

Colby’s group set out on cross-country skis and in two days despite bad weather had made 40 miles. They finally arrived at the peaks overlooking the Tangen bridge, somewhere north of Tangen, where the railroad skirts Oiingen Lake. The terrain was extremely hazardous.

The men had to reach the bottom and were loaded down with Tommy guns (Thompson Submachine guns), M-1 Garand rifles, Bren MGs, 180 pounds of TNT plus other equipment on a big sled. They made it, none the worse for wear and were waiting for the train while another group of five men went north snipping wires and smashing telephones.

Changing their plans again after learning that they missed the train, the OSS men decided to blow the bridge immediately. The men set the charges under the long, I-girder bridge. The 180 pounds of explosives were enough to blow four bridges of the same size.

The bridge vanished in a deafening explosion that was so large, the ice-covered lake leaped briefly and cracked. The railway for the Germans was cut. Now Colby and his men had to reach their base, another 30-mile ski trip away. The Germans were looking for the raiders both with ground troops and in the air with spotter aircraft.

But immediately upon arriving, one of the men reported that a 50-man German patrol was hot on their heels. The OSS men had to keep going. Colby aimed for Sweden which was 40 miles ahead. Fresh of a 30-mile hike, they hiked and skied the next 40 in 56 hours, with Germans behind them, overhead in spotter aircraft and patrolling the terrain in front.

The men took Benzedrine, the little white tablets that kept them going, the pharmaceutical speed issued for just such an emergency. But they made it, and collapsed exhausted in the huts on top of a huge steep hill, that Colby nicknamed “Sugar Top” because of the tablets. The men finally rested after being on the move for over 72 hours.

Four days later, a Liberator appeared low over Jaevsjo Lake and dropped the supplies needed for the team: food, K-rations, cigarettes, soap, one-pound rail bombs, noncom’s outfits for five, lieutenant’s bars–and a case of canned Hawaiian pineapple which one of the group had specifically requested.

The team’s morale was sky-high after the successful operation. They rested, refitted, and planned follow-on operations. Their plan, after consulting with high-level members of the Norse underground was to seize the county of Lierne and form guerrilla units from the men inside the area.

All of Colby’s men had the OSS operational experience of doing the same thing in France, either with the Jedburgh teams or the Operational Groups. Normally a unit such as OSS or Special Forces would have to prove their worth militarily before the resistance groups would trust them enough to place their lives in OSS hands.

But the word in Norway was spreading like wildfire and the Norwegians, anxious to rid themselves of the oppressive Nazi yoke after five years were eager to join the fight. But with few spare arms and not enough equipment, those plans would have to wait. They skied back to the railway on the Swedish border and despite heavy German patrols in the area, blew the railway in four different spots.

They had a 50-mile trip back to their hut where all of the Norwegians were ordered elsewhere. With their food running out and the German noose tightening, one five-man enemy patrol stumbled on the camp. They were armed with MP-40s. Colby tried to talk them into surrendering, but all hell broke loose. The Germans were eliminated but one Norwegian courier was wounded. The OSS men improvised a litter and skied and dragged him 50 miles into Sweden.

Colby’s men then began recruiting a guerrilla force to conduct the Lierne operation and to protect the OSS men. The Germans were hot after them, especially as a result of the rail line blowing mission. But before Colby and the OSS men were able to put their plan into operation, the war ended. Everywhere the men went, they were treated like heroes and in each town, bands would play the Star Spangled Banner, which deeply touched the Americans. Colby’s after-action report reflected how quickly things changed.

“But the rest of this story is routine. We supervised the surrender and policed 10,000 Germans at Namsos, and we acted as honor guard for Crown Prince Olaf on his return to Trondheim and accompanied him in the parade in his honor on 10 June.”

Colby’s men were decorated for their valor on the mission and went on about their lives. He would leave the service briefly working as a lawyer for William Donovan’s (Commander and founder of the OSS), firm before getting bored with it and joining the CIA. He quickly rose through the ranks and was the Station Chief in Saigon during the Vietnam conflict and ran the controversial Phoenix Program. He eventually became the DCI as head of the agency under President Nixon.

Photo courtesy of US Army

USACAPOC dedicates new headquarters to fallen N.C. trooper

The US Army’s Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command is set to open a new headquarters on Ft. Bragg, NC and they will be naming it after one of their own who fell in combat.

Alan H. Newton was a North Carolina native who had a great love for his family and animals and was killed in Afghanistan in 2009. Now the command will honor his memory by naming their new HQs building, set to open soon after Newton.

The center is the future home of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. Officials expect to move into the new headquarters in the near future.
The $22-million facility was recently completed on Pratt Street, near the Fort Bragg Noncommissioned Officer Academy.
It will allow USACAPOC to consolidate its Fort Bragg facilities. The U.S. Army Reserve Command oversees more than 90 units in 34 states across the nation and Puerto Rico.
The command’s nearly 13,500 soldiers make up the vast majority of the nation’s conventional civil affairs, psychological operations and theater information operations soldiers.
Newton – a North Carolina native and soldier with USACAPOC’s Greensboro-based 422nd Civil Affairs Battalion – is one of 49 soldiers who have died in Iraq or Afghanistan while serving with the command.
In addition to dedicating the building for Newton, officials also unveiled a memorial stone featuring the names of all of the soldiers who have been killed while deployed with USACAPOC units. The command of Maj. Gen. Daniel R. Ammerman and Command Sgt. Maj. Peter Running also added a streamer denoting the unit’s Global War on Terror service to the USACAPOC colors.
Speaking to members of the Newton family, Ammerman said the fallen soldier was trying to “do good” when he and Capt. Benjamin A. Sklaver – another USACAPOC soldier – were killed by an Afghan police officer wearing a suicide vest on Oct. 2, 2009.
“That’s really what we all try to do,” Ammerman said.
He related how Newton – a 26-year-old who graduated from Southwestern Randolph High School in 2002 – joined the North Carolina National Guard in 2003.
When Newton learned his unit wasn’t set to deploy in the near future, he transferred to the Army Reserve and became a civil affairs specialist.

Newton’s parents were on-hand to dedicate the 111,000-square-foot headquarters, which will eventually replace an older building on Butner Road being used by the command.

To read the entire article from The Fayetteville Observer, click here:

Photo courtesy The Fayetteville Observer

Battle for Ben Het Special Forces A-Camp June 23,1969

Ben Het, was a U.S. Special Forces camp located 288 miles northeast of Saigon and six miles from the junction of the Cambodian, Laotian, and South Vietnamese borders, and on June 23, 1969, it was besieged and cut off by 3,000 North Vietnamese troops using artillery and mortars.

The base was defended by 250 U.S. soldiers and 450 South Vietnamese Montagnard (CIDG) Civilian Irregular Defense Group tribesmen. The siege lasted until July 2 when the defenders were reinforced by a South Vietnamese relief column and assisted by heavy B-52 strikes.

During the final years of the US involvement in Vietnam, the Special Forces held onto six A-Camps along South Vietnam’s mountainous western border in the Central Highlands. Bu Prang, Duc Lap, Duc Co, Dak Pek, Dak Seang and Ben Het. All of them would see intense action as each was besieged by the NVA, who did little to hide their intentions for the camps.

Ben Het, was situated with an airstrip on a barren mountaintop in the Central Highlands and was the westernmost of the camps. It was strategically important because it was located 7 miles east of the point where Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam conjoined. Ben Het was manned by a 12-man Special Forces A-team (A-244, Commanded by CPT Louis Kingsley) and some 200 Montagnard tribesmen forming a Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), along with their families.

In late February and early March, the camp placed anti-tank mines in the roads surrounding the camp in preparation for NVA armor. They were right. On March 3, the NVA launched almost 650 rounds of artillery on the camp. An NVA battalion from the 66^th NVA Regiment supported by 10 PT-76 tanks launched an attack on the west side of the base.

There was a CIDG company dug in with several US M-48 Patton tanks. The defense was organized by the A-team’s XO 1LT Michael D. Linnane, two other Green Berets and two other CIDG companies from Dak Pek (A-242) and Mang Buk (A-246).

The NVA tanks drove into the minefield and two were knocked out. Later during the battle, an American tank was hit and two crewmen killed. But the camp help and the NVA retreated with a MIKE Force unit (1st Bn. 2^nd Mobile Strike Force) came in to relieve the troops.

As the monsoon season of May and June fell upon the area, the camps at Ben Het and Dak To were again besieged by the 28^th and 66^th NVA Regiments from late May until 29 June. Mountain tops were often obscured under cloud cover and the terrain in the mountains surrounding Ben Het was very rugged with triple canopy jungle.

The roads were cut in several places and the NVA took up positions to fire on aircraft attempting to use the airstrip. Air resupply became a problem. Often, C-7 Caribous had to parachute their loads into the Special Forces camp. For any aircraft attempting to land, a full saturation of ground support aircraft was needed to silence the gauntlet of ground fire. First, the hills surrounding Ben Het were softened up by A-1 fighter-bombers trying to make the North Vietnamese gunners keep their heads down. A forward air controller supervised the Caribou’s approach, with a pair of F-4 Phantoms stacked up to react on his call to any anti-aircraft fire. Planes dropped smoke just before the C-7s lined up for their final approaches.

By late June with the battle imminent, the C-7s could no longer land to unload. Supplies had to be airdropped. Two hundred tons of supplies arrived this way between June 10 and the end of the battle.

On June 23, there was a serious probing attack that led to a three-hour firefight. One American was killed and a half-dozen more wounded. The NVA were estimated to have 1,500 to 2,000 troops in the immediate vicinity of the camp. They had dug trenches and tunnels under the north hill of the camp that went under all three barbed wire entanglements and reached the bunkers of the outer perimeter defenses.

The NVA used loudspeakers to attempt to get the CIDG to surrender. They broadcast messages in English and Vietnamese, then followed their message with a barrage of artillery and mortar shells. The U.S. countered with B-52 strike that dropped 340 tons of bombs on the area surrounding the camp.

The NVA was broadcasting that Ben Het was the “Dien Bien Phu” for the American soldiers. It was imperative that the roads to both Dak To and Kontum be reopened. The camp was running low on ammunition, especially illumination rounds. This was the first major test for the “Vietnamization” process for the US pulling out and the ARVN troops taking over the defense of their country.

The ARVN commander cleared the road around Dak To but asked for reinforcements. He was augmented by four infantry battalions with half of the armor available in II Corps. The US supported with a battery of 175mm guns along with a battalion of 105mm howitzers, a large amount of helicopter support as well as tactical air strikes and B-52 strikes.

This massive amount of firepower was brought to bear on the hills surrounding Ben Het and the once triple canopy jungle was stripped bare. But the NVA with their tunnels withstood the vast majority of it unscathed.

ARVN troops succeeded in getting a convoy over Road 512 from Dak To into Ben Het on June 24 but it took heavy fighting most of the way to do so. Just outside the A-Camp US engineers clearing mines were ambushed by the NVA, suffering heavy casualties. The ARVN escort column for the engineers fled at the first shot.

Another convoy trying to make it into the camp was badly shot up. On June 27^th, another valuable Mike Force company was tasked to air assault into the camp to help stem the tide. The NVA stepped up the artillery fire on the base dropping nearly 450 rounds into the camp wounding nine Americans. The Americans countered with 60 B-52s that delivered 1,800 tons of bombs.

With the eyes of many watching the ARVN troops in their first real test on their own, they poured troops in to stop the NVA. At the peak of the battle, there were seven ARVN battalions joining the two American-led Mike Force battalions totaling close to 4,000 troops.

ARVN troop convoys continued to move between Road 579 and 512 in the ensuing few days and the ARVN troops systematically cleared the areas around the camp of NVA. But they weren’t defeated although stopped at Ben Het. They faded back into jungle into Cambodia and in August, the same NVA regiments would then siege the SF A-camps at Bu Prang (A-236) and Duc Lap (A-239).

By July 2, the siege of Ben Het was declared over. The Ben Het camp was rebuilt by and reinforced by engineers and all of the bunkers strengthened.

Losses included one Green Beret killed and 16 wounded; one South Vietnamese Special Forces killed and seven others wounded; 15 ARVN soldiers killed and 70 wounded, and 52 CIDG strikers killed and 141 wounded. There were 23 civilians killed and 11 wounded. Casualties among the US artillerymen was high as well.

The end result was that the camp at Ben Het was powerless to stop the NVA from infiltrating from Cambodia along the Ho Chi Minh trail. The NVA were able to pin the CIDG strikers into the camp by siege and they weren’t able to affect the NVA as envisioned.

But the camp’s existence was a political victory, (one of the few), the camp and the SF defenders had defeated every attempt to push them out, even when the NVA brought tanks into the wire. While the US Special Forces, artillerymen and armor troops fought a heck of a fight, it showed that the South Vietnamese, the ARVN had a long way to go to being self-sufficient.

Below is a clip from the Stars and Stripes News from the battle on June 26.

B52s SATURATE BEN HET JUNGLES
*Stars and Stripes Thursday, June 26, 1969

SAIGON (UPI)– American B52 bombers unloaded hundreds of thousands of pounds on NVA Troops concentrations threatening the Allied Specials Forces camp at Ben Het, military spokesmen said Wednesday. The B52s struck in two raids Tuesday night and early Wednesday, dumping their bombs on targets in jungles about three miles south and two miles north of the Special Forces camp, 285 miles Northeast of Saigon. Reverberations from at least 180 tons of bombs rolled over the beleaguered outpost, which sits near the South Vietnam’s, Cambodian and Laotian borders.

Tuesday, Military spokesman reported Allied troops at the Special Forces Camp were resupplied by truck convoy but remained under pressure from NVA gunners. They said there had been continuing battles with NVA troops in the jungle. A spokesman reported that at least 183 NVA soldiers were killed around the outpost in a series of firefights on Monday.

A delayed report from a South Vietnamese spokesman said a government infantry battalion backed by U.S. air and artillery power killed 105 NVA troops Monday about three miles northeast of Ben Het. Most were killed by artillery. 12 U.S. Special Forces advisers, about 189 U. S. artillerymen and hundreds of South Vietnamese regulars and Civilian Defense Group (CIDG) forces occupied Ben Het.

A U.S. convoy guarded by Allied troops resupplied Ben Het from Dak To, Eight miles to the east along Route 512. NVA troops destroyed one of 11 trucks in the convoy and wounded two U.S. Army Engineers and 19 Government Soldiers along the way, but the ammunition-laden trucks got through to Ben Het

Photos Courtesy DOD

Remembering Navy SEAL Michael P. Murphy, Medal of Honor 6/28/2005

On June 28, 2005, Navy SEAL LT Michael P. Murphy would perform heroic actions that would result in his being awarded the Medal of Honor. It would also cost him his life in the process, in one of the bloodiest days in the history of the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the SEALs.

Murphy was killed in action while taking part in a kill or capture mission in Afghanistan during Operation Red Wings. He was a member of SEAL Delivery Team Vehicle Team ONE as the commander of Alpha Platoon and was deployed to Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Operation Red Wings was a counter-insurgency mission in Kunar Province, Afghanistan. The mission was for Murphy along with SEALs Danny Dietz, Matthew Axelson, and Marcus Luttrell to locate and then either kill or capture Afghan top resistance leader, Ahmad Shah (code name Ben Sharmak), who commanded a large group of insurgents west of Asadabad.

The follow-on missions of Operation Red Wings after the neutralization of the target and his insurgent group were for the US Marines in the area to pacify and improve the stability of the Afghan villages in the area.

The team was inserted by helicopter using a fast rope technique and covering the insertion near the border of Pakistan by conducting a series of false insertions to throw off any Taliban or insurgent forces in the area.

The crew chief of the MH-47 Chinook helicopter cut the fast rope away as soon as the SEALs inserted which would leave evidence of a US unit on the ground. Murphy and Axelson did their best to cover the rope with vegetation but the mission was off to an ominous start.

The mountainous area immediately posed problems with the team’s communications. The team had eschewed the more powerful and heavier PRC-117 radio for the lighter PRC-148 MBITR with a satellite link back to their headquarters.

The team moved to near the summit of Sawtalo Sar which offered them good observation of the village where the target was thought to be located but little cover and concealment. There just before dawn, a fog rolled in, obscuring their view. Murphy decided to find another site and he and Axelson went in search of one.

They returned and moved the team to the new site about 1000 yards away which offered better observation for the snipers but was even more exposed. Worse, there was only one way in and out and if compromised, the team would have to shoot its way out.

The team was in position when about noon, three Afghan goat herders with 100 goats wandered into the SEALs position. They were quickly rounded up and detained. The team sent a message back to their headquarters that they had been “soft compromised” which meant by civilians, not Taliban.

After a short discussion on their options, Murphy decided to cut them loose. “We gotta let them go,” he said according to Luttrell. Once the goat herders disappeared down the mountain, the SEALs gathered their gear and double-timed as quickly as possible back to their original position to continue the mission.

About two hours later the SEALs heard movement above and to the left of their position. Shah’s men had been alerted and were using the terrain to their advantage. He had a group of insurgents of around 40 men armed with AK-47s and RPGs.

With the Taliban closing only about 20 yards from their position, the SEALs opened fire. With superior numbers and the terrain at their advantage, the insurgents began to flank the vastly outnumbered SEAL team. Dietz had managed to alert Bagram air base that the team had been hard compromised by armed insurgents which set in motion a rescue force being alerted. But the team had no way of knowing if the message had gotten through.

The team was forced to retreat down a steep, rocky slope and they half-slid, half-fell down to a rocky ledge where they re-organized. Murphy had been shot in the abdomen, Dietz had his thumb shot off.

The fire from the insurgents increased and the team leaped to another rocky ledge 30 feet below. Dietz was shot two more times and was dead, and the SEALs were forced to leave him behind. Axelson was shot in the chest and the head.

Murphy knew that their situation was desperate, he took out his satellite phone but the signal was blocked. The only way he could make contact was to get out in the open in plain view of the insurgents. Knowing what was going to happen, he moved.

With bullets peppering the rocks around him, Murphy got through to Bagram. “My men are taking heavy fire. We’re getting picked apart. My guys are dying out here . . . we need help.”

Just then a bullet tore through his back and went out his chest, causing him to drop the phone. He picked it up and said, “Roger that, sir. Thank you.” Seconds later, in a position above Axelson and Luttrell, he was fatally wounded. An RPG explosion blew Luttrell down the slope and his last view of Axelson was him using his pistol.

The rescue force of two MH-47s carrying SEALs, Blackhawk helicopters and Apache gunships were on the way. But they ran into heavy gunfire. An RPG fired from an insurgent went right in the open rear compartment door of the MH-47 Chinook, causing it to crash into a ravine, killing all eight SEALs and eight aircrews from the 160^th Special Operations Aviation Regiment onboard. Operation Red Wings had become a disaster.

Luttrell was discovered by a friendly villager and following the centuries-old custom of Pashtunwali, the villager brought Luttrell suffering from numerous wounds to his village where he was protected from the Taliban under the Pashtun code of melmastia. One of the village elders brought a note from Luttrell to the nearest US base, a Marine encampment, describing his plight. A rescue force of US Army Rangers then rescued Luttrell, five days after the team initially began the mission on July 2.

On July 4, 2005, Murphy’s remains were found by a group of American soldiers during a combat search and rescue operation and returned to the United States. Nine days later, on July 13, Murphy was buried with full military honors at Calverton National Cemetery, Calverton, New York, Section 67, Grave No. 3710, less than 20 miles from his childhood home

Murphy’s parents were awarded his Medal of Honor by President George Bush on October 22, 2007. There have been numerous places and awards honoring the sacrifice of Murphy, but perhaps the best was a naming of a US Navy ship in his name. The Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer (DDG-112) was named the USS Michael Murphy.

Murphy’s heroism and self-sacrifice were portrayed in the films “Lone Survivor” and “Murph the Protector”.

Medal of Honor Citation: During his speech with Murphy’s parents in attendance, President Bush read Murphy’s Medal of Honor citation:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life and above and beyond the call of duty as the leader of a special reconnaissance element with Naval Special Warfare task unit Afghanistan on 27 and 28 June 2005.
While leading a mission to locate a high-level anti-coalition militia leader, Lieutenant Murphy demonstrated extraordinary heroism in the face of grave danger in the vicinity of Asadabad, Kunar Province, Afghanistan. On 28 June 2005, operating in an extremely rugged enemy-controlled area, Lieutenant Murphy’s team was discovered by anti-coalition militia sympathizers, who revealed their position to Taliban fighters. As a result, between 30 and 40 enemy fighters besieged his four-member team.

Demonstrating exceptional resolve, Lieutenant Murphy valiantly led his men in engaging the large enemy force. The ensuing fierce firefight resulted in numerous enemy casualties, as well as the wounding of all four members of the team. Ignoring his own wounds and demonstrating exceptional composure, Lieutenant Murphy continued to lead and encourage his men. When the primary communicator fell mortally wounded, Lieutenant Murphy repeatedly attempted to call for assistance for his beleaguered teammates. Realizing the impossibility of communicating in the extreme terrain, and in the face of almost certain death, he fought his way into open terrain to gain a better position to transmit a call.

This deliberate, heroic act deprived him of cover, exposing him to direct enemy fire. Finally achieving contact with his headquarters, Lieutenant Murphy maintained his exposed position while he provided his location and requested immediate support for his team. In his final act of bravery, he continued to engage the enemy until he was mortally wounded, gallantly giving his life for his country and for the cause of freedom. By his selfless leadership, Lieutenant Murphy reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

Photos courtesy of US Navy

Seventeen Rangers Added to Ranger Hall of Fame at Ft. Benning

An Army Ranger team leader who led a convoy during the fierce battle known as Black Hawk Down in Mogadishu, Somalia, who is now Columbus, GA chaplain is among 17 Rangers that were inducted Wednesday into the Ranger Hall of Fame at Fort Benning.

The Airborne and Ranger Training Brigade and the 75th Ranger Regiment hosted the annual event at Ft. Benning. After the ceremony, photos and citations of the inductees were displayed in the Ranger Hall of Fame at the Airborne and Ranger Training Brigade in Harmony Church.

The inductees to be honored are: Chaplain Jeffery D. Struecker, Sgt. Maj. Tyrone J. Adderly, Command Sgt. Maj. Frank G. Ashe, 1st Sgt. Herbert M. Baugh, 1st Sgt. Ronald W. Grenier, Master Sgt. Gilbert H. Howland, Staff Sgt. Ronnie N. Imel, Command Sgt. Maj. Richard C. Lamb, Maj. Larry D. Moores, Brig. Gen. James C. Nixon, U.S. Navy Lt. Thomas R. Norris, Master Sgt. Leroy A. Petry, 1st Sgt. Michael J. Ramsey, Sgt Maj. John W. Roy, Command Sgt. Maj. Charles W. Thompson, Lt. Gen. John R. Vines and Command Sgt. Maj. Matthew C. Walker.
The Hall of Fame has recognized the contributions of Rangers since 1992 by honoring and preserving the spirit of America’s finest soldiers. Representing and era of Ranger history, inductees are selected impartially from Ranger units and associations.
To become eligible for the nomination, each soldier must be a successful graduate of the U.S. Army Ranger School, be deceased, separated or retired from active-duty military service for at least three years and served in a Ranger unit in combat.
Struecker is now lead pastor at Cavalry Baptist Church in Columbus. As a 24-year-old sergeant, he was a squad leader assigned to Task Force Ranger in 1993 as part of the 75th Ranger Regiment. While facing intense fire in the Battle of Mogadishu, Struecker led the three-vehicle convoy back to the base with wounded Ranger Pvt. Todd Blackburn.

“Ranger School was an introduction into manhood and a rite of passage”, said Adderly, who was personally awarded the Distinguished Service Cross by then President Richard Nixon. Adderly a Green Beret participated in the Son Tay Raid to rescue American Prisoners of War in North Vietnam. It is listed as one of the 10 greatest raids in military history.

“At Ranger School, I came to understand fully what maximum effort is about,” Adderly said. “Either you want to be or you don’t want to be.”

To read the entire article from Ledger-Enquirer, click here:

Photo courtesy US Army

Special Operations Forces Strategic Success Takes Total Effort

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of SOFREP.com nor of any agency of the U.S. government.

Recently I’ve been reading some articles about the United States Special Operations Forces and their lack of strategic successes as the authors spin their own yarns in trying to tell the story. While certainly entertaining, and no doubt bolstered by countless FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) requests, the results are myopic and in many cases, just not true.

But first, to get the cat out of the bag, Special Operations Forces are not a panacea for every security issue facing the country. Yes, it is true. The USSOCOM Commander said so himself at the recent SOFIC (Special Operations Forces Industry Conference) about six weeks ago in Tampa.

The use of Special Operations Forces (SOF) itself, “by, with, and through” indigenous allies are always limited by the need to manage the interests of all parties involved. That takes a total effort by the US. Military, political and economic elements all have to be working in concert for strategic success of any kind to be realized.

SOF success, strategic success, relies on a total commitment to US policy, not just the deployment of Navy SEALs or Green Berets to advise the local military or police units in the country. And no one understands this more than SOF. SOF Truths were published when the command was in its infancy and one those reads. “Most Special Operations will require non-SOF Support.”

But to say that there have been no strategic successes ignores the truth. El Salvador was a country on the brink in the early 1980s. The FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) controlled vast areas of the Morazán and Chalatenango Departments of the country during the civil war.

The US, fresh off of the Vietnam experience, limited the SOF to just 55 permanent advisors for the military although other SOF units could enter the country on very short TDY (Temporary Duty) deployments. After the FMLN’s failed attempt at overthrowing the government during a 1989 offensive designed to take the capital of San Salvador, the US’ initiative at finding a peaceful solution worked. The FMLN was forced to negotiate a peace treaty and a deal was struck just three years later.

The US helped rebuild a shattered US economy and the US Ambassadors to the country deserve a tremendous amount of credit in negotiating a very tricky situation there.

The successful Salvadoran example also helped stabilize and secure what was a shaky Honduran government of the time. They were dealing with a latent insurgency of its own that was brewing just under the surface. And US SOF involvement with a solid political and economic effort was enough to stop it in its tracks.

Colombia was another nation in chaos in the 1980s and 1990s. Civil war with the FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, along with narco-terrorism rampant in the streets, had the Colombian government also teetering on the edge of collapse.

The US government sunk billions of dollars into the military and police as well as the infrastructure to the country. It was a long drawn out civil war there but the government was ultimately successful. The FARC laid down their arms and have disarmed themselves.

As for the illegal drug trade? SOF troops have been involved for over 30 years with the Colombian (and other nations) forces trying to eradicate the production of illegal drugs (Cocaine) in the country. It is a tricky proposition as the growing of coca plant in many areas of the Andean Ridge countries (Colombian, Bolivia, and Peru) is not illegal as there is a legitimate market for the crop. Finding the illegal precursor chemicals that are used in the production of cocaine as well as the illegal drug labs was a difficult proposition as anyone who ever worked in the jungles there will attest.

While one can argue the success or failure of the policies governing the eradication programs, they’ve certainly done their jobs in helping the Colombians in taking down countless illegal drug labs that dotted the landscape.

It was with amusement I read that in the same article that drug use in the United States, particularly cocaine is rising. As if the SOF operators were at fault for the people of the US wanting to use that and other illegal drugs. That is a failure at home and has zero to do with the troops trying to stop the flow. A common complaint among the Colombians during the 1990s was as true then as it is now.

“You say WE don’t do enough to stop the flow of cocaine to your country,” a Colombian general told me in Bogota. “And yet most of the cocaine from Colombia goes straight to the United States. I watched the Mayor of Washington D.C. smoke cocaine (crack) with a hooker on CNN. You people need to get your own house in order.”

And it was true. Blaming rising drug use on SOF’s lack of success in eradicating all of the drug labs is laughable. As long as there is a demand on the streets of the US, someone will take the place of every Colombian drug lord. And now the illegal drug use of choice has swung back to heroin and opiates. These are issues which need to be solved at home by Washington and not by SOF operators.

Another strategic success was in Peru. During the 1980s the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrillas controlled vast areas of the southern and central areas of Peru, especially in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Under the command of leader Abimael Guzman (aka Comrade Gonzalo) they waged a brutal civil war that took an enormous toll on the civilians.

Through a long and concerted effort by SOF, the Peruvian SOF units were able to capture or kill most of the Sendero Luminoso leadership, including Guzman in 1992. In this case, the loss of their senior leaders caused the fracture and disintegration of the organization. They are no longer a viable threat to the country and have been nearly totally defeated.

Likewise, the SOF operations in the Philippines with low-visibility and total government cooperation took 13 years to see success. Now, the government of the Philippines is facing a new threat with the Islamic State terrorists and the use of foreign fighters. The threat is being addressed with US support.

The threat in Afghanistan is more of a political failure at the policy level in Washington than that of the SOF operators that continue to put themselves in harm’s way. The country removed the Taliban from power with just a handful of SOF and CIA personnel along with US air support. But just as with the earlier failed US involvement with the mujahideen and the efforts of US Congressman Charlie Wilson, the US quickly tired of it and left. Wilson stated after the US helped oust the Russians and then lacked the foresight to see it thru, “These things happened. They were glorious and they changed the world… and then we fucked up the end game.”

Therein lies the crux of the issue. Patience and the ability to see things through even when US control is not what it could be has always been the major failure of US foreign policy. We as a people want a solution, today, right now, yesterday to the problems facing the country.

As a result, Washington has grown increasingly in love with its SOF units as if they can magically transform all of the problems in one swing of the axe. Then they grow frustrated by the limitations that SOF has. While SOF will generate the tactical and operational successes on the battlefield, the overall strategic success requires that our leaders in Washington be educated on what SOF can, should, and should not be doing.

America’s SOF units are doing tremendous work in all corners of the globe. Strategic success will come from a combined effort however and not just from our operators. And you don’t need a FOIA request to see that.

Photos courtesy DOD

Roger Donlon Awarded Medal of Honor, Nam Dong, July 6, 1964

In 1964, the United States wasn’t yet fully immersed in Vietnam and our commitment at that time were just advisors. Roger Donlon was the Commander of A-726, a Special Forces A-Team from the 7^th Special Forces Group. His team was placed in Nam Dong, a strategically placed village 30 miles west of Da Nang and 15 miles east of the Laotian border.

Donlon’s actions during a two-day battle July 5-6, 1964 would ultimately result in him being awarded the Medal of Honor. He was the first US soldier to be awarded it during the Vietnam War. There were also two Distinguished Crosses awarded as well as four Silver Stars and five Bronze Stars to the team members. Nine team members were awarded the Purple Heart.

A-726 at Ft. Bragg before deploying to Vietnam.

Later, in 1968, the John Wayne film, “The Green Berets” had a scene where a Special Forces A-Camp (A-107) was sieged by the Viet Cong. It was loosely based on the battle at Camp Nam Dong.

The camp was on a major infiltration route for the North Vietnamese along the Ho Chi Minh trail, located on a finger of terrain that extended from Laos. Donlon’s team consisted of 12 Americans, an Australian Warrant Officer Kevin Conway and an American anthropologist, Gerald Hickey who was studying Vietnam’s indigenous tribes. The Green Berets were assigned to train and advise 311 Katu Tribesman along with a South Vietnamese SF team and 60 Nung (ethnic Chinese) mercenaries at the camp.

Nam Dong was situated on a rise in a valley and encompassed about 5 acres of territory. The Green Berets and their trusted Nung mercenaries would control the inner compound while the South Vietnamese would protect the outer compound with the tribesmen who were broken down into three strike force companies.

Donlon’s team had been in-country only about a month but they already suspected that many of Vietnamese strikers and army troops were Viet Cong (VC) sympathizers. Later, it was revealed that nearly a third were VC.

Donlon and the team sensed what was coming. A three-day patrol returned with the news that the VC had executed two village chiefs that had been friendly with the Americans. Throughout that Sunday afternoon, tension ran high in the basecamp, culminating in a confrontation between members of the Vietnamese strike force and the Nungs, ethnic Chinese mercenaries who served as bodyguards for the members of Special Forces in South Vietnam. Donlon later said that the confrontation was started by VC sympathizers inside the camp’s strike force.

Captain Roger Donlon at Nam Dong before the battle

SSG Merwin Woods was writing a letter home to his wife before going to bed on the night of the July 5^th. “All hell is going to break loose here before the night is over,” he wrote. He was right.

Donlon was checking the camp’s defenses at 0230 and getting ready to relieve Conway who had been on duty. As he reached the door of the mess hall to get some coffee, the roof exploded in a blinding flash. VC mortar gunners had expertly targeted the mess hall and the command post with white phosphorous rounds. The fires were a beacon for VC incoming fire to pepper the camp.

VC mortar fire peppered the camp, the camp dispensary was hit but the medic, SGT Thomas Gregg made it safely with his pump-action shotgun. He blasted three VC who tried rushing in from the gate area.

Many of the Vietnamese were VC sympathizers including the South Vietnamese camp commander and the Intelligence Officer. Many in the strike force killed their Vietnamese counterparts while they slept or once the battle commenced.

The team’s radio operator, SSG Keith Daniels was radioing Da Nang when the Commo Bunker was hit. “They had superb planning,” Donlon said after the battle. Machinegun fire and grenades raked the camp as 800 VC of a reinforced battalion were beginning to assault the camp.

Donlon and MSG Gabriel “Pop” Alamo were trying to douse the fires while retrieving weapons and ammo from the command post. Alamo was burned badly but quickly joined SSG Ray Whitsell and SGT Michael Disser at their 81mm mortar pit near the main gate. It was one of three mortar positions, along with two 60mm mortar pits, ringing the inner perimeter. Disser was firing illuminating rounds that revealed hundreds of VC swarming through the outer perimeter.

“It was the most frightening sight of my life,” Disser was quoted in the book “Vietnam Medal of Honor Heroes.”

That is when Conway was killed. He was bounding down the steps of the mortar pit slowly in an effort to bolster the confidence of the young SF troops when he took a shot between the eyes. He lingered for a half-hour unconscious but died despite being given what little first aid was available. He was the first Australian soldier to die in Vietnam.

SGT John Houston saw more Viet Cong inside the inner perimeter and rushed to meet them headlong. He was behind a berm where a new command post was to be put in. The SF troops called it “The Pool.” Donlon was going to help him when he was hit by shrapnel from a mortar round. The blast took off all of his equipment, leaving him with no boots and just his AR-15. He was wounded in three places.

The youngest member of the team, Houston dueled with VC troops lobbing grenades at him for over two hours before his ammunition began to run out. He still refused to leave his position telling other soldiers to throw him ammo. He was then mortally wounded by the enemy that continued to advance.

In the mortar pit, the tube was glowing red-hot from the constant use of shells and illumination rounds that were being fired. Pop Alamo with an AR-15 and 1LT Jay Olejniczak, the XO of the team with an M-79 grenade launcher also kept up a steady rate of fire.

Alamo saw the VC attempting to breach the main gate. He rushed from the pit under heavy automatic weapons fire and bolstered the defense there, despite suffering a serious wound. The team’s situation was rapidly becoming untenable.

Donlon and Alamo covered the rest of the men in the pit as Donlon ordered them back to a safer position in a ditch. When it was their turn to leave, Donlon helped Alamo to his feet just as a VC mortar round hit the edge of the pit. The blast killed Alamo and wounded Donlon a fourth time. He had wounds to his face, arm, leg, and a quarter-sized hole in his stomach. His fingers were numb but it didn’t stop him from carrying the 60mm mortar and ammunition back to the men in the ditch.

He made three trips while treating the Nungs who were badly wounded and distributing ammunition and rallying the men. Donlon was seemingly everywhere. He made his way to SSG Woods who manned the other 81mm mortar pit. Woods was nearly knee deep in brass and empty ammunition tubes. He was wounded in his feet and had a perforated eardrum.

At just after 0400, Donlon heard the drone of an approaching aircraft which would drop flares and then the airstrikes would follow. He expected the VC to make a final all-out attempt to take the camp. Then the unexpected happened.

The team heard a voice shouting something in Vietnamese over a megaphone. The sound echoed in the darkness, and for a moment both sides stopped firing. “What’s he saying?” the Americans asked their interpreters.

The Vietnamese interpreter was visibly shaken by the words that the voice was shouting. “He say lay down weapons. V.C. going to take camp and we all be killed.”

After a pause, the voice shouted over the loudspeaker again, this time in English. “Lay down your weapons! We are going to annihilate your camp, you will all be killed!”

In the mortar pit, SGT Brown feverishly started dialing the knobs of the mortar tube trying to pinpoint where the sound of the loudspeaker came from. He dropped 10 rounds in succession. Enemy machine guns answered, but the loudspeaker had been silenced.

“In my mind’s eye, I see Brownie’s mortar rounds dropping directly down that megaphone,” Donlon said in an interview in 2003.

The arrival of air support turned the tide. VC fire began to dwindle. At 0600 Donlon finally was able to reach SSG Beeson’s position. He’d been firing his mortar all night long with his Nungs keeping him supplied with ammo. No one else on the team had been able to reach him. But the sight of his commander, now wounded all over his body, shocked the NCO. It was then, only because Beeson had to threaten Donlon that he’d knock him down, that the Captain allowed his own wounds to be treated.

By 0700, the VC withdrew. They left behind 154 dead and probably carried many more away. Then the wounded were treated and withdrawn from the shattered camp. Two Americans, Alamo and Houston were killed as was their Australian counterpart Conway. Nine more were wounded.

Both Alamo and Houston had pregnant wives waiting at home in Ft. Bragg. Upon hearing about his death, Alamo’s wife had a miscarriage. Houston’s wife gave birth to twins. One died at birth. The other, Houston’s son has stayed in close contact with Donlon thru the years.

On December 5, 1964, all ten surviving members of Detachment A-726 were in attendance at the White House where President Lyndon Johnson presented Captain Roger H.C. Donlon with the Medal of Honor. It was the first of 248 such awards to be presented for heroism during the War in Vietnam. And one of 18 Medals of Honor bestowed upon the Green Berets during the war.

Donlon’s portrait hangs in the Special Warfare Center’s Hall of Heroes.

Alamo and Houston were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross posthumously for their bravery, while Olejniczak, Brown, Disser and Terrin received Silver Stars. Bronze Stars for Valor were awarded to Beeson, Daniels, Gregg, Whitsell, and Woods. Nine of the twelve A-Team members received Purple Hearts.

Donlon later commanded the 3^rd Bn. 7^th Special Forces Group in Panama and retired as a Colonel. He and his wife live in Kansas.

Photos courtesy US Army

Opinion: Even “Quiet Professionals” Need to Tell Their Stories

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are strictly those of the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of SOFREP.com nor any of the writers and editors that work for it.

I had an interesting conversation the other day with someone I know and it broached the uncomfortable and difficult subject of whether Special Operations Forces should be writing books about their exploits.

It is uncomfortable because many Special Operations professionals live by the code of the “Quiet Professionals” which means that the A-Team guys, SEAL Platoons, Rangers, Raiders, CCTs, and Delta boys, who we now all lump together as “operators” should not seek self-promotion or recognition for the services that they provided for our country.

The conversation (and for the record, none of the other participants were Special Operations) got into the realm of OPSEC and putting the lives of active duty troops at risk. And in that aspect, we are in total agreement, never should anyone’s lives be risked over the publication of a book or magazine.

The government came down hard on Mark Bissonnette who penned the book, “No Easy Day” under the pen name of Mark Owen because he broke a confidentiality agreement that he signed off on concerning the raid that killed Osama bin Laden. As a result, Bissonnette was largely shunned by the Navy SEAL community.

The Navy granted Marcus Luttrell a leave of absence to write “Lone Survivor” which was later made into a film with Mark Wahlberg. Which kind of went against the grain of what the Navy did sending a memo to its Special Warfare members telling them not to advertise their exploits. But that is another subject.

But Luttrell’s story needed to be told. His survival was one of those hard to believe true stories. And the difficult decisions that our troops must make on a daily basis in the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and countless other hot spots around the globe. Lt. Michael Murphy’s self-sacrifice for his teammates may have been a footnote in a history book somewhere, someday.

And unlike Bissonnette’s story, Robert O’Neill’s “The Operator” was submitted to the Pentagon for vetting, which they did. They edited out some parts of the book which were deemed to cross the line in revealing tactics and/or methods. But once again, if no confidentiality agreement was broken and the book didn’t threaten any security of active duty personnel, then it is a story that should be told.

Listening to a recent radio podcast with O’Neill, it was obvious that he isn’t bent on a mission of self-aggrandizement, but was telling his side of a story that was much bigger than anyone involved. Despite how he’s been portrayed in much of social media, his words were more of a celebration of those around him than himself.

The world was full of bin Laden stories since 2011 and he was the most wanted man in the world. And the story of the operation to get him was one that needed to be told. The American public needed to hear as much of the story as was allowed thru security protocols. Similar questions have been raised about other books such as “13 Hours” and “American Sniper” among others.

And there is this… there are no rules, other than confidentiality agreements for Special Operations veterans in the media other than the bushido that their services follow. Many Special Forces veterans of Vietnam wrote books after their careers were over.

Sometimes our own government sends mixed signals. While they went after Bissonnette and have actively frowned on others for going public, the government went out of their way to aid in the production of the film “Zero Dark Thirty” which depicted the mission to kill bin Laden.

And the Navy let filmmakers use active duty SEALs in the action film “Act of Valor” which was essentially a propaganda, recruiting vehicle to attract young men to enlist in Naval Special Warfare. Is this wrong? One can point at several WWII films, that were of the same vein that the Pentagon gave tremendous support to make.

The Navy was right in telling the active duty SEALs to limit their exposure in the media or on film. And that should go for all of the services as well. But once their days of serving are done, where is the line drawn that says this much is okay, but anything more is not?

The public has always had an insatiable appetite for tales of derring-do from her warriors. It provides an outlet for the veteran to tell their stories. We always hear and lament the loss of our WWII generation and so many stories that go untold. I point those who argue against this to the story of my own father. A battle he was involved with and one I didn’t know anything about until after he died.

As long as no rules of Operational Security (OPSEC) are broken nor any specific confidentiality agreements, then let the men and women tell their stories. Even the “Quiet Professionals” in Special Operations.

This is something that the individual services including USSOCOM should encourage a dialog among the troops who are both active and retired. Why? Because a lot of guys perspective will change once they are retired.

Fighting among each other especially on social media doesn’t do the services any favors. But many Special Operations troops have a story to tell. And they should be told

Photos Courtesy DOD

This article was originally published on SpecialOperations.com and written by STEVE BALESTRIERI

MARSOC Critical Skills Operators Worthy of Their WWII Lineage

The Marine Corps hadn’t had a Special Operations unit since World War II, but all of that changed in 2003 when on June of that year, the Marine Corp and USSOCOM formed Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment One (MCSOCOM Det 1) to explore unit level Marine Corps participation in USSOCOM. Prior to this, Marine Corps brass were vocal against an “elite within an elite” as they considered all Marine Corps units elite.

MCSOCOM Det One deployed with a Naval Special Warfare unit in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2004.

After the deployment, the Marine Corps contributions were studied, and in October 2005, the Secretary of Defense directed the formation of a Marine component of U.S. Special Operations Command. It was determined the Marine Corps would initially form a unit of approximately 2,500 to serve within the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community.

On Feb. 24, 2006, MARSOC was activated at Camp Lejeune, N.C. MARSOC initially consisted of a small headquarters staff and a battalion level unit which had been formed to train, advise, and assist partner nation militaries by conducting the mission of Foreign Internal Defense.

Just a couple of years ago, the MARSOC Operators decided to choose the name “Raiders” to celebrate their lineage and unconventional nature of their mission. The Raiders were back in the Corps after a long hiatus.

The Marine Raiders from World War II were only active for about 2 years between 1942 until they were officially disbanded in 1944. But they had an impressive combat record and gave the Japanese a taste of their own medicine during battles in the Solomon Islands. The modern MARSOC Special Operations draws its lineage from these Raider battalions. Perhaps the best example of a Marine Special Operations officer was Major Evans F. Carlson.

Carlson was a maverick who was an intelligence officer in China, had fought guerrillas in Nicaragua and spoken out publicly about the plight of the Chinese. When given command of the Marine 2^nd Raider Bn., he broke ranks with many of the traditional ways of doing things and operated in an entirely unconventional manner.

Every man regardless of rank would have a say in things and were expected to say what they thought. Their motto became the Chinese term “Gung-ho” which means “work together.”

Carlson was brilliantly innovative. He implemented an important change to the Raider organization where instead of the usual eight-man squad, he created a 10-man unit composed of a squad leader and three fire teams of three men each. Each fire team had good firepower with a Thompson submachine gun, a Browning automatic rifle (BAR), and a rifleman with the Garand M-1 semiautomatic rifles.

He was building an unconventional warfare unit that could operate as he envisioned like a guerrilla unit. He set up a training program that leaned heavily on long-range movement, weapons and demolitions training, hand-to-hand combat, and physical conditioning.

Today’s Raiders are even better trained than their counterparts. Once a Marine has three years of service, he or she can volunteer for the Raiders of MARSOC.

Like other Special Operations Forces, the Marines are looking for self-starters, operators with the initiative who will always seek to improve themselves. Team players who will seek the knowledge of others to make the unit much more proficient.

For Marines designated as Critical Skills Operators (CSO) with the MOS 0372, for officers 0370, they must first pass Assessment and Selection (A&S). A&S is a 21 day mentally and physically challenging evaluation. The first phase starts with a Physical Fitness Test, or PFT, a swim and an 8-mile rucksack march. It ends with another PFT, an abandon ship drill, 300-meter swim in fatigues with no boots, 11 minutes of treading water and a 12-mile rucksack march in under three hours with a 45-pound ruck.

Those Marines that successfully complete A&S attend the MARSOC Individual Training Course (ITC). Much of it is like the other Selection and Assessment courses run by the other services. It places a high premium on a candidate’s physical fitness and the ability to think on his feet while tired and under a great deal of stress.

ITC is a physically and mentally challenging course designed to provide MARSOC Raiders with a basic foundation of essential special operations skills. Some of the skills taught in the course include SERE, Medical, Communications, Small unit tactics (SMU), Amphibious Training, Special Reconnaissance, Close-Quarters Battle (CQB), Urban Combat, Combat marksmanship and Irregular Warfare.

Training and educating the Raiders does not end with ITC. Operators will continue training once assigned to their designated unit. All MARSOC Marines are required to undergo continual language training, with designated Marines attending follow-on language training at an Advanced Linguist Course.

MARSOC Marine Raiders also attend advanced-level courses in a number of subject areas such as Airborne and Static Line Jumpmaster, Military Free Fall and HALO Jumpmaster, Sniper, Breaching, and Weapons Employment as well as many others. A total of 85 Advanced Training courses are available to the MARSOC Raiders in their operational units.

The basic operating is a 14-man team consisting of 1 Officer, 4-6 Senior NCOs, 4-6 Sergeants and 2 Navy Corpsmen. The team is broken down by an HQ element and two Tactical Elements. The HQ Element is comprised of a Captain Team Leader, Master Sergeant Team Chief, Gunnery Sergeant Operations Chief, and a Staff Sergeant Assistant Operations Chief.

The two Tactical Elements consist of 4 Marines and a Navy Corpsman. The team can function as one unit or split into two smaller tactical ones. The MARSOC Raiders have conducted Direct Action, Foreign Internal Defense, Special Reconnaissance, Counter-Insurgency, Security Force Assistance, and preparation of the environment missions in over 40 countries since their inception just over a decade ago.

They are still Marines first and Special Operators next but with the changes making them a permanent part of the Marine Corps, they now have the MOS to stay in Special Operations for the remainder of their careers. It makes for a better unit with superior operators with better training. Major Carlson would approve.

Photos Courtesy US Marine Corps

Former Green Beret Medic Still Making a Difference

As a former Special Forces soldier, sometimes you never see the final results of the hard work and sacrifice that you put into a mission. For Phil Melcher, a former medic in the 7^th Special Forces Group, he met the results of a life-saving operation face-to-face.

Melcher had served all over Latin America but found himself in a very difficult dilemma while serving in Colombia. But as SF medics have done for the past 65 years, he found a way to save two lives and got a nice surprise much later.

Melcher, an Army Green Beret, was serving in the South American country when he was woken up at 2 a.m. to deliver a baby. When he got to the mother, the umbilical cord was wrapped around the baby’s neck. With no hospitals or modern technology available, Melcher had to perform the high-risk delivery without any help.
“When I delivered the child he wasn’t breathing,” Melcher said. “I had to resuscitate the baby and start CPR. After 45 seconds of CPR, the baby started coughing and screaming and spitting in my face. I was more excited about getting baby spit on me than at any other time in my life.”
Eight years later, Melcher was coming out of a commissary when a young boy ran into him. The boy’s mother yelled at the boy in Spanish, “Phillip, what are you doing?”
“And I looked and it was the mom and it was the kid,” Melcher said. “And I looked at her and she looked at me and we both started to cry and I’m like, ‘you named him after me?’ And she said yes, that she’s always told him about the man that helped him.”
He delivered 32 kids in some pretty extreme conditions. One of the other deliveries came to an indigenous tribe in Bolivia, where the baby was literally born on the jungle floor.
“I was a medic in the Special Forces before I became an operations and intel guy,” Melcher said. “In Special Forces you’re always a shooter first and you’re specialty is kind of a secondary thing, but you do whatever you need to do. Whenever a team goes into deployment, there are no doctors there. You’re the doctor.”
“The Special Forces medical course is unlike any other kind of medical training. It’s basically a cut down version of medical and physician’s assistant. You receive dentistry and animal husbandry training. It’s literally everything rolled up into one because you have to operate in any environment.”
Green Berets have to be as intelligent as they are physical. Melcher speaks three languages, helping him to fit into many cultures to operate seamlessly.
Melcher’s unit was assigned to Central and South America. His unit performed various peacekeeping operations, especially between Ecuador and Peru over Amazon River access. It also performed counter-narcotics operations, working against Pablo Escobar’s cartel.

Today he’s the Director of Security for the St. Louis Cardinals baseball team. “I have to make sure I’ve got everything scheduled right, making sure staffing and secondary support from city police is adequate at each game,” he said. “I make sure there are security checks around the stadium.”

And Melcher teaches Cyber Security as an Adjunct Professor at Webster University.

To read the entire article from St. Louis Today, click here:

Photo courtesy Phil Melcher